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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the conceptual origins of the control of the air in Britain 
between 1911 and 1918. It concludes that military and naval aviators possessed an 
innate understanding of the concept, informed by the wider operational and 
organisational context of their respective parent services. For the Royal Flying 
Corps, the control of the air was understood in terms of providing auxiliary support to 
the British Army in the field. For the Royal Naval Air Service, the concept possessed 
an inherently strategic slant. Pre-war theorising, developed during the First World 
War, has been the subject of some controversy in the literature. The overtly tactical 
focus of the Royal Flying Corps and its concept of the control of the air, praised in 
the first instance, is now widely criticised. In contrast, naval aviators, highlighted as 
lacking focus and direction, are now hailed as progressive innovators. By examining 
various facets affecting the conceptual origins of the control of the air, including 
doctrine, education, and relations with allies, this thesis attempts to reinvigorate the 
traditional interpretation of military and naval air power in Britain during this period. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores the conceptual origins of the control of the air, setting its 
examination in the context of the development of British military and naval aviation 
between 1911 and 1918. It is by examining these contexts that the thesis seeks to 
illuminate the factors that affected how military and naval aviators came to think 
about the control of airspace. This introductory chapter addresses several points: 
first, it will provide some background relating to the control of the air, offering a 
definition of the concept and justifying the use of modern terminology. Whilst a 
proactive attempt has been made to avoid the use of inherently technical language, 
the term 'doctrine,' used throughout the thesis, is also briefly defined. This will lead 
into a discussion of the general and specific literature relevant to the thesis, which, in 
turn, will be used to draw out the general and specific research questions that this 
thesis will seek to answer. After establishing the parameters and structure of the 
thesis, the chapter will conclude with a brief exploration of the archival foundations 
upon which the thesis is constructed. 
 
Background 
 
Air forces and academics agree that the notion of controlling airspace is at least one, 
if not the most important, of the central functions of air power. The Royal Air Force 
2 
 
(RAF) observes that '[s]ecuring control of the air is the RAF's paramount duty.'1 RAF 
doctrine states that the control of airspace is the first of four fundamental air (and 
space) power roles:  
 
[the control of the air] has doctrinal primacy because it enables freedom of 
manoeuvre in all of the Service environments: air, land and maritime. 
Control of the air provides commanders with the ability to retain the 
initiative while denying it to the enemy, and although military operations 
may be attempted without it, success may be fatally compromised 
beneath contested airspace.2  
 
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) supports this position, noting that the ability 
to exploit the medium of the air is considered to be the 'prerequisite for the conduct 
of all other operations to achieve campaign objectives,' and the control of airspace is 
an axiomatic priority amongst many air forces of the world.3 These air forces include 
those of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the aerial forces that are 
available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).4 As with air forces, 
academics recognise the axiomatic quality of controlling airspace. Richard Hallion, a 
former chief historian of the United States Air Force (USAF), has referred to the 
                                            
1
 Royal Air Force (RAF) Website,  
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafoperationalupdate/opsupdate/controloftheair.cfm. Accessed, 21 Mar 2013.  
2
 Ministry of Defence (MoD), British Air and Space Power Doctrine: AP3000, Fourth Edition (London: 
MoD, 2009), pp.37 – 38.  
3
 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), Australian Air Publication AAP 1000-D: The Air Power Manual, 
Fifth Edition (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2008), p.139. 
4
 United States Air Force (USAF), Counterair Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-01, Interim 
Change 2 (Maxwell, AL.: Centre for Doctrine Development and Education, 2011), pp.2 – 5; North 
Atlantic Treat Organisation (NATO), Three Air Power Considerations within a Comprehensive 
Approach (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2010), p.15; Office of the President 
of the Russian Federation, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Moscow: Website of the 
President of the Russian Federation, 2010), p.6. Translated version available via the website of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
Accessed, 15 Sep 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf. 
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control of airspace as an 'enduring requirement,' and continues to write of the 
importance of the concept.5  
 
As a concept, the ability to control airspace has a long heritage, and it is the 
conceptual origins of this heritage that are examined in this thesis. This is achieved 
via an exploration of the development of military and naval aviation in Britain 
between 1911 and 1918. Given the somewhat cautious attitude of the British 
government toward aviation in the era preceding the First World War, it is telling that, 
by the conclusion of the conflict, great significance was attached to air power and its 
ability to control airspace. As RAF doctrine has stated,  
 
By the end of the World War I ... the need to achieve control of the air was 
recognised as an important aim in its own right.6 
 
For example, by 1917, the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF) greatest set-piece 
enterprise of the First World War, the Third Battle of Ypres, hinged, at least in part, 
upon the Royal Flying Corps's (RFC) ability to establish the control of the air.7 Such 
conclusions are supported by Morrow, who argues that 
 
Control of the airspace over the battlefield became essential to victory in 
World War I, just as it would twenty years later in the next world war.8 
 
                                            
5
 R. Hallion, The Control of the Air: The Enduring Requirement (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History 
and Museums Program, 1999); R. Hallion, 'Air and Space Power: Climbing and Accelerating' in A 
History of Air Warfare, ed., J. A. Olsen (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), pp.379 – 380. 
6
 MoD, Air Power Doctrine: AP3000, Second Edition (London: MoD, 1993), p.40. 
7
 G. Sheffield & J. Bourne, eds., Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters, 1914 – 1918 (London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), Haig Diary, 7 Jul 1917, p.302. 
8
 J. H. Morrow, 'The First World War, 1914 – 1919,' in A History of Air Warfare, ed., J. A. Olsen 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), p.24. 
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The same could be said of the naval context, and the senior operational 
commanders of the Royal Navy (RN), Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, 
continued to press the Admiralty to ensure that the Grand Fleet was able to control 
the airspace around their ships. For example, Beatty wrote in 1917 that 
 
No naval operation should be complete without the co-operation of aircraft 
... [emphasis in original].9 
 
In many respects, the birth of the RAF in 1918, the world's first independent air force, 
was driven by considerations relating to the control of the air. However, when writing 
of the importance of air power in the aftermath of the Second World War, Churchill 
was to argue that  
 
Air-power [sic] is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure, 
or even express in precise terms [emphasis added].10 
 
Thus, in the first instance, it is important to explore and, where appropriate, define 
the technical terms used throughout this thesis.  
 
Understanding and Defining Doctrine 
 
For some, 'doctrine is nothing more than a whole group of words,' but this thesis 
makes use of the term, arguing that it represents something much more than the 
                                            
9
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, Vol. I, 1908 – 1918 (London: Navy 
Records Society, Vol. 113, 1969), p.497. Letter, Beatty to Geddes (First Lord), 12 Aug 1917. 
10
 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol.I: The Gathering Storm (London: Folio Society, 2000) 
[1948, revised 1949], pp.87 – 88. 
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traditional definition of 'that which is taught.'11 The current definition accepted by 
Britain's armed forces comes from NATO, which defines doctrine as the  
 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in 
application.12 
 
In discussing the nature of doctrine, Parton suggested that  
 
doctrine can most usefully be thought of as representing a nexus between 
the past, present and future ... However, doctrine can also represent 
something deeper than simply the results of analysis; it can point to the 
most heartfelt beliefs of an organisation, and consequently to some extent 
reveals the culture of the organisation at the time that it was produced.13 
 
Sheffield has written that  
 
doctrine should establish a framework of understanding and action, which 
should inform the decision making process. Doctrine at the higher levels 
should permeate the language and thinking of those in high command, 
and their subordinates should be able to gauge their thoughts, and 
indeed, anticipate them because of a common background and training.14 
 
In defining doctrine, Sheffield highlighted the work of J. F. C. Fuller. Fuller argued 
that doctrine was the 'central idea of an army ... nothing else than common sense – 
that is, action adapted to circumstances.'15 Possibly influenced by Fuller, General 
                                            
11
 R. H. Kohn & J. P. Harahan, eds., Air Superiority in the World War II and Korea (Washington D.C.: 
Office of Air Force History, 1983), p.69; MoD, AP3000, Second Edition, p.7. 
12
 NATO, AAP-6 (2010): NATO Glossary of Term and Definitions (Brussels, Belgium: Office of NATO 
Terminology Coordination, 2010), 2-D-9. 
13
 N. Parton, 'The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919 – 1939' (PhD Thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 2009), p.6. 
14
 G. Sheffield, 'Doctrine and Command in the British Army: An Historical Overview,' in Army Doctrine 
Publication (ADP): Operations (London: MoD, 2010), E-3. 
15
 J. F. C. Fuller, The Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926), p.254. 
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Curtis LeMay, an advocate of strategic bombing and an influential figure in the 
creation of the USAF, suggested that  
 
at the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs 
for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a 
network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the 
pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building 
material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.16 
 
Guided by the work of Corbett, Gray has emphasised that doctrine can be usefully 
thought of as allowing  
 
politicians and military planners to be able to utilize 'mental power and 
verbal apparatus' on a level playing field.17 
 
In terms of its production, Overy has argued that  
 
Air power doctrine cannot be understood apart from the intellectual, 
cultural and political context in which it has been generated.18 
 
In drawing together these thoughts and definitions, several key aspects of doctrine 
emerge: first, doctrine provides a conceptual framework of understanding; second, it 
should be the product of theory, experience, and practice; third, it reflects the cultural 
ideals and central beliefs of an organisation; fourth, doctrine makes it so that 'words 
have the same meaning for all;' and finally, that the production of doctrine is affected 
                                            
16
 USAF, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command: Air Force Doctrine Document 1 
(Maxwell, AL.: Centre for Doctrine Development and Education, 2011), p.vii. 
17
 P. Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 
1945 (London: Continuum, 2012), p.19; J. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London, 
Longmans, 1911), p.3. 
18
 R. Overy, 'Introduction,' in Air Power History: Turning Points from Kittyhawk to Kosovo, eds. S. Cox 
& P. Gray (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2002), p.x. 
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by a range of contextual factors. It is these five facets upon which this thesis bases 
its understanding of doctrine. 
 
The Control of the Air: The Evolution of Air Power Language in the 
Professional and Organisational Context 
 
It is apparent that the terminology relating to the control of airspace has changed 
over time and continues to evolve. For example, whilst some modern air forces use 
the term 'control of the air,' others, such as the USAF, make use of the term 'air 
control.'19 In contrast, the military doctrine of the Russian Federation stresses the 
importance of 'securing supremacy … in the air' and taking active steps to defend 
'air-space.'20 To complicate matters, some air forces believe that differing conditions 
and levels of control exist in the air, whilst others are less comfortable with this 
suggestion.21 The use of terms such as 'control of the air' or 'air control' are only the 
most recent favoured taxonomic manifestations of a concept that, in the lengthening 
history of organised air power, has been referred to as 'superiority in the air,' 
'mastery of the air,' 'air superiority,' 'air supremacy,' the 'command of the air,' and 
other variations on these linguistic themes.  
 
Given the shifting taxonomic landscape, it is important to trace the manner in which 
the language relating to the control of airspace has evolved. The result of this 
process will be to present a working definition of the 'control of the air' that will inform 
                                            
19
 MoD, AP3000, Fourth Edition, p.38; RAAF, Australian Air Publication AAP 1000-D, p.139; USAF, 
Counterair Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-01, Interim Change 2, pp.2 – 5. 
20
 Russian Federation, Military Doctrine, p.6 and p.12. 
21
 Australian Air Publication AAP 1000-D, p.141; USAF, Counterair Operations: Air Force Doctrine 
Document 3-01, Interim Change 2, p.3, figure 1.1 – 'Air Control Relationships.' In contrast, see MoD, 
AP3000, Fourth Edition, p.38. 
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the rest of the thesis. To afford a clear focus for the discussion that follows, the 
language used by air power organisations and the air power professionals (usually 
service personnel) will be examined. These organisations and the professionals that 
work for them have a clear interest and involvement in the development of air power 
language. The air power language that they develop is usually deployed in official 
publications, such as doctrinal manuals, although some individuals also produce 
what could be termed 'unofficial' or 'informal doctrine.' As such, the following section 
explores RAF doctrine between 1922 and 2009 and, where especially relevant, 
some American air power doctrine.  
 
This overview of RAF doctrine illuminates several important points. First, that 
concepts relating to the control of airspace hold a place of fundamental importance 
within British air power doctrine (and the air power doctrines of other air forces). In 
the case of the British example, the significance of this concept has fluctuated to an 
extent, particularly in the period between the First and Second World Wars, but has 
returned to a place of centrality. Second, the language used to define concepts 
relating to the control of airspace has changed over time and continues to evolve. In 
British air power doctrine, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the word 
'control' has found increasing favour. Finally, this overview demonstrates that, whilst 
air power organisations and professionals spent much of the First and Second World 
Wars 'doing' rather than 'defining,' they have become increasingly comfortable, 
particularly in recent years, with developing and defining taxonomy relating to the 
concept of controlling airspace.22 
                                            
22
 R. H. Kohn & J. P. Harahan, Air Superiority, pp.17 – 18; L. Baker & B. F. Cooling, 'Developments 
and Lessons before World War II,' in Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority, ed., B. F. 
Cooling, (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Air Force History, 1994), p.2. 
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The idea that some form of control could be asserted in the air was a feature of the 
earliest air power doctrine produced in Britain, both officially and informally, and it is 
an exploration of such ideas that sits at the heart of this thesis.23 However, as Parton 
records, it was not until 1928 that the RAF began to offer official definitions relating 
to such concepts.24 Rather than defining terms, the RAF and its predecessor, the 
Royal Flying Corps (RFC), tended to define the method to achieve the aim. This 
invariably focused on offensive action to seize both material and moral ascendancy 
over the enemy.  
 
In 1922, the RAF published its first operations manual, Confidential Document 22 
(C.D.22).25 Discussed at length by Parton, this manual emphasised the prime 
importance of establishing control in the air to facilitate operations on land, at sea, 
and in the air.26 A clear definition was not to be found in the manual, and, in the 
pages of C.D.22, at least four different terms were used to refer to establishing 
control of airspace: 'aerial supremacy,' 'supremacy in the air,' 'superiority in the air,' 
and 'aerial ascendancy.'27 In turn, the words 'local' and 'temporary' were used to 
further refine these terms, suggesting that asserting control in the air could be limited 
in both time and space.28 
 
                                            
23
 General Staff, Air Publication (AP) 144, Training Manual, RFC (Military Wing), Part II (Jun 1914), 
p.47 and p.49. Copy held at RAF Museum (RAFM), Hendon.  
24
 N. Parton, 'The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine,' p.125. 
25
 The National Archives (TNA), Air Ministry Files (AIR) 10/1197 – Air Ministry, C.D.22, Operations 
Manual, Royal Air Force (London: Air Ministry, 1922). 
26
 N. Parton, 'The Development of Early RAF Doctrine,' Journal of Military History (Vol. 72, No.4, Oct 
2008): pp. 1155 – 1177. 
27
 AIR 10/1197 – Air Ministry, C.D.22, p.14, p.63, p.71, p.79, pp.105 – 106, and p.123.  
28
 AIR 10/1197 – Air Ministry, C.D.22, p.14 and p.71. 
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In 1928, the RAF published what was the result of a significant expenditure of 
intellectual capital, AP1300, the 'operations' part of its war manual.29 By 1928, the 
favoured term for establishing control in the air had become 'air superiority,' defined 
as  
 
a state of moral, physical and material superiority which enables its 
possessor to conduct operations against an enemy, and at the same time 
deprive the enemy of the ability interfere effectively by the use of his own 
air forces.30  
 
As with C.D.22, AP1300 continued to make the distinction that control in the air was 
limited in time and space; the word 'local' being a favoured adjective.31 However, in a 
break from its predecessor, AP1300 emphasised that establishing control of airspace 
was a means and not an end.32 This reflected that, in the six year period since the 
release of C.D.22, the RAF's focus had begun to set on the central importance of the 
bomber as a war-winning weapon.33 Such ideas were further developed in Slessor's 
Air Power and Armies (1936); a volume to which historians such as Higham and 
Parton attach great significance.34 For example, Parton notes that some elements of 
Air Power and Armies were 'very close to official doctrine,' although Slessor's views 
on operational level air / land cooperation, crafted during the latter's time on the 
                                            
29
 Air Ministry, AP1300: Royal Air Force War Manual, Part I: Operations (London: Air Ministry, 1928). 
30
 Air Ministry, AP1300, Part I (1928), Chapter VII, 10. 
31
 Air Ministry, AP1300, Part I (1928), Chapter VII, 11 (i). 
32
 Air Ministry, AP1300, Part I (1928), Chapter VIII, 1. 
33
 For the interwar years, see H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918 – 1939 
(London: Heinemann, 1976). 
34
 J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 2009) [1936]; 
R. Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918 – 1939 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1966), pp.208 – 217; N. Parton, 'The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine,' pp.195 
– 198. 
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directing staff at the Army Staff College in Camberley, had to be 're-learnt through 
bitter experience' during the Second World War.35  
 
In examining the use of air power during the First World War, Slessor briefly 
analysed air power language and terminology. He cited the RAF's official definition of 
'air superiority' and explained the rationale behind the decision to use such a term.36 
Slessor noted the links between early air power taxonomy and ideas relating to the 
use of naval power. For Slessor, the concept of the 'command of the sea' had a 
direct influence on the way in which Britain's air power organisations and 
professionals came to think about the use of the air. As such, a term that found 
favour between 1911 and 1918 was the 'command of the air.'37 However, as Slessor 
suggested, given the experiences of the First World War, particularly in relation to 
the evasive qualities of both submarines and aircraft, the use of the word 'command' 
fell out of favour because it suggested that a level of 'absolute command' could be 
attained where in practice it could not.38 Slessor offered his own definition for air 
superiority, which may have reflected that the RAF's definition was falling out of 
favour. This new definition was simple and to the point, suggesting that air 
superiority was 
 
the capacity to achieve our own objective in the air and to stop the enemy 
achieving his.39  
 
                                            
35
 N. Parton, 'The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine,' p.198. 
36
 J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, p.4. 
37
 For example, see H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, 'Military Aviation,' The Army Review (Jan 1912), p.96. 
38
 J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, p.5. 
39
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Again, reflecting the evolving nature of RAF doctrine and the growing importance of 
the bomber, Slessor emphasised explicitly that air superiority was a 'means and not 
an end.'40  
 
The question of controlling airspace was an important issue in the RAF, and, some 
five years before Slessor published his Air Power and Armies, Leigh-Mallory, an 
officer who would play a leading role in the Battle of Britain and the Normandy 
campaign, wrote an article addressing 'The Maintenance of Air Superiority in a Land 
Campaign.'41 Leigh-Mallory opened his article by clearly defining his terms, noting 
that 'air superiority' was  
 
the attainment of operational freedom by our own aircraft, and denying it 
to the enemy.42 
 
In discussing the nature of language, Leigh-Mallory felt that 'superiority' was a more 
appropriate word than 'supremacy,' reflecting the impermanence of air power and the 
fluctuating nature of establishing control of airspace.43 However, in 1940, when the 
second edition of AP1300 was published, the term 'air superiority' was all but 
banished from its pages.44 The only reference to 'air superiority' was found within a 
section relating to direct cooperation with the Army, and it may have been that its 
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use was the result of an editorial slip.45 In expressing how control would be 
established in the air, the 1940 edition favoured the use of a somewhat unwieldy 
term, the 'Neutralization of the Enemy Air Forces.'46 Again, this reflected the RAF's 
evolving views on the importance of establishing control in the air. By 1940, a direct 
contest to establish such control was not given the prominence that it had received in 
either C.D.22 or the first edition of AP1300. The use of words such as 'local' or 
'temporary' continued to indicate that the RAF understood that controlling airspace 
was never 'permanent or absolute,' particularly in light of the evasive qualities of air 
power.47 In fact, it was the emphasis on the evasive qualities of air power that saw 
an evolution in the conceptual basis of controlling the air, and a subsequent shift in 
the importance attached to fighting for the control of airspace. This process has been 
described as 'tragic' and as a major factor contributing to the severe difficulties 
experienced during the RAF's strategic bombing campaign of the Second World 
War.48 More generally, the 1939 – 1945 conflict seemed only to emphasise the 
importance of controlling airspace, and, in recording his four principles of air power, 
Trenchard stressed the primary importance of obtaining 'Mastery of the Air 
[emphasis in original].'49 This conclusion was supported by the work of the American 
official historians who declared that  
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Of all the accomplishments of the air forces, the attainment of air 
supremacy was the most significant.50 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Tedder also noted the importance of 
controlling airspace when he recorded that 
 
The first round in modern warfare takes place in the air – the fight for air 
superiority.51 
 
As such, it is unsurprising that the next incarnation of AP1300, the third edition 
(1950), saw a resurgence of the concept.52 This edition returned to 'air superiority' as 
the favoured term, and the concept was the subject of detailed exposition.53 It is 
interesting to note that the third edition embraced concepts from the two previous 
editions of AP1300 and of C.D.22. As it had been in C.D.22, the prime importance of 
establishing control in the air was emphasised and, again, the concepts of time and 
space were also highlighted. In addition, the importance of 'moral factors' and the 
need for offensive action were also given prominence.54 Air Superiority was defined 
as  
 
a condition in which we are able to make use of the air for our own 
purposes and the enemy air forces are unable to operate against us 
effectively [emphasis in original].55  
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It is also noteworthy that, in summarising the RAF's doctrinal position relating to air 
superiority, the term 'control of the air' was used.56 Tedder had also used the term in 
his 1946 lecture to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and it may have been 
his influence as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) that saw the RAF include the term in the 
1950 edition of AP1300.57 The heritage of the term 'control of the air' is unclear, but it 
had been used as early as 1908, when Alexander Graham Bell wrote that '[t]he 
nation that secures control of the air will ultimately rule the world.'58 Its use in a 
military context seems to have been favoured by American air power professionals 
and organisations. Reflecting on his experience of the First World War, the US air 
power theorist 'Billy' Mitchell was to note that,  
 
as a prelude to any engagement of military or naval forces, a contest must 
take place for control of the air.59  
 
The history of US air power language reflects the same shifting taxonomy as that of 
the British, and, as Maurer's official histories indicate, such language was directly 
influenced by British air power doctrine of the First World War.60 For Lieutenant-
General E. R. Quesada (USAF), concepts relating to air superiority came to be 
'defined after the second [sic] World War started.'61 However, as Biddle notes, US 
military aviators were using the term 'control of the air' during the 1930s, and had 
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given prominence to the concept during the early 1920s.62 As USAF General R. M. 
Lee suggests, it was whilst working with British forces in the North African desert 
during the Second World War that US aviators came to revisit the use of airspace in 
terms of 'control' rather than 'superiority.'63 This change was captured in the United 
States Army Air Force's (USAAF) doctrinal manual, FM 100-20: Command and 
Employment of Air Power (1943).64 Use was made of the term 'control of the air,' and 
it was apparent that this term was an overarching concept, with other terms such as 
'air superiority' and 'air supremacy' reflecting the various degrees of control that 
could be attained in the air.65  
 
It was in 1957 that the final (nuclear) edition of AP1300 was published.66 Given the 
importance of air-dropped nuclear weapons, particularly during the first decade of 
the Cold War, the control of airspace remained a crucial priority throughout this 
period.67 Nonetheless, the Cold War was defined by something of a doctrinal drought 
in the RAF.68 This was accompanied by stagnation in the officially promulgated air 
power terminology relating to the control of airspace, and the RAF returned to an 
attitude of 'doing' rather than 'defining.'69  
 
                                            
62
 T. Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic 
Bombing, 1914 – 1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.134 and pp.158 – 159. 
63
 R. H. Kohn & J. P. Harahan, Air Superiority, p.35. 
64
 United States (US) War Department, Field Manual FM 100-20: Command and Employment of Air 
Power (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, July 1943) 
65
 US War Department, FM 100-20, p.1 and p.7. 
66
 AIR 10/5589 – Air Ministry, AP1300: Royal Air Force War Manual, Fourth Edition, Part I: Operations 
(London: HMSO, 1957). 
67
 For example, see M. A. O'Neill, 'Air Combat on the Periphery: The Soviet Air Force in Action during 
the Cold War, 1945 – 1989,' in Russian Air Power and Aviation in the Twentieth Century, eds., R. 
Higham, J. T. Greenwood, & V. Hardesty (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p.210.  
68
 N. Parton, 'Strategic Air Power Theory in the 21st Century,' Air Power Review, Vol.7, No.2 (Summer 
2004), p.15. 
69
 M. Mäder, 'In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine 
in the Post-Cold War Era, 1989 – 2002,' Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Vol.13 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004), pp.111 – 112. 
17 
 
However, the 1990s saw a doctrinal resurgence in the RAF with the publication of 
AP3000 (four editions between 1991 and 2009).70 It was in the pages of these 
manuals that the RAF again began to articulate and develop language relating to the 
control of the air. A comparison of the second, third, and fourth editions of AP3000 
(1993, 1999, and 2009) demonstrates how air power language and concepts 
continued to evolve. The second edition of AP3000 saw the RAF fully embrace the 
concept of the 'control of the air,' noting its  
 
crucial importance not only to air operations, but also to virtually all types 
of surface and sub-surface operations.71  
 
Importantly, the second edition used historical examples to draw out pertinent factors 
relating to the control of airspace, and, in doing so, utilised and applied modern 
terminology ('control of the air') retrospectively.72 Within this over-arching concept, 
this edition also noted that there were varying degrees of control that could be 
attained: a 'favourable air situation,' 'air superiority,' and 'air supremacy.' Such levels 
were also a feature of the third edition of AP3000, and similar levels, within an over-
arching concept of control, are also found in American and Australian air power 
doctrine.73 In contrast, the fourth edition of AP3000 (2009) utilised only the term 
'control of the air,' rejecting  
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traditional conceptions of air superiority [that] have limited utility in 
contemporary operations.74 
 
In the fourth edition, the control of the air is defined as  
 
The freedom, bound by time, to use a volume of airspace for one's own 
purposes while, if necessary, denying its use to an opponent.75 
 
Of all the definitions highlighted and explored during this overview, the 2009 version 
is the most clear and concise. It embraces the impermanence of air power, the 
offensive and defensive aspects of controlling airspace, and the ability to fight or 
evade in order to establish control of the air. It is this definition that will inform the 
rest of the thesis, and the term 'control of the air' will be used throughout when 
referring to concepts relating to the control of airspace. It is important to note that 
such a definition could embrace a range of factors including both the political and 
economic dimensions of air power.76 However, this thesis will focus exclusively on 
the operational aspects of the control of the air – i.e. how air forces conceptualise 
their use of airspace in an operational sense to achieve a particular tactical, 
operational, or strategic goal. This can also include the manner in which air forces 
prevent or restrict the ability of their opponents to use airspace. Naturally, non-
operational factors affect the evolution and development of concepts relating to the 
control of airspace. However, such factors are considered only in relation to the 
development of operational ideas about the control of the air. 
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In choosing to utilise modern terminology, it is important to emphasise that, given the 
ever changing linguistic environment in which the concept of the control of the air 
has emerged, this is an attempt to introduce a degree of taxonomic stability. This 
follows the example of AP3000, Second Edition, and the example of Olsen, who, in 
exploring aerial operations during the Gulf War of 1991, made use of the modern 
term 'control of the air' when the use of various other terms, including 'air superiority,' 
were favoured during the conflict.77 Moreover, whilst aviators of the 1911 to 1918 
period may have favoured terms such as 'superiority,' 'supremacy,' 'mastery,' or 
'command of the air,' it will become apparent in this thesis that they would have 
possessed an innate understanding of the RAF's current definition.  
 
Of course, another factor that has affected the need for a clear and concise definition 
is the manner in which academics have approached the concept of the control of the 
air. Whilst air forces have become increasingly comfortable with defining and 
developing air power terminology, there has not been a corresponding improvement 
in its use in the literature. The following section provides an overview of the 
development of air power terminology in the general and specialist literature relating 
to the control of the air. It demonstrates that, whilst an important precedent was set 
by the work of Webster and Frankland, academics have very mixed success when 
exploring the concept of the control of the air, particularly from the perspective of 
language. In many respects, academic terminology has not kept pace with the 
evolving language used by air power organisations and professionals. 
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The Evolution of Air Power Language in the Academic Context 
 
In the first volume of The War in the Air series (1922), Raleigh wrote of the 
importance of language, noting that  
 
One of the strongest bonds of human sympathy is community in habits of 
speech.78 
 
Possibly reflecting his background in English literature, Raleigh left his linguistic 
analysis in the realms of the abstract and did not attempt to explore the development 
of specialist air power terminology relating to the control of the air.79 Outside of 
Slessor's Air Power and Armies (1936), perhaps the most significant and proactive 
engagement with air power language came with the publication of Webster and 
Frankland's The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (four volumes, 1961). In 
their first volume, they were to write that  
 
Air superiority is a term which has been in constant but generally vague 
and often conflicting use almost since the first military employment of 
aircraft.80 
 
Such conclusions may have been informed by the analysis of Slessor, who, in 1936, 
noted that the term 'air superiority' had 'become something of a catchword.'81 For 
Frankland, a lack of clarity in air power taxonomy created a 'language barrier,' which 
kept the fundamentals of strategic air power from entering the general field of 
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historical research.82 In preparing his own PhD thesis, which came to form the final 
volume of the Air Historical Branch series, The RAF in the Bomber Offensive against 
Germany, Frankland noted that there was 'hardly any agreed grammar of air 
warfare,' and that he could not use the terms 'air superiority' and 'command of the air' 
without providing clear definitions.83 In stating that 'air superiority' was measured by 
the 'gulf between strategic desirability and tactical feasibility,' Frankland argued that, 
because the battle for the control of airspace was 'continuous,' air superiority was not 
a 'static condition which can be precisely defined …'84 He also concluded that the 
degree of control that could be asserted in the air varied, and, within the overarching 
concept of the 'command of the air,' conditions existed which included 'air superiority' 
and the more dominant level of control, 'air supremacy.'85 
 
Given the importance Frankland's analysis attached to establishing control of the air, 
it is unsurprising that, in the official histories, he and Webster offered perhaps the 
fullest discussion of the subject.86 In exploring the various different meanings of the 
term 'air superiority,' the official historians noted that, for some, the concept could 
mean possessing a larger air force or carrying a greater weight of bombs than an 
opponent. For others, it meant pushing one's enemy onto the defensive, or ensuring 
that one could operate over enemy territory whilst denying such freedoms to one's 
enemy.87 For Webster and Frankland, such reasoning illuminated only aspects of air 
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superiority. As Holley would later suggest, the concept was so complex that it 
constituted a 'seamless web' of factors.88 
 
As such, the official historians argued that  
 
Air superiority can be measured by the extent to which it is possible for 
one side and impossible for the other to carry out constant and effective 
naval, military and air operations in spite of the opposition from the enemy 
air force.89 
 
However, as they continued,  
 
Air superiority is not simply a question of being able to use an air force. It 
is a question of being able to use it effectively [emphasis added].90 
 
In developing and refining a definition of 'air superiority,' the official historians were 
able to enhance the clarity of their study by providing their readership with a fixed 
point of reference. The influence of Webster and Frankland was pronounced, and 
Cox has called their study 
 
a model for all official historians to follow in terms of the depth and quality 
of analysis.91 
 
The same could be said for their treatment of air power taxonomy, which had a direct 
influence on at least one important study that explored the concept of 'air superiority.' 
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Cooling's Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority (1994), a volume 
produced under the auspices of the USAF's Center for Air Force History, made direct 
reference to Webster and Frankland's discussion of air superiority.92 Cooling 
observed that those involved in the production of air power doctrine continued to 
refine concepts relating to the control of airspace, although not always successfully. 
Moreover, he argued that air power 'operators have little time to differentiate the 
subtitles of the terms,' such as 'absolute,' 'defensive,' or 'local.'93 Accepting Webster 
and Frankland's definition of air superiority as being able to make 'effective' use of an 
air force, Cooling defined air superiority as the  
 
ability to deny the enemy air superiority as well as asserting friendly air 
superiority over him.94 
 
Other histories written during this period were also careful to define their terms 
relating to the control of the air, particularly when the concept was at the heart of 
their studies. McFarland and Newton's To Command the Sky (1991) provided brief 
and concise definitions of the terms 'command of the air,' 'air superiority,' and 'air 
supremacy,' each of which sat inside the overarching concept of the 'control of the 
air.'95 It is perhaps natural to expect academics to clearly define terms relating to the 
control of airspace when such concepts are the focus of their studies. However, this 
is not always the case and the studies discussed above are, in fact, the exceptions 
to the rule.  
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For example, in Overy's study of the Battle of Britain, a contest with the control of 
airspace at its core, his use of specialist terminology was inconsistent.96 Overy used 
the term 'air superiority' seven times, 'mastery of the air' twice, and 'air supremacy' 
on a further four occasions.97 On page 33, Overy defined 'air superiority' for the 
German Air Force during the Battle as '[the defeat of the] enemy fighter force.'98 This 
is the only point at which he offered a definition relating to the control of the air. 
Admittedly, Overy's history is aimed at a popular audience, and adopts an accessible 
and concise approach to the topic. Yet, in a recent collection of specialist air power 
essays, Overy continues to use such terminology without definition and 
clarification.99 This is not to unduly criticise Overy, one of the pioneers of modern air 
power studies, but it serves to highlight a curious trend: the absence of clearly 
defined air power terminology in academic literature. It is more curious still given 
that, in his groundbreaking The Air War, 1939 – 1945 (1980), Overy made frequent 
use of specialist terminology relating to the control of the air, favouring the terms 'air 
superiority' and 'command of the air,' whilst providing a simple working definition for 
both.100  
 
In fact, within Olsen's edited collection of essays, the linguistic treatment of concepts 
relating to the control of the air is extremely varied.101 Whilst Hallion clearly defines 
such concepts, and Gordon offers a highly succinct analysis of 'air superiority' in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, chapters by Freedman and by Murray, for example, use a 
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variety of specialist terms without definition.102 A possible explanation of this trend 
relates to the axiomatic qualities of the control of the air. As AP3000, Fourth Edition 
observes, 
 
Because Western air power has been so dominant in post-Cold War 
conflicts, this fundamental requirement is easily forgotten and control of 
the air is taken for granted.103 
 
It is as if the concept of the control of the air and the accompanying taxonomy are 
recognised as being so obvious and important that their use has become routine and 
they require no explanation or definition. However, given the importance of the 
concept and the manner in which it evolves (linguistically, conceptually, and 
doctrinally), even greater care is required when discussing the control of the air.  
 
Studies that explore air power during the First World War also provide further 
evidence of this phenomenon. For example, in Duffy's otherwise excellent study of 
the Somme campaign, the expressions 'air superiority' and 'command of the air' are 
both used without clear definition.104 Ash, in his air power biography of Sykes, 
includes the terms 'mastery of the air' and 'command of the air,' yet does so without 
fully defining their meanings or justifying their use.105 In a recent essay exploring air 
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power during the First World War, Morrow follows a similar pattern.106 As Buckley 
offers, 
 
Such terms as 'air superiority,' 'air supremacy' and 'mastery of the air' 
were bandied about, usually then as now, in an interchangeable 
fashion.107 
 
In other words, the inconsistent nature of the use of specialised air power language 
in the literature, particularly that relating to the First World War, matches the manner 
in which such terms were deployed between 1911 and 1918.108 As this overview of 
the academic literature indicates, the use of specialist terminology has met with 
varying degrees of success. Thus, the decision to utilise a modern term, the 'control 
of the air,' relating to the operational control of airspace, is entirely justified. 
 
Literature Review 
 
One of the central themes to emerge from the preceding discussion of air power 
language, in both an organisational and academic context, is that the control of the 
air has been, and continues to be, of fundamental importance in air power doctrine. 
As such, it is essential to trace the origins of this concept. This thesis seeks to 
explore these origins by examining how such concepts developed from the birth of 
organised aviation in Britain and on in to the First World War. In turn, it attempts to 
discover what factors affected the manner and nature of this development, in both a 
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military and naval context. For, as Biddle suggests, the 1914 – 1918 conflict 'tested 
theory and became the anvil on which new aerial missions were forged.'109 
 
In attempting to frame a series of research questions to examine this wider subject, it 
is vital to engage with the historiography relating to air power in Britain between 1911 
and 1918. In addition, given that air power developed under the wider organisational 
context of both the British Army and Royal Navy, it is important to explore the 
historiography of both organisations during this period. Finally, given that this period 
was defined by the First World War, it is vital to embed the development of British air 
power in the historiography of this conflict. There are two distinct periods within the 
overall chronology of the thesis: the period before the First World War, and the 
conflict itself. These periods provide a natural structure for the review of the literature 
and, in turn, they inform the overall structure of the thesis.  
 
As this review will demonstrate, there is a tendency to divorce the study of air power 
from the wider contexts in which it developed. Air power developed within the 
existing organisational framework of Britain's armed forces, organisations that had a 
particular understanding of warfare, and became an important aspect of the war at 
sea and a highly significant feature of the war on the Western Front. What is more, 
whilst this wider context affected the development of air power, the development of 
air power also affected this wider context.  
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There is an overwhelming consensus in the historiography that Britain's early 
aviators, both military and naval, were drawn to reconnaissance as the prime 
function of air power. In the naval context, Goulter argued that the first 'role 
envisaged for the aeroplane was coastal patrol,' with aircraft acting as the '"eyes" of 
the fleet.'110 In similar vein, Mead noted that, by the outbreak of the First World War,  
 
The necessity for aircraft for observation and reconnaissance was 
established beyond doubt.111 
 
These conclusions are supported by Paris, who noted that  
 
officialdom and much expert opinion saw ... [aviation's] ... sole purpose as 
gathering information for the benefit of the Army or the Navy.112 
 
What is less clear is the significance attached to the concept of the control of the air 
and the manner in which ideas relating to the concept developed. For example, 
Neville Jones asserts that, by August 1914, there were only 'vague ideas' relating to 
the control of airspace.113 What is more, there are suggestions in the literature that 
the conceptual origins of the control of the air were to be found in the First World 
War.114 As McFarland and Newton argue, the need to control the air was 'not long in 
dawning on commanders' once air power had been used in the opening campaigns 
of the First World War.115 For Hallion, it was after these opening encounters that 
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ground commanders began to engage with the problem of shielding 'their units from 
the prying eyes of enemy airmen.'116 However, as Buckley suggests, there had been 
some 'contemplation' in the pre-war period relating to the control of airspace.117  
 
It is such statements that the opening chapters of the thesis seek to test. How much 
thought had gone into the concepts relating to the control of the air in the pre-war 
period, and what factors shaped the manner in which these thoughts were crafted? 
Of course, it is also important to examine the practical steps that were taken to turn 
theory and rhetoric into reality. Thus, an exploration of the development of policy and 
doctrine, and of the creation of an operational air power capability, will be another 
important aspect of the opening chapters. 
 
In developing air power theory, the role of the individual is stressed in the 
historiography. Both Paris and Holman argue that authors such as H. G. Wells and 
Montagu of Beaulieu, both non-service personnel, asserted significant influence in 
this regard.118 For example, Paris highlights that The War in the Air (1908), a novel 
written by Wells, emphasised the importance of controlling airspace to make 
effective use of the medium.119 Also emphasising the significance of the individual, 
Gollin highlighted the important role played by military professionals; for example, 
the lectures and writings of J. E. Capper, an early air power professional in the 
British Army.120 What is less well known is the influence of such theorising on the 
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development of tentative air power policy and doctrine in Britain, particularly that 
which related to the control of the air. 
 
As Howard urged, it is vital to study military history in 'context,' and perhaps the most 
significant context in which air power developed in Britain was within the country's 
two services departments; the War Office (WO) and the Admiralty.121 To an extent, a 
focus on this institutional context reflects a wider debate regarding the interaction of 
individuals (agents) and what Kershaw would refer to as 'structural determinants;' in 
this instance, how the culture and organisational structure of the British Army and 
Royal Navy affected the manner in which individuals developed air power concepts, 
and vice versa.122  
 
This military / naval dimension is an important feature of the historiography of British 
air power throughout this period, and is particularly significant in relation to the 
creation of the RFC, a joint venture between the WO and Admiralty. It was under the 
umbrella of the RFC project that the WO and Admiralty came to produce air power 
policy and doctrine, and to focus on the practical steps necessary to create and 
mould air power components that could provide assistance to the Army and Navy. In 
fact, given that the service departments clashed repeatedly over air power policy 
during the First World War, a certain tension has translated into the historiography, 
with historians supporting or criticising the WO and Admiralty based on a range of 
factors. Perhaps the most influential voices to examine British aviation during this 
period, at least in the first instance, were the official historians, Raleigh and H. A. 
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Jones. Commissioned by the Air Ministry in the aftermath of the First World War, The 
War in the Air series (six volumes plus a volume of appendices) was published 
between 1922 and 1937.123 These volumes remain the starting point for scholars 
examining the history of British air power between 1911 and 1918.124 
 
The first volume, the weakest of the series, given its somewhat muddled structure 
and Raleigh's use of flamboyant and emotive language, highlighted the different 
approaches that military and naval aviators took to the conceptualisation of air power 
roles.125 The use of air power in a military context was 'definitely conceived from the 
first ... brought into being to fulfil a certain purpose;' providing tactical support for the 
commanders of the BEF.126 In contrast, the development of naval aviation was 
characterised by Raleigh as 'experimental,' reflecting that there was  
 
no complete, definite, and practical scheme for the employment of aircraft 
in naval warfare.127  
 
For the official historian, these differences reflected the varying complexities of land 
and naval war respectively, although, as he was to note, naval aviators 
demonstrated a 'certain centrifugal tendency.'128 In the words of Biddle, the result 
was that naval aviators continued to 'stretch in new directions.'129 In many respects, 
there is something rather obvious about the analysis of Raleigh; reflecting the tactical 
outlook of the Army and the more complex, strategic focus of the Navy. Yet, in 
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placing air power in this wider service context, Raleigh and Jones established a vital 
precedent that pre-empted Howard's advice by several decades. In focusing on the 
control of the air, Raleigh made the comparison between the historic importance of 
the command of the sea and 'the new duty – command of the air.'130 However, as 
Paris suggests, Raleigh tended to neglect the development of air power, particularly 
military aviation, before 1914, and his analysis of this period is not sustained.131 
 
Of course, the volumes that comprise The War in the Air series are shaped by a 
certain penchant for criticising British naval aviation, particularly with regard to its 
'experimental' approach to air power, and a somewhat sympathetic treatment of 
military aviation. As Higham, Cooper, Paris, Goulter, and Abbatiello have each 
observed, the content of these volumes was influenced to a significant degree by 
Hugh Trenchard, a wartime commander of the RFC and the RAF's first CAS (a post 
he would hold for a second time between 1919 and 1929/1930).132 Given 
Trenchard's close association with the development of British military aviation, he 
had a vested interest in ensuring his vision for air power was given a positive 
appraisal. Moreover, criticism of naval aviation and the Royal Navy provided the RAF 
with political ammunition in the ongoing battle for resources and responsibilities that 
characterised Air Ministry-Admiralty relations during the interwar years.133 
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As such, the objectivity of the official historians has been questioned, and their 
conclusions, focusing on 'experimental' and 'centrifugal' naval aviators and their 
'purpose[ful]' colleagues in the Army, have been subject to question and revision. For 
Neville Jones, the official historians marginalised the important conceptual and 
developmental efforts of naval aviators, particularly in relation to the strategic 
deployment of air power.134 However, in taking the official historians to task, Neville 
Jones deploys such forceful analysis that, in the words of Williams, he 'proceeded 
beyond [the conclusions of] The War in the Air,' perpetuating much of the subjective 
analysis of the series.135  
 
More recently, Goulter has sought to re-establish the reputation of Britain's naval 
aviators of the period.136 For Goulter, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), as it 
would become known, was a 'very modern force' that, on the eve of the First World 
War, was  
 
materially, and perhaps psychologically, better prepared for its particular 
tasks than its military counterpart.137 
 
Drawing on the Navy's 'strong [institutional] tradition in research and development,' 
naval aviators made important advances with regard to technological 
experimentation and training.138 In contrast, Goulter emphasises the WO's 'lethargic 
attitude to research and development,' resulting in poor aircraft and engines; a 
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situation compounded by a training regime that lacked the rigour and 
comprehensiveness of that offered by the RNAS.139 Paris, in discussing the control 
of airspace, noted that both military and naval aviators understood the importance of 
the contemporary term 'command of the air,' but that it was only naval aviators that 
were taking any practical steps to be able to secure such a condition.140 In fact, the 
Navy's advanced state in this regard is recorded by Raleigh.141 Like Goulter, Paris 
criticised the WO for its attitude to research and development, arguing that it ensured 
that the RFC was not 'in a position to gain aerial supremacy.'142 Paris also offered 
contrasting analysis of the RFC's clear focus, arguing that the desire to support the 
Army, particularly by providing reconnaissance support, served 'little purpose[,] ... 
tying up valuable resources.'143  
 
These appraisals, which seek to revise aspects of Raleigh's work, are now widely 
accepted. For example, Grove has written that, by August 1914, the RNAS was 'one 
of the most progressive air services in the world.'144 Similarly, Parton argues that, as 
the outbreak of the First World War approached, naval aviators were 'far closer to 
being "fit for service" than was the RFC.'145 However, whilst acknowledging aspects 
of the organisational context in which air power theory and practice developed, 
historians such as Goulter and Paris do not explore the wider historiography relating 
to the British Army and Navy of this period. Particularly relevant are studies that 
explore service culture and attitudes relating to education and doctrine. For it was 
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under the influence of the dominant intellectual paradigms of both the British Army 
and Royal Navy that military and naval aviators came to conceptualise their 
respective understanding of the control of the air.  
 
Goulter does mention the 'strong tradition' of research and development in the Navy, 
but she does not examine how this strong tradition developed, the way it was 
emphasised to members of the service, and the manner in which it subsequently 
influenced naval attitudes to aviation and the concept of the control of the air. In 
writing of these wider attitudes, naval historians have been fairly critical of the RN's 
approach to education, innovation, and technology. For example, Hunt writes of the 
Navy's preoccupation with technological development, a 'material ethic' that saw a 
'virtual atrophy of the Navy's apparatus.'146 In offering similar criticism, Schurman 
argues that the Navy came to confuse means and ends.147 Rüger supports such 
contentions, noting that the Navy's fascination with technology was also driven by 
considerations of cultural power projection.148 As highlighted by the work of Andrew 
Lambert and of Dickinson, this fascination was driven home to officer recruits of the 
RN during their initial training and education with the service.149 As Gordon's study of 
naval command and doctrine indicates, the influence of the 'scientific school' resulted 
in a tendency to seek 'one-dimensional' solutions, usually focused on material 
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considerations.150 Thus, there seems something of a tension in the historiography. 
Whilst air power historians have stressed that the RNAS was 'fit for service,' an 
analysis of the wider Navy has led some historians to question if the Navy as a 
whole was indeed 'fit for purpose.'151 An exploration of these issues and the relevant 
historiography is a feature of the opening chapters of the thesis.  
 
Again, whilst highly critical of the efforts of military aviators, neither Paris nor Goulter 
attempt to contextualise such efforts in regard to the British Army's attitude to 
education, technological innovation, or the production of doctrine during this period. 
In a similar vein, Woodman's study, which discusses the practical development of 
aviation armament in this period, does so without acknowledging this wider 
context.152 There is a growing historiography that examines the British Army's 
attitude to education, innovation, and doctrine, with important studies by Badsey, 
Palazzo, Simpson, and Bowman and Connelly (to name but a few), often using the 
provocative work of Travers as a foil.153 Given that military aviators operated within 
this organisational context, it is vital to embed an analysis of air power in this period 
within this wider historiography. For, as Terraine remarked, 'the RFC was part of the 
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Army and did not pretend to be anything else.'154 As such, it is important to 
investigate the dominant paradigms that influenced the organisational culture / ethos 
of the British Army, how its members were inculcated into this culture, and, in turn, 
how, when the time came to produce policy and doctrine, these factors came to 
affect air power concepts and practices, particularly those relating to the control of 
the air.  
 
In his biography of Frederick Sykes, a driving force behind the organisation and 
doctrine of the early RFC, Ash seeks to answer some of these questions, 
demonstrating that the Staff College education was one of the contextual factors that 
shaped the development of air power doctrine and practice; inculcating Sykes with a 
belief in the importance of offensive action to achieve a rapid victory.155 In turn, this 
affected how Sykes came to conceptualise ideas and doctrine relating to the control 
of the air. As Ash notes, his 'short-sighted' understanding of the 'command of the air' 
was 'a product of Staff College teaching.'156 Ash's analysis will be explored in more 
depth during the thesis, but his study is important at this stage because it is the 
exception that demonstrates the more general tendency to treat air power as an 
independent entity when, in fact, during this period, air power organisations were 
firmly embedded in the existing infrastructure and cultures of their parent services. 
For example, in recognising differing attitudes toward the production of air power 
doctrine, particularly with regard to the control of the air, Parton only hints at the 
influence of the wider organisational ethos of the British Army and the Royal Navy on 
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this process.157 It may seem axiomatic, but air power did not develop in a conceptual 
vacuum; military aviators came to understand the control of the air in keeping with 
the wider philosophy of the British Army, whilst their naval colleagues were 
influenced by paradigms dominant within the Royal Navy.  
 
To summarise, the literature relating to British air power between 1911 and 1914 is 
shaped by several key facets: first, an overwhelming consensus that reconnaissance 
was seen as the most important role of aviation, both military and naval; second, a 
focus on the role of the individual; third, largely as a response to the first volume of 
The War in the Air, the historiography is now shaped by a general consensus that 
stresses the progressive nature of naval aviation, while being critical of military 
aviation; and finally, a tendency to examine air power in something of a conceptual 
vacuum. An examination of the conceptual origins of the control of the air provides 
an opportunity to test and challenge many of these conclusions. 
 
The vibrant historiographical landscape of First World War studies, particularly that 
relating to the British Army's contribution to the conflict, provides clear evidence of 
Geyl's suggestion that history is 'an argument without end.'158 These debates capture 
wider developments in the historiography of the First World War, and scholars such 
as Griffith and Sheffield, revising the traditional 'lions led by donkeys' interpretation, 
attempt to demonstrate that the British Army of the period underwent a process of 
learning, being honed into a sophisticated war winning weapon by the summer of 
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1918.159 This revisionist school was a response, at least in part, to the critical work of 
scholars such as Travers and, more recently, Gardner and Greenhalgh.160 However, 
it is telling that the richness of these debates has not carried over into the history of 
British air power during the First World War. In general, this is explained by two 
factors. The first of these is a tendency to 'dwell at great length on the romantic icons 
of that first war in the air,' a  
 
"Knights of the Air" ... approach [that] robs World War I air power of its 
genuine military and industrial significance.161 
 
A second factor reflects Overy's contention that the Second World War was the  
 
greatest turning point in air power history ... closing the door on the early, 
tentative history of simple, lightly armed bi-planes.162  
 
As such, there is a trend for historians to view the history of air power during the First 
World War via the prism of air power during the Second World War, serving to enrich 
their studies of the latter conflict rather than examining air power during the 1914 – 
1918 conflict as an entity in its own right. A very obvious exception in this regard is 
the work of Biddle.163 Of course, as Buckley highlights, there is some debate relating 
to the importance of air power during the First World War, and, as he concludes, air 
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power gained more from the First World War than the conflict gained from air 
power.164 
 
A desire to revise the conclusions of the official historians has done much to shape 
perspectives on British air power during the First World War, as it had in relation to 
the historiography focused on 1911 to 1914. These perspectives, driven by the 
questionable objectivity displayed by Raleigh and H. A. Jones, have given rise to a 
notable consensus in the historiography that is highly critical of the manner in which 
military aviators conceptualised and developed their understanding of the control of 
the air. In contrast, authors such as Goulter, Biddle, and Neville Jones emphasise 
the progressive and revolutionary approach taken by naval aviators to the 
conceptualisation of air power roles.  
 
For Goulter, the RNAS was 'at the forefront of aeronautical science and its military 
application,' with a 'striking' ability to think conceptually about air power roles.165 
These roles were extremely varied and included anti-submarine duties, air defence, 
an ambitious scheme to attack the German High Seas Fleet with aerially dropped 
torpedoes, and, of course, a far-sighted interest in strategic bombing. In terms of the 
control of the air, the air defence of the UK continued to be the major focus, and it 
was in such a field that the RNAS 'demonstrated its greatest ability to "think outside 
the box,"' striking at the sources of enemy air power.166 As Goulter, Neville Jones, 
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and Biddle have each observed, this was progressive thinking that, by the conclusion 
of the war, had evolved into a sophisticated conception of strategic bombing.167  
 
However, given that Goulter acknowledges that, in August 1914, one of the two main 
functions of naval air power was 'co-operation with the navy,' it is interesting that, 
other than the plans relating to the use of torpedo strike aircraft, she offers almost no 
discussion of the use of air power in conjunction with the most important assets of 
the RN – its Grand Fleet.168 The conclusions of Wise go some way to explaining the 
balance of Goulter's chapter: 
 
Direct co-operation with naval units was never the prime function of 
[British naval aviators] during the [First World] war.169 
 
The RNAS may have laid the conceptual foundations for some of the most important 
air power roles of the Second World War, but how did it approach conceptualising its 
more conventional duties, such as controlling the airspace over the Grand Fleet, or 
providing tactical support to its capital ships? What is more, if Wise's contention is 
correct, what explains the RNAS's decision to focus on such a diverse range of air 
power roles? In many respects, a focus on the RNAS's proclivity for the 
conceptualisation of advanced air power roles clouds what were very serious 
contemporary criticisms of naval aviation. Demands that the RNAS should be more 
'naval' and less 'aerial' became commonplace as the war moved into 1915, and, as 
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Grove suggests, naval aviators had an uneasy relationship with the wider RN.170 As 
Rodger argues, post-1918, the RN came to believe that it had 'burnt its fingers badly' 
with the RNAS.171 This is supported by Till, who notes the Admiralty's belief that the 
RNAS's diffuse interests had resulted in the neglect of 'naval aviation proper.'172  
 
The official histories take a sympathetic approach to such criticism, noting that 
operating air power over water was an extremely hazardous pursuit.173 What is 
more, the diversification of RNAS activities reflected the varied pursuits of the wider 
RN.174 In practice, this saw a scattered RNAS operating independently and from a 
variety of locations. This was in marked contrast to the centralised command and 
control infrastructure of the BEF and RFC.175 As Jones was to conclude, 
 
on the whole, it is true to say that the naval airman stands out as a more 
solitary figure than his army comrade, having something of the loneliness 
of the element over which he flew.176 
 
The result, particularly in relation to RNAS operations from their central hub at 
Dunkirk, was a tendency for naval air power to be 'called upon to do too much by too 
many people.'177 It is these differing perspectives, one focusing on the positive 
aspects of the RNAS's conceptualisation of air power, and the other stressing some 
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of the more negative aspects of its pursuit of diversification, that the thesis will seek 
to evaluate. Again, the vital organisational context in which naval aviators 
conceptualised their ideas about the control of the air will provide the central focus of 
this analysis. 
 
In moving to an examination of military aviation, Cooper has suggested that the 
RFC's approach to the control of the air – via an aggressive offensive to seize 
freedom of manoeuvre for aircraft engaged on tactical support duties – utilised air 
power as a blunt instrument, whilst Higham comments upon the 'high casualties' that 
stemmed from this approach.178 Goulter also criticises this concept, arguing that it 
was based on inappropriate 'yardsticks of success.'179 Furthermore, Neville Jones 
and Wise suggest that the RFC conceptualised an understanding of the control of 
the air that applied air power in an 'expensive and inefficient' manner.180 For Paris, 
the RFC's approach to the control of the air, particularly in conditions of static trench 
warfare, was 'quite pointless and made little contribution to the eventual victory.'181 A 
stern critic of the RFC's concept of the control of the air during the First World War 
was Frederick Sykes, who lamented the RFC's use of 'battering-ram tactics;' the 
irony of which will become clear in the subsequent analysis of RFC doctrine.182 
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Sykes was joined in such criticism by his loyal subordinate, P. R. C. Groves, who 
had served as Director of Flying Operations from April 1918.183 For Groves, the 
RFC's concept of the control of the air resulted in the 'wholesale massacre of the 
Royal Flying Corps in France.'184 The inadequate training of its pilots, coupled with 
the incessant nature of its operations, saw the RFC waste its qualitative and 
quantitative advantage in aircraft.185 Of Sykes's rival, Trenchard, Groves argued that, 
given the wasteful nature of the RFC's approach to the control of the air, Trenchard's 
duty was to inform Haig that such a policy could not be maintained, although Groves 
insinuates that Trenchard lacked the 'courage' to do so.186 Groves also took issue 
with the suggestion that the RFC's approach to the control of the air was 'dictated by 
military necessity,' arguing that, by not devoting more resources to strategic 
bombing, Britain missed opportunities to pursue the war more effectively and 
efficiently; a line of argument that the work of Williams does much to undermine.187  
 
There are also studies that, whilst remaining generally critical, offer a more balanced 
appraisal of the RFC's conception of the control of the air. Jordan, critical of the 
inflexibility of the RFC's offensive vision, stresses that it had a strong impact on the 
German Air Service, whose aircraft rarely ventured over the front. The result was 
relatively low losses amongst RFC tactical support squadrons.188 Jordan does 
concede that the RFC, particularly under the command of Trenchard, misused 
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resources, resulting in unnecessarily heavy losses of pilots and aircraft.189 Biddle 
provides a brief, but masterly, overview of the debate on this subject. She 
emphasises both the strength of the RFC's vision for the control of the air and its 
weaknesses, including its high loss rates and its failure to respond effectively to 
German tactical evolution. Biddle concludes that the RFC's approach was not an 
'unqualified success,' and her conclusions fit within the critical historiography on this 
subject.190  
 
However, in examining the conclusions of H. A. Jones and the official histories, 
Biddle draws attention to the former's contention that the RFC's vision for controlling 
the air was shaped by wider pressure from the British Army.191 As Jones argued, the 
BEF fought almost continually between 1914 and 1918, suggesting that the RFC 
was forced to match this pace for operational reasons, ensuring the adequate 
provision of tactical air support, facilitated by a constant struggle for the control of the 
air. He also asserts that the RFC conducted their operations under the influence of 
an intangible force akin to a comradely obligation.192 As Jones notes,  
 
it has never been the British way for one service to hold anything back 
when another service was giving all.193  
 
In spite of the very questionable objectivity that characterises the analysis of Jones, 
resulting in a somewhat clipped examination of the RFC's understanding of the 
control of the air, his focus on the wider context of the BEF, equating to a genuine 
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structural pressure upon the RFC, is entirely legitimate. What is more, this line of 
analysis is not generally reflected in the wider historiography of the RFC during the 
First World War. For example, Cooper notes that the RFC's concept of the control of 
the air was, amongst other factors, 'a product ... of the intellectual climate of [the] ... 
army.' However, he does not explore this contention in relation to the wider policies 
and practices of the BEF, the organisational and cultural climate in which the RFC 
was operating, or the existing historiography on the subject, such as Ashworth's 
Trench Warfare (1980).194 As such, it is important to explore the influence of such 
structural pressure on the manner in which the RFC conceptualised and fought for 
the control of the air during the First World War.  
 
Of course, another vital context of the First World War, particularly for the British 
Army, was that it operated as part of a coalition. The significance of this context has 
been recognised in a wider fashion by scholars such as Greenhalgh and Neilson, 
and in a specific air power context by the official histories and, more recently, by 
Dye.195 As Dye notes, British and French military aviators were 'partners' during the 
First World War, supporting each other both materially and intellectually.196 In 
reaching such conclusions, Dye does not embed his analysis in the wider 
historiography of the Anglo-French coalition during the conflict, further demonstrating 
the tendency to divorce air power from wider contexts. In turn, Greenhalgh's analysis 
of this wider coalition context, an account generally critical of British efforts, does not 
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examine the air power aspects of the Anglo-French coalition.197 Admittedly, air power 
was but a very small part of the wider Anglo-French war effort, yet, had Greenhalgh 
examined the subject closely, she may have found that it served to undermine one of 
her central contentions; that Anglo-French cooperation was not characterised by a 
genuine process of 'binding.' For Greenhalgh, true 'binding' was defined by 
cooperation and liaison that went beyond the practical and the logistical,  
 
bind[ing] together the actions of one or more commanders and their 
armies, thus increasing effectiveness ...198 
 
In turn, Greenhalgh asserts that the British learned nothing from the French; 
particularly in relation to Verdun.199 This focus on learning, as captured by the 
learning curve / learning process paradigm, is another aspect of the wider 
historiography of the First World War that has yet to penetrate into the realm of the 
air power history of the conflict.200 In many respects, the consistent and forceful 
rhetoric of the RFC – particularly that of Trenchard and his conception of the control 
of the air – goes some way to explaining historiographical criticism in the 'battering-
ram' mould. Such rhetoric serves to cloud the increasingly nuanced operational and 
tactical evolution of the RFC and its approach to the control of the air; evidence of a 
process of learning. Interestingly, such nuances are a feature of the official 
histories.201  
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These two factors – operating as part of a coalition and the paradigm of the learning 
process – provide further opportunities to contextualise how military aviators 
conceptualised their understanding of the control of the air; a line of analysis absent 
from Parton's recent discussion of British air power doctrine. As such, what impact 
did the Anglo-French coalition have in relation to the control of the air, and was there 
an exchange of ideas at a practical or intellectual level? Did these relations also 
affect the production of air power doctrine? More generally, what relationship was 
there between the rhetoric of the RFC and the reality of its operational practices? If 
there was a gap between rhetoric and reality, what factors account for such 
differences? 
 
Given that this review of the literature has emphasised the significance of structural 
or contextual factors, it is important to note that this thesis does not ignore the role of 
the individual. The existing literature places great store in the personalities that 
helped shape air power doctrine and practice. In the context of military aviation, no 
individual looms larger than Trenchard, although the work of Ash and of Pugh now 
highlights the important roles played by Sykes and by Sir David Henderson 
respectively.202 In the case of naval aviation, the roles of both Winston Churchill and 
Murray Sueter, the first Director of the Admiralty Air Department (DAD), draw the 
attention of scholars.203 Hussey has gone as far as to say that  
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[Trenchard] was the second greatest British fighting commander in 
France, after Haig himself.204  
 
However, this view is at odds with characterisations of Trenchard that emphasise 
how he 'wasted men and aircraft.'205 Equally divisive appraisals are available in 
relation to Churchill and Sueter. For example, D'Este's study praises Churchill's 
attitude to technology and aviation, whilst emphasising the positive aspects of the 
latter's 'boundless thirst for adventure.'206 Such conclusions are generally supported 
by Best, although the accounts put forward by both he and D'Este are heavily 
influenced by the discredited 'lions led by donkeys' school.207 This is aggravated, 
particularly in the case of D'Este, by a severe case of ahistoricism; viewing the First 
World War by the standards of the Second.208 In contrast, Charmley's study 
emphasises Churchill's 'bellicose' attitude and his desire to interfere, which resulted 
in perceptions of Churchill as  
 
a man whose mind was on every aspect of the war, rather than on that 
part of it which concerned the Admiralty.209 
 
Again, the thesis will attempt to explore and, where possible, reconcile these 
differing perspectives. Of course, a focus on the individual, in the vein of Liddell 
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Hart's 'Great Captains' approach, continues to worry historians.210 Yet, by exploring 
the agent and the structural determinants to which they were subject, it is possible, 
to an extent, to bridge this gap, demonstrating both the role of the individual and their 
interaction with existing organisations. For some, such as Churchill, their force as an 
individual was so great as to overcome a great many of the structural determinants 
that served to restrict and shape the actions of their subordinates. Moreover, 
personalities of the stature of Churchill had opportunities to mould the wider context 
in which ideas were created.  
 
Churchill, Sueter, Trenchard, and Sykes are among just some of the personalities 
that feature in the thesis. In keeping with the importance of embedding aviation 
within the wider historiography of the British Army and Royal Navy, senior and 
influential commanders in both services are also examined. These include Sir John 
French and Sir Douglas Haig, as commanders of the BEF, and Sir John Jellicoe and 
Sir David Beatty, as commanders of the Grand Fleet, and, in the case of Jellicoe, 
First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.  
 
Thesis Content and Structure 
 
This thesis explores military and naval conceptions of the control of the air in the pre-
war period, before moving to examine their evolution during the First World War. The 
thesis does not include an exploration of British air power in peripheral theatres, 
such as the Eastern Mediterranean (the Dardanelles / Gallipoli campaign and 
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Salonika), Palestine, and the Middle East. This decision was partly taken in the 
interests of manageability, but not exclusively so. The bulk of British air power was 
deployed in the North-West European theatre, specifically on the Western Front.211 
In addition, genuine innovation in terms of the control of the air was often driven by 
considerations relating to the use of air power in this theatre of operations – for both 
military and naval aviators.212 As such, a focus on this theatre seems justified. The 
balance of the thesis favours military aviation, with three chapters examining the 
development of air power in the military context, and two in the naval context. From a 
statistical standpoint alone, this decision seems sensible. For example, in March 
1918, the strength of the RNAS in officers and men was 55,066, whilst, at the same 
point, the strength in personnel of the RFC stood at 144,078.213 However, it is not the 
only explanation, and, as Cooper notes, the conflict came to be dominated by the air 
power concepts of the RFC.214 As such, a thorough exploration of these concepts is 
warranted. 
 
The thesis also focuses generally on the tactical application of air power by both the 
British Army and Royal Navy. Given the sheer scale of tactical operations in this 
theatre, it has not proved possible to cover every aspect that relates to the control of 
the air. For instance, the use of static balloons has not been included. Of course, the 
control of the air impinged upon all aspects of the use of air power during the First 
World War. For example, this included such roles as strategic bombing and the use 
of air power on anti-submarine duties. Such topics, given their well developed 
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historiography, are only touched upon in the thesis, and are sign-posted in a general 
sense where they affect wider conceptions of the control of the air.215  
 
What is more, as Holley argued, the concept of the control of the air can embrace a 
vast number of considerations including, but not limited to, technology, tactics, and 
logistics.216 For example, Buckley stresses the importance of technology, and rightly 
so: the introduction of new aircraft types, for example, made a significant difference 
to the ability of an air force or service to secure control of the air.217 However, given 
that there are some excellent studies available on each of these subjects, such 
issues are, again, sign-posted in a general sense rather than examined here in 
detail.218 Furthermore, a focus on such subjects can also serve to downplay other 
vital factors, including the development of doctrine and policy.  
 
In practical terms, the thesis is divided into two chronological periods, the first of 
which focuses on the development of aviation in the pre-First World War era. Whilst 
the formal chronology of the thesis starts in 1911, the year in which the British 
government began committee proceedings that resulted in the creation of a Flying 
Corps, the examination of air power concepts briefly considers developments 
beginning in 1906. As Paris's study indicates, the conceptual origins of British air 
power can be traced back to the beginnings of the 1900s.219 Studies by Wohl and by 
Hallion indicate that the years 1908 to 1909 were particularly significant for air 
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power, given the growing awareness of the work of the Wright Brothers, the 
proliferation of airships in Germany, and the increasing importance of aviation in 
France.220 However, as Gollin suggests, 1906 was itself a significant year, given that 
figures within Britain's service departments began to reflect seriously upon aviation, 
whilst the British government gave some consideration to purchasing an aircraft from 
the Wrights.221 
 
As such, the second chapter explores the development of military air power in Britain 
between 1911 and 1914, with a brief focus on developments from 1906. The chapter 
seeks to discover how military aviators came to understand the concept of the 
control of the air, and to examine the factors that came to affect these conceptions. 
In the first instance, this involves an exploration of material written for and presented 
in forums such as the RUSI and the Aeronautical Society of Great Britain, which 
proved to be important focal points for air power theorising. With the birth of the RFC 
in 1912, the chapter then seeks to explore how theorising relating to the control of 
the air was captured and codified into policy and air power doctrine. When 
investigating this process, the ethos and culture of the British Army provides the 
backdrop. How did dominant paradigms within the Army affect how military aviators 
conceptualised their understanding of the control of the air? An examination of the 
Staff College education of Frederick Sykes is used to test the suggestion that an 
offensively driven vision of warfare pervaded the British Army. In turn, it will then be 
possible to assess whether this vision shaped the creation of air power doctrine. 
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Moreover, did the Army's wider attitude to doctrine affect how military aviators 
approached the business of codifying their ideas into an existing doctrinal hierarchy? 
Finally, in assessing if there was a gap between rhetoric and reality, the chapter 
explores the practical steps undertaken by military aviators to operationalise their 
concept of the control of the air, including the context in which such efforts were 
undertaken.  
 
The third chapter of the thesis explores the development of naval air power before 
the First World War. Evaluating the literature that stresses the progressive attitude of 
naval aviators, this chapter seeks to juxtapose the development of aviation in a naval 
context against the previous chapter's focus on military aviation. Following a similar 
pattern to the second chapter, chapter three begins by examining early theorising on 
the control of the air, before moving to consider the way in which such ideas were 
codified into policy in the era of the Flying Corps. In particular, was initial theorising 
influenced by the Navy's inherently strategic focus, and, if so, how did this affect the 
Navy's concept of, and approach to, the control of the air? More generally, what were 
the dominant paradigms that served to shape the wider organisational culture and 
ethos of the RN? In turn, what influence did this organisational context exert upon 
naval concepts relating to the control of the air? How did such factors affect the 
Navy's wider attitude to doctrine and, in turn, the production of naval air power 
doctrine? This context is considered via an examination of the initial training received 
by officer recruits of the RN, which serves to demonstrate the intellectual 
environment into which naval recruits were inculcated. It was under the influence of 
these factors that the officers of the RN came to develop concepts relating to the 
control of the air. Finally, it is important to consider whether naval aviators were 
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equipped with the correct intellectual tools to ensure the smooth assimilation of air 
power into the wider organisational and operational context of the Navy.  
 
The fourth chapter, the first to move into the 1914 – 1918 conflict, examines military 
aviation on the Western Front. In the first instance, the chapter considers an oft 
noted, but frequently unexplored, detail about the RFC: that it was an integral 
component of the BEF. Thus, to avoid surgically removing military aviation from the 
organisational and operational context in which it developed, the wider culture and 
policies of the BEF are examined. What was the wider strategic vision of the senior 
commanders in the BEF, and how was this vision operationalised? In turn, how did 
such considerations affect the development and conduct of the RFC and its 
conception of the control of the air? Did a close relationship exist between the senior 
commanders of the BEF – French and then Haig – and the senior command team of 
the RFC? If so, did the nature of this relationship also serve to affect the RFC's 
conception of the control of the air? Of particular interest is the relationship that 
existed between Haig and Trenchard. In essence, this chapter seeks to test the 
assertions of H. A. Jones regarding the pressure applied to the RFC via the BEF's 
operational tempo, a product of its aggressive doctrine, and the RFC's comradely 
obligation to their khaki brothers on the ground.222  
 
The fifth chapter examines another aspect of military aviation on the Western Front, 
engaging with the subject via the coalition context and the importance the RFC 
attached to its use of information. Greenhalgh's suggestion, that a process of 
genuine 'binding' was absent from the Anglo-French coalition, is examined in relation 
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to the air power experiences of the Verdun and Somme campaigns. What was the 
nature of cooperation between the RFC and their French equivalents? Given the 
increasingly close cooperation between the British and French Armies during the 
pre-war period, were the origins of Anglo-French air power cooperation to be found 
in this period? During the conflict, did the RFC study the experiences of their French 
allies, and, if so, what lessons did the RFC take from the French? In turn, how did 
this affect the development of the RFC's conception of the control of the air? In part, 
such discussions must accept the criticism of Krause, who notes that 'Anglophone' 
historians  
 
only discuss the French when doing so enriches the British or American 
narratives.223 
 
However, it is hoped that this analysis will offer insights that illuminate aspects of 
both British and French air power during the conflict. Whilst continuing to 
acknowledge the coalition context, the chapter then seeks to examine how the RFC, 
particularly Trenchard, made use of information to help shape and develop an 
understanding of the control of the air. How was the RFC's vision of the control of the 
air presented to interested parties, and, in turn, was there a difference between the 
rhetoric of the RFC and the development of ideas relating to the control of the air in a 
tactical and operational context? In addition, both chapters four and five consider the 
doctrinal lineage of the RFC's conception of the control of the air, aiming to discover 
whether the RFC's approach to the control of the air can be traced to pre-war military 
aviation doctrine and the theorising of the pre-Flying Corps period.  
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The sixth chapter of the thesis focuses upon naval aviation and the control of the air 
during the First World War. In the first instance, the chapter examines the senior 
command team of the RNAS – Winston Churchill as First Lord, Murray Sueter as 
DAD, and Charles Samson as the Service's senior squadron commander – and their 
impact on the development and direction of naval aviation. This discussion considers 
how the RNAS came to be involved in the development of armoured cars, and how 
the continued diversification of its activities affected its wider perception within the 
Navy. For example, how did senior operational commanders in the Navy – Jellicoe or 
Beatty – come to think about the control of the air, and what were their perceptions 
of the RNAS? Did they feel the RNAS did enough to support the Grand Fleet during 
the conflict, particularly in terms of the control of the air, and was the extent and 
effectiveness of such support affected by a lack of coherence in naval aviation 
policy? Moreover, did tensions exist between the RN and RNAS, and, if so, what 
were the results at the conceptual and practical levels? Where appropriate, 
comparisons are made between the RFC and RNAS, reflecting on their approaches 
to command and to doctrine, their interaction with their parent bodies, and their 
dealings with the numerous governmental air policy bodies. As the following 
chapters of the thesis indicate, the reputation of the RNAS as a force committed to 
the progressive conceptualisation of air power roles requires at least some revision. 
In contrast, it seems difficult to maintain a wholly negative appraisal of the RFC's 
conception of the control of the air. 
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Sources 
 
A range of sources have been examined, none more important than the collection of 
primary documentation found in the AIR 1 (Air Ministry) files located at The National 
Archives, Kew. This vast and sprawling set of papers, collected by the fledging Air 
Historical Branch to assist in the production of The War in the Air series, contains 
copies (or originals) of the most important papers relating to British air power theory, 
policy, and practice, both naval and military, between 1911 and 1918. Additional 
material of value has been found in Admiralty, War Office, and Cabinet papers.  
 
The private papers of various senior officers were also consulted, and the Trenchard 
and Sykes papers held at the RAF Museum, Hendon, were of particular interest. 
Likewise, the Brooke-Popham papers, located at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College London, contained highly valuable doctrinal material. At the 
National Aerospace Library, Farnborough, the files of C. G. Grey, editor of the 
Aeroplane, were consulted. In addition, the Library's vast collection of aeronautical 
journals, particularly those of the pre-First World War period, also proved to be 
extremely useful. 
 
In terms of published primary material, a number of volumes have proved 
indispensable, none more so than Roskill's Naval Records Society (NRS) edition on 
the RNAS (1969).224 Additional NRS volumes, particularly the Jellicoe and Beatty 
papers, were also useful.225 In a volume compiled and edited by Sheffield and 
                                            
224
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service.  
225
 A. Temple Patterson, ed., The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the private and official 
correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of Scapa, Vol.I: 1893 – 1916 (London: Navy 
59 
 
Bourne, extracts from Haig's letters and diaries offer insights into Haig's increasingly 
positive attitude toward air power and his good working relationship with 
Trenchard.226 The introductory chapter, exploring the various versions of the Haig 
diaries, is especially informative.  
 
Finally, the following chapters draw heavily on the much criticised official histories of 
Raleigh and Jones. Acknowledging the very real limitations of their volumes, this 
thesis attempts to provide a scholarly update to the arguments put forth by the 
official historians. The furore surrounding the objectivity of their study has done much 
to cloud the genuine and profound insight contained within the volumes. By exploring 
the operational and organisational context in which the concept of the control of the 
air was developed, it is hoped that this thesis goes some small way to reviving the 
reputation of The War in the Air series. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE MILITARY WING OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS, AND THE 
CONTROL OF THE AIR: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND POLICY, 1911 – 1914 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent scholarship has established that the Military Wing (MW) of the RFC 
gave doctrinal primacy to aerial reconnaissance.1 This primacy was evident 
during the formative pre-war years of the MW, and constituted its core task 
during the opening campaigns of the First World War. The Training Manual of 
the MW deals with the issue in a highly concise and transparent manner: '[t]he 
most important rôle of aircraft in war is reconnaissance.'2 The importance of 
this task was itself the product of a discourse that pre-dated the creation of 
the RFC. Accompanying this debate was a growing realisation that aerial 
reconnaissance may provoke aerial fighting, which would provide the means 
to establish control of the air over the battlefront, acting as an enabler for 
friendly forces whilst preventing, or terminating, the operations of the enemy.  
 
Lectures, articles, and speeches addressing the issue of military aviation were 
almost inevitably drawn to aerial reconnaissance as their central theme. As 
ideas became less speculative and more specific, a further consensus 
developed that aerial fighting would be an important enabler for 
reconnaissance. These ideas were shaped into tentative policy and moulded 
                                            
1
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2
 General Staff, AP 144, Training Manual, RFC (Military Wing), Part II (Jun 1914), p.22. 
61 
 
further with the production of the MW's first doctrinal publication – the Training 
Manual (June, 1914).3 
 
This chapter analyses the pre-war hypothesising regarding the use of aerial 
fighting to control the airspace over the battlefront. These pre-war ideas had a 
direct influence on policy and doctrine, which subsequently shaped the 
practical response at the lower levels. In creating policy and doctrine, the Staff 
College education was of profound importance. This education proved to be a 
formative experience for Frederick Sykes, who was perhaps the most 
significant driving force behind the codification of the ideas of the MW.4 Whilst 
accepting that military aviators became fixated with the tactical application of 
air power, the chapter emphasises their attitude to the production of doctrine. 
This was sophisticated, modern, and highly successful, reflecting wider trends 
within the Army. In the final section, a case study of MW weapons 
development offers a counter to recognised historiographical criticisms of the 
Wing's experimental efforts.  
 
Pre-War Hypothesising, 1906 – 1911 
 
The roots of the pre-war discourse on aerial fighting can be traced to 1906. J. 
E. Capper, a senior military figure in Britain's early aviation community, 
delivered an address on 24 January 1906 to RUSI, discussing 'Military 
Ballooning.'5 RUSI would serve as an important forum for the discussion of 
defence topics during this period, with air power lectures and articles featured 
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regularly. Raleigh terms Capper 'a firm believer in the aeroplane, and a true 
prophet,' but whilst there is no disputing his belief in the importance of 
powered flight, to label Capper a prophet is exaggerating somewhat.6 In a 
section that was more postscript than prophecy, Capper speculated that, once 
the mastery of powered flight had been achieved, the aircraft might make 
 
a useful scout, whilst later, larger machines will be built and 
passengers will be carried who can devote all of their attention to 
observation or to offensive operations, and then a new phase of 
war will be brought into being.7 
 
The importance of these largely speculative comments, influenced as they 
were by Capper's early association with the Wright Brothers' Flyer, was to 
highlight to a significant audience the potential of powered flight in the sphere 
of military operations.8 That Capper's thoughts gravitated toward the use of 
aircraft for scouting is easily explained, given his background in military 
ballooning, and the importance of reconnaissance in contemporary warfare. 
There were other, simple and logical reasons for the fascination with aerial 
reconnaissance that influenced all early air power practitioners and theorists. 
The prospect of powered flight seemed to offer unlimited potential with regard 
to speed, manoeuvrability, and access to height for unparalleled levels of 
observation. All these factors would give aviators incomparable reconnoitring 
powers that would improve on the limited capabilities of static and free-floating 
balloons.9 
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7
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8
 A. Gollin, No Longer an Island, pp.146 – 147. 
9
 P. Mead, The Eye in the Air, p. 8.  
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Capper's reference to 'offensive operations,' vague as it was, also served an 
important purpose, offering the suggestion that powered flight could be used 
for tasks other than providing information. That Capper failed to conclude that 
'offensive operations' might take the form of aerial fighting between powered 
aircraft is also understandable. For Gollin, successful hypothesising about 
future aircraft roles was particularly far-fetched in 1906, and could only be 
attained once the practice of flight had become routine.10 Moreover, Capper's 
failure to elaborate upon 'offensive operations' reflected that, in 1906, Britain 
lacked any means of powered military flight, its experiments being limited to 
preliminary work on man-carrying kites.11 
 
It was in 1909 that the British government was forced to engage with the 
question of developing Britain's military aviation capability. As Paris argues, 
this interest stemmed from the development of aviation in Germany and the 
proliferation of rigid airships such as the Zeppelin.12 A Sub-Committee of the 
Committee for Imperial Defence, under the chairmanship of Lord Esher, 
reported in January 1909 upon developments in aerial navigation.13 The 
Committee, in making a direct comparison between the aerial situation and 
the development of the submarine, was reluctant to devote resources to 
military aviation, but felt that Britain had no choice but to develop aeroplanes 
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and airships. If Capper's lecture was a fuse, then Esher's report was the spark 
that served to ignite a wider debate on the role of air power in a future conflict. 
 
Another lecture by J. E. Capper appeared in the 25 January 1909 edition of 
Flight. In addressing the 'Military Aspect of Dirigible Balloons and Aeroplanes,' 
Capper took the significant step of attempting to move the discourse from the 
speculative to the practical. Capper's comments were still largely tentative, but 
it was clear that he realised that Britain needed to think more practically about 
the potential use of aircraft in war. In concentrating upon the invulnerability of 
aircraft, Capper suggested that the aeroplane 'must be fought in its own 
element – the air.'14 This is one of the earliest examples of a senior figure 
within Britain's military-aeronautical community recognising that a combative 
encounter may take place in the air between aircraft in order to establish 
control in the air. Again, the timing of this lecture is significant. Military aviation 
had moved from the realms of fantasy to a practical and increasingly valuable 
pursuit. Capper appears as something of a lone voice at this stage, confirming 
Mead's contention regarding the dearth of ideas upon subjects other than 
aerial reconnaissance.15 
 
However, to detect the tangible influence of Capper's ideas is problematic. By 
1911, junior figures within Britain's community of military aviators were 
attempting to wrestle with the issues of aerial fighting and the control of the 
air. In papers delivered to RUSI and the Staff College, Captains Burke and 
Brooke-Popham, respectively, followed the familiar pattern of focusing their 
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lectures upon aerial reconnaissance, whilst also discussing issues concerning 
fighting in the air.16 It may have been that Capper's 1909 paper had forced 
others to think and engage with the subject of the control of the air. This is a 
very real possibility, as Britain's community of military aviators was 
comparatively small at this stage. Lectures were attended by familiar faces, 
and articles widely circulated, which meant that new ideas and theories 
travelled quickly.17  
 
To give some idea of the scale of Britain's aviation community at this stage, it 
is worth reflecting upon the size of Britain's first military aviation unit, the Air 
Battalion of the Royal Engineers. This unit, created by a special Army Order 
dated 28 February 1911, was formed of two companies; one focusing on 
lighter-than-air-craft, the other on heavier-than-air-craft.18 As the Army 
Estimates of 1911 – 1912 recorded, the establishment strength of the Air 
Battalion was 190 officers and men.19 In reality,  
 
The Air Battalion had very few serviceable aircraft for training and, 
by the end of 1911, it was thought that there were only 11 flying 
men in the Army... 20 
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Irrespective of the small size of Britain's aviation community, it is also quite 
possible that Burke and Brooke-Popham arrived at a consensus about the 
need for aerial fighting independently of Capper. Mason offers wise counsel 
when he suggests that 
 
Too often the coincidence of an idea about air power expressed at 
one time and then applied in another has been evaluated to cause 
and effect.21 
 
Burke and Brooke-Popham, members of the Air Battalion, the pre-cursor to 
the MW, continued to move the debate from the speculative to the practical. 
Both acknowledged that aerial fighting would take place as a response to the 
need to deny the enemy's ability to reconnoitre from the air, whilst ensuring 
the success of friendly aerial reconnaissance. Importantly, their lectures 
showed that a language specific to military aviation was developing. Brooke-
Popham believed that 
 
A struggle for the command of the air will, no doubt, be a feature of 
the next great war. 
 
In a similar fashion, Burke argued that  
 
There will be a struggle for the supremacy of the air, from which 
one side or the other must emerge with a decided advantage.22 
 
The use of specialist language of this kind has been commented on by both 
Buckley and Frankland.23 However, there were, perhaps, more subtle and 
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sub-conscious reasons for utilising language such as 'command,' 'supremacy,' 
or 'superiority.' Britain, at this time, was the world's leading imperial power, 
and ruled a massive global empire via an ethos that stressed the racial and 
moral superiority of the British. In practical terms, this control was exercised 
by the world's largest and most powerful navy. For those involved in Britain's 
defence establishment, the terms 'command of the sea,' or 'naval supremacy,' 
were axiomatic statements. For example, the term 'command of the sea' was 
such an integral aspect of Britain's cultural identity that it featured in the 1911 
edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica.24 Thus, it was natural to assume that 
Britain would pursue its interests in air power in a similar fashion. The 
Women's Aerial League and the Young Aerial League wrote to the Secretary 
of State for War in mid-1911 pressing the government along such lines.25 In a 
specific air power context, Sykes made a direct comparison between 
'command of the sea' and 'command of the air.'26 Early aviators were 
comfortable with this association, not only from a rhetorical standpoint, but 
also because there were similarities between the mediums of the sea and air, 
a suggestion countered by Sykes.27 In addition, writers such as H. G. Wells 
often stressed the imperial overtones and potential of air power. For Wells, 
this took the form of dystopian fiction, although, as Wohl notes, there were 
those who saw and articulated a utopian, imperialist vision of air power.28 The 
use of the term 'command of the air' was entirely fitting in relation to Britain's 
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wider attitude to itself as a global empire and naval power, capturing the 
imperialist rhetoric of the time.  
 
When analysing the meaning of the terms used by Burke and Brooke-
Popham, it is evident that the two Captains were hypothesising in the 
broadest sense. They both concurred that an aerial battle would likely form a 
pre-cursor to the land campaign, and would be decisive and absolute in 
nature. As Burke remarked,  
 
Since it is probable that both antagonists will put forward all their 
best pilots on the outbreak of war, in order to attain a decisive 
advantage from the beginning, it is improbable that either side will 
be able to replace their pilots, even if they are able to produce fresh 
aeroplanes. One antagonist will, after this aerial battle, remain, we 
may confidently assume, in command of the air.29 
 
There were excellent reasons for concluding that the battle for the control of 
the air would be decisive, none more so than the small size of air forces and 
their respective support infrastructure. In noting the likelihood of 100 percent 
casualties every three months, Brooke-Popham highlighted the fragility and 
unreliability of contemporary aircraft, as well as the strain placed on aviators 
by the stresses of flight.30 That decisiveness and the importance of moral 
superiority in battle were strategic conditions sought by the British Army was 
also influential. 
 
Paradoxically, Brooke-Popham's call for improvements in supply and 
production, to provide the quantitative edge during aerial fighting, would 
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actually reduce the chances of decisiveness. A focus on casualties, 
production, and supplies, a notable feature of the air war of 1916 – 1918, 
highlighted that attrition and pressure would play an important role in 
establishing control of the air. Brooke-Popham's conclusions were amongst 
the first to hint that the battle for the control of the air would not be a short, 
decisive encounter. Both lecturers also referred to the attainment of the 
control of the air via a pro-active offensive campaign. For Brooke-Popham, 
'determined attempts' would be made to deny the 'command of the air' to the 
enemy, whilst, for Burke, defeating the enemy's aircraft was the only means of 
ensuring the success of friendly reconnaissance.31 
 
That Brooke-Popham delivered his paper to the Staff College demonstrates 
the progressive attitude of some members of the British Army to aviation. 
Moreover, Brooke-Popham's lecture was presented when the Commandant at 
Camberley was Major-General William Robertson, who would become a 
noted supporter of aviation in his role as CIGS. The cultivation of the 
relationship between the Army's military aviators and the Staff College 
established an important precedent, and, by early 1914, MW personnel were 
being requested to assist in the delivery of Staff College Tours.32 Robertson's 
attitude built upon that of Henry Wilson, who, during his time as Commandant 
of the Staff College, arranged the delivery of two lectures focusing on air 
power. This was a small, but significant step during 1909 and 1910.33 It is also 
telling that Brooke-Popham's paper was published in The Army Review. As 
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Bond notes, and in contrast to The Naval Review, The Army Review was an 
officially sanctioned publication that  
 
provided a forum for debate and showed that the General Staff was 
making a serious attempt to educate the Army for war.34  
 
Another significant step in the pre-war debate on military aviation took place 
during December 1911 when the Aeronautical Society of Great Britain met to 
discuss 'The Military Aeroplane.'35 The two meetings, on 6 and 18 December, 
confirmed that a consensus existed regarding the importance and likelihood of 
aerial fighting. Gollin establishes the prestige and reputation of the 
Aeronautical Society of Great Britain, and it was in front of this esteemed body 
that the pioneering military aviators of the day came to hypothesise about the 
use of air power.36 In attendance during the meetings of December 1911 were 
figures of great significance, including David Henderson (future Director 
General of Military Aeronautics (DGMA) and head of the RFC), C. J. Burke 
(future squadron commander with the MW), and J. E. B. Seely (Under-
Secretary of State for War).  
 
At the first meeting, Capper noted that measures would need to be taken to 
ensure aircraft possessed 'immunity from destruction by the enemy,' as it was 
likely that  
 
attempts may be made to interfere with a reconnoitring aeroplane 
from hostile aeroplanes, by rifles or pistols.37 
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This echoed a point made by Brooke-Popham some weeks earlier regarding 
the likelihood and viability of the use of rifles for the purposes of aerial 
combat.38 That rifles and pistols were of limited value during fighting in the air 
was not realised at the time. The failure of the participants to recognise the 
machine gun as the future in aerial weaponry was understandable. An 
attendee of the first meeting, Captain H. F. Wood, observed that mounting a 
heavy machine gun in a contemporary aircraft was far-fetched. Whilst Wood 
did not elaborate on the reasoning behind his comment, it is clear he was 
referring to the weight of a machine gun and the limited lifting power of 
aircraft.39 Some eight months later, David Henderson still considered the 
development of an effective aerial weapon a very great challenge.40 In 
contrast, in a report to the War Office (WO) upon French aviation, Sykes 
wrote that, 
 
In a word[,] aeroplanes must be able to cope with hostile aerial 
reconnaissance, and stop the enemy from gaining information by 
means, probably, of some light form of machine gun.41 
 
Sykes's attendance at the French Manoeuvres of 1911 may have been an 
important factor in his recognition of the need for aerial fighting, although, as 
Morrow observes, the French were 'not interested in aerial combat,' in spite of 
some experimentation during the pre-war period.42 Ash is correct when he 
stresses that Sykes's experience with French aviation was influential in an 
organisational and administrative sense, serving to highlight the gap between 
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the aerial capability of the British and the French.43 It would be close wartime 
relations between the British and French air services that would help develop 
the aerial doctrine of both nations.44 At the 6 December meeting, Burke 
discussed the design of aircraft types, pressing for the development of a 
specialist fighting machine. 45 The shift toward technical issues was a natural 
development as individuals became more aware of the technological nature of 
flight. Discussing the performance desired from future types was the first step 
toward what would become a technologically driven contest: the battle for 
superior aircraft during the First World War.46  
 
The second meeting, addressed by Major Radcliffe of the General Staff, also 
focused on reconnaissance. Radcliffe acknowledged the enabling qualities of 
aerial fighting, yet, importantly, he observed that '[aerial] fighting ... can only 
be a means to an end, and not the end itself.'47 Radcliffe's central point was 
that fighting in the air was wasteful and unproductive if directed without 
sufficient care to wider strategic, operational, and tactical goals, and he urged 
his listeners to think beyond an aggressive desire for combat. Radcliffe's 
point, which was not addressed during the subsequent question and answer 
session, was of the most profound importance. The significance attached to 
the need for aerial fighting, which seemed to gather its own momentum during 
the First World War, had its origins in these debates and lectures. The desire 
and fervour for aerial fighting, once a consensus had been reached with 
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regard to its inevitability, is almost palpable in the text of the lectures and 
articles cited above. Enthusiasm grew further as significant figures within 
Britain's military establishment recognised and endorsed the need for fighting 
in the air.48 This enthusiasm translated into a self-sustaining phenomenon 
during the First World War as the need and desire for aerial fighting grew 
exponentially.49 By not acknowledging this contention, the path to the RFC's 
'battering-ram tactics' was laid open.50  
 
The Creation of Tentative Policy, 1911 – 1912 
 
In late 1911, an attempt was made to turn theory into formative policy. The 
Standing Sub-Committee on Aerial Navigation tasked a small Technical Sub-
Committee to explore recommendations to establish a 'corps of aviators.'51 
The timing of the creation of the Committee reflected the terrible performance 
of the Air Battalion during the 1911 Army Manoeuvres.52 The conclusions of 
this Technical Sub-Committee, reported in February and approved in April 
1912, led to the creation of the RFC and, importantly, the establishment of 
policy upon which the Corps would develop its doctrine and carry out its 
duties during any future conflict.53 That Seely and Henderson, both present at 
the Aeronautical Society meetings, were two of the most important members 
of the Technical Sub-Committee on Aerial Navigation, provides a concrete 
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causal connection between these debates and the policy espoused by the 
Committee. Neville Jones reflects on the military domination of the 
Committee, whilst Ash comments upon the role played by Sykes in actually 
drafting the report in close liaison with Henderson.54 Lewis makes the astute 
point that the composition of the Committee was, in large part, decided by a 
dearth of aviation expertise.55 
 
With reference to the use of aeroplanes in land warfare, the Technical Sub-
Committee concluded three points of particular interest. The Committee 
stressed the importance of 'Reconnaissance [and the] Prevention of [the] 
enemy's reconnaissance.'56 In giving primacy to these two tasks, the 
precedent was set that a central function of air power would be to establish 
the control of the air: first, to enable the success of friendly aircraft; and 
second, to deny success to the enemy. The third point of relevance, 'infliction 
of damage upon the enemy,' could be read to suggest that the Committee 
were interested in ground attack or aerial bombing.57 However, this statement 
was influenced by British Army doctrine, which stressed the importance of an 
offensive mindset. The similarities between the consensus reached by the 
pre-1912 discourse and the recommendations and policy directives contained 
within the Technical Sub-Committee's reports are telling. The conclusions of 
the report, stressing the importance of reconnaissance and the need to fight 
for the control of the air, are almost identical to Henderson's comments at the 
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18 December meeting.58 Moreover, the focus on reconnaissance reflected 
Henderson's own expertise in the field.59 
 
Sykes and the Staff College Experience 
 
Sykes, appointed the first operational commander of the MW, formed an 
integral part of the Technical Sub-Committee. In shaping policy and 
subsequent doctrine, Ash argues that Sykes was indoctrinated into dominant 
military trends, particularly the importance of offensive spirit, and that his Staff 
College experience was influential.60 The following section seeks to provide 
an overview of this experience, whilst setting the discussion in the wider 
historiography of the Staff College. It is important to examine the ideas and 
teaching to which Sykes was exposed, because it was with such ideas that 
Sykes (and his contemporaries) came to shape MW doctrine.  
 
Overview and Historiography of the Staff College 
 
The British Army's Staff College, replacing the senior division of the Royal 
Military College, was created in 1858, moving to its now familiar home in 
Camberley in 1862. After an inauspicious start – attendance had fallen to as 
few as forty students in the 1870s – the Staff College came to fill an important 
role as the British Army edged toward the First World War.61 Developing the 
conclusions of Bond, Sheffield has noted that the prime function of the Staff 
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College was to 'train officers in staff work.' This comprised operational, 
administrative, and logistical functions.62  
 
The Staff College also performed the role, to a certain extent, of providing the 
British Army with a 'school of thought.' This function became increasingly 
important in the decade preceding the First World War, and, as Bond 
suggests, such a philosophy was designed to '... create a sense of uniformity 
and harmony in the Army as a whole.'63 From a practical standpoint, such an 
aim was achieved via a focus on command functions and the underlying 
principles of war.64 These were highlighted by examining strategic and tactical 
examples from historical and contemporary campaigns. As Robertson, the 
Commandant of Camberley during Brooke-Popham's tenure, wrote,  
 
… there is no position in the army where greater influence can be 
exerted over the rising generation of officers than that of 
Commandant of the Staff College ... The object of the Staff College 
being to train officers not only for staff work but also for the duties 
of command, the name is rather a misnomer, and I have always 
thought that 'War School' would be more appropriate.65 
 
Between 1904 and 1907, as the importance of a Staff College education 
increased, a twin to the Camberley facility was established in Quetta, India 
(now Pakistan). This provided Indian Army officers with greater opportunities 
to receive a Staff College education, whilst opening up an additional route for 
British Army officers. As Quetta's official history notes,  
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The syllabus for the entrance examination was practically the same 
as that for the Home College, except for certain modifications in 
administration, languages, and geography, entailed by local 
requirements.66 
 
Obtaining the letters p.s.c. (passed Staff College) became increasingly 
important for career-minded officers. As Lieutenant-General Smith-Dorien 
observed during his address at the opening of the permanent buildings of the 
Staff College at Quetta, 'if you obtain the letters P.S.C [sic] you will find them 
really magic.'67  
 
In asserting an influence over the development of doctrine and military 
thought in Britain, the importance of a Staff College education has divided 
opinion. Bond argues that Staff College trained graduates had a positive 
impact on the performance of the BEF during the opening campaigns of the 
First World War.68 However, Bowman and Connelly argue that historians tend 
to overemphasise the wider significance of the institution to the Army as a 
whole.69 Travers, in his important, if somewhat dated, study of the British 
Army, cites Staff College notes, essays, and assessed material to argue that, 
whilst at Camberley, the BEF's future Commander-in-Chief, Douglas Haig, 
acquired and developed an antiquated, rigid, and inflexible approach to 
warfare, which would shape his strategic and operational conduct between 
1914 and 1918.70 This was based on the notion of the structured, decisive 
battle, viewed through the paradigm of the human-centric battlefield and the 
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importance of the offensive.71 Sheffield, in his recent biography of Haig, has 
characterised such a line of argument as looking 'increasingly threadbare.'72 
As Sheffield argues, Staff College teaching was based upon an 'unexceptional 
and sensible' approach, examining historical material in an attempt to draw 
out the underlying principles of warfare.73 As Sheffield concludes,  
 
rather than a rigid, doctrinaire approach, Haig learned at 
Camberley – or more likely had confirmed – an adaptable, 
empirical, pragmatic approach to war. This gave him an overall 
framework within which he could work out his ideas.74  
 
Sheffield suggests that to place too great an emphasis on the papers 
generated by students during their Staff College experience is inappropriate. It 
is very difficult to assert that what is written in student papers actually reflects 
the opinions of the students themselves. To be successful, students were 
required to show they had assimilated some of the lessons on offer, or, at the 
very least, to express criticism in sufficiently humble language. Such criticism 
needed to be less caustic than that utilised by J. F. C. Fuller during his time at 
Camberley.75 In the case of Haig, there was well over a decade between the 
conclusion of his Staff College education and his appointment to a position in 
which he could shape the direction and outlook of the Army. This 
chronological gap is troubling, and serves to undermine Travers's cause and 
effect chain.76 However, Sykes's Staff College experience is still worth 
considering, given that, within 24 months of leaving Quetta, Sykes was in a 
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position of sufficient seniority to have a decisive influence over the creation of 
the MW and its doctrine.77 
 
Sykes and Quetta 
 
Ash suggests that, in conveying the impression of conforming to dominant 
strategic and military thinking, Sykes was motivated by a desire to progress 
his career and please his superiors.78 On examining the evidence available, 
some of which was not consulted by Ash, it becomes clear that Sykes was 
heavily influenced by the teaching and education he received at Quetta.79 This 
did no harm with regard to Sykes's ambitions within the Military. It is also 
apparent that Sykes embraced this education because he came to believe in 
the validity of the ideas being taught, not simply as a pragmatist but as a 
genuine advocate of such thinking.80 
 
Ash may feel his characterisation of Sykes as a revolutionary air power leader 
and true strategic visionary takes something of a blow if it is discovered that 
Sykes shared a vision of warfare, at least up to 1915, with Douglas Haig.81 In 
noting that Haig disagreed with Sykes's theories on air power, Ash does not 
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acknowledge that, rather than disagreeing from the start, they came to 
disagree.82 Ash's decision to downplay Sykes's formative experience, which 
illustrates Sykes as a product of his environment, is interesting. That Sykes 
was a conformist to established British Army thinking and doctrine during the 
opening campaigns of the First World War makes his rejection of such ideas 
more profound, and serves to strengthen Ash's case.  
 
As Gray records, entering Staff College required serious commitment in terms 
of time and finances.83 After failing his entrance examination for the Staff 
College at Camberley in 1907, Sykes applied and passed the entrance 
examination for admission to Quetta. Between 1908 and 1910, during his time 
at the College, Sykes had five lessons driven home: first, the importance of 
moral superiority; second, the need for aggressive and relentless offensive 
action; third, the significance of concentrating forces at the decisive point; 
fourth, the need to engage and defeat the enemy's armed forces; and finally, 
that by following these steps, decisive victory would be attained in quick 
time.84 That Sykes had observed the German Army's manoeuvres of 1907 
reinforced his receptiveness to these five ideals, which Gat would 
characterise as coming from the 'German military school.'85 
 
Sykes's attendance at Quetta, rather than Camberley, is an interesting 
variable. Bond examines the early history of Quetta, and is largely positive 
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about the role of the college, although, more recently, Gardner provides an 
alternative appraisal, suggesting that Quetta's regional focus did not equip 
students for the European style of warfare in 1914.86 Even with regional 
variations, however, the curriculum at Quetta was still heavily focused upon 
European approaches to war. For example, special attention was paid to the 
Russo-Japanese conflict, providing, as it did, a (subjective) weight of evidence 
regarding the decisive value of moral superiority in contemporary warfare.87 
That the conflict also provided evidence regarding the strength of defensive 
firepower and the negative consequences of an over-focus on moral / human 
factors, was an alternative and underplayed conclusion at the time.88  
 
Ash argues that Sykes experienced a Staff College curriculum that focused on 
Clausewitz.89 Such a statement requires immediate qualification. As Bassford 
suggests, some figures in the British Army may have been familiar with 
Clausewitz, and may even have read On War.90 Consequently, these ideas 
may have found their way into the Staff College experience. However, he 
concedes that it is difficult to establish a concrete evidential chain.91 Referring 
to Haig's Staff College experience, Travers suggests that a selective 
interpretation of Clausewitzian ideas was in evidence, embracing the moral / 
human elements of On War and rejecting the notion of the power of the 
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defence.92 This interpretation may not have been as Clausewitz intended, but 
it is evident that the thinking highlighted by Travers in relation to Haig's Staff 
College experience was still active during Sykes's Staff College education. 
Quetta's Commandant during Sykes's tenure, Major-General Thomas Capper, 
has been characterised as being influenced by Clausewitz, and there are 
some examples of Capper citing the work of Clausewitz in his lectures to 
students.93 It is difficult to extrapolate too much from these examples, 
although it is apparent that Capper continued to stress principles and ideas 
that could be interpreted as being Clausewitzian in nature.  
 
In writing about the importance of Night Attacks during the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1905, Capper offered the distinctly Clausewitzian conclusion that  
 
War is an art not a science ... [W]e must not think that we have 
evolved certain rules, capable of universal application. The human 
mind is always seeking to take refuge in the comfort of an 
established rule. Such refuge can never be attained in war.94 
 
Earlier in the same paper, Capper stressed that it was vital to  
 
... foster and nourish by all means in our power the offensive and 
go-ahead spirit of our officers and men.95  
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Thus, it could be suggested that Sykes was subject to teaching that was 
flavoured with ideas and principles to which the label Clausewitzian could be 
attached. It is also possible to suggest that Sykes would have been familiar 
with Jominian theorising. Hamley's The Operations of War (seven editions 
between 1866 and 1922) was one of the two core texts upon which the 
military strategy and tactics section of the entrance examination was based.96 
Gat and Strachan acknowledge the Jominian roots of this study, noting the 
prescriptive arguments and conclusions forwarded by Hamley.97 Bond 
recognises the influence of this work whilst conceding that, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, there had been a sharp move away from Hamley's 
theories.98 This move away from geometric theorising saw the British Army 
actively reject prescription in favour of a flexible understanding of warfare that 
embraced the concept of the offensive based upon moral superiority. Capper, 
an advocate of such thinking – a focus on the 'importance of courage and self 
sacrifice' – was not an isolated voice at the Staff College, and his colleagues 
also stressed similar ideals.99 A. A. Montgomery-Massingberd, a future CIGS, 
lectured Sykes during 1908. Massingberd's lectures focused upon Napoleon's 
early campaigns, the American Civil War, the Boer War, and the Russo-
Japanese conflict. Emphasis was given to the importance of concentrating 
force and the need for decisive battle. Moral or human factors were stressed, 
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and boldness, offensive spirit, and aggression were encouraged as 
characteristics to be cultivated and praised.100  
 
In an essay submitted at the end of October 1908, Sykes addressed the issue 
of strategy. This paper clearly demonstrated the nature of teaching to which 
Sykes was exposed. In the essay, Sykes argued that  
 
The effects of the enormous size and cost of modern armies, are, 
amongst others, to cause the duration of wars to be shorter.101 
 
This analysis would resonate with those individuals in Britain's armed forces 
who came to subscribe to a view subsequently associated with the short-war 
myth.102 Mid-way through the essay, Sykes wrote of the advantages of the 
offensive and of seizing the initiative, whilst, a page later, he noted that, 
 
Assuming that the offensive has been decided upon, the great aim 
must now be to destroy the enemy's offensive power, and to 
ensure superiority at the decisive point, i.e., the point which will 
vitally affect the course of the campaign.103  
 
Sykes was effectively quoting Clausewitz's discussion and conception of the 
'centre of gravity.'104 It is also possible, however, that Sykes was influenced by 
the work of G. F. Henderson, whose notes upon strategy were periodically 
issued to the Staff Colleges. The Henderson notes, issued in 1911, are 
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illustrative of his thinking, being presented as a series of maxims. Included 
amongst this list were the following:  
 
 Concentration is important.  
 The main objective is the enemy's main army. 
 Concentrate a superior force at a decisive point. 
 Moral advantage is obtained by seizing the initiative.  
 The best defensive measure is a strategic counterstroke.105 
 
These are similar points to those stressed by the Commandant and Sykes's 
teachers. The ideas themselves could be characterised as distinctly 
'Clausewitzian' in nature. 
 
More generally, Sykes received instruction that stressed the importance of 
Britain's wider geo-political interests and, foreshadowing the modern focus on 
joint operations, the need for successful co-operation between the British 
Army and Royal Navy.106 That this message had been understood was 
confirmed by Sykes's essay of October 1908. Sykes wrote of the importance 
of Britain's command of the sea in giving her the greatest flexibility when 
choosing a theatre of operations. In addition, he noted the significance of 
power projection and the deployment of the Army, as well as the indirect 
benefits gained by blockading.107  
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Tentative links between the Navy and Army, at the educational level, had 
been established as early as 1901. Julian Corbett, the noted naval theorist, 
began addressing the Staff College at Camberley from 1905 onwards. 
Lambert is persuasive when he discusses the links between the theorising of 
G. F. Henderson and of Corbett, and the subsequent link of both to 
Clausewitz.108 Mahan, whose theoretical perspective was more akin to the 
prescriptive work of Jomini, was interpreted in Britain as arguing for large, 
concentrated battle fleets that would attain command of the sea by defeating 
an enemy's fleet, thus protecting friendly maritime trade.109 Menon observes 
that the influence of the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan was pronounced in 
Britain during this period.110 The themes of decisiveness, concentration, 
aggression, and striking directly against the main enemy force are, again, 
remarkably similar to the theoretical trends cherished by the Army's Staff 
College.  
 
Another obvious parallel is found when comparing Mahan's method for 
establishing command of the sea with the ideas espoused during the pre-war 
debates concerning aerial fighting. Command would be established by friendly 
units after a decisive contest with the equivalent forces of the enemy. This, in 
turn, would facilitate friendly activity and deny the benefits of such activities to 
the enemy. As Kennedy observes, the concept of the command of the sea 
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was never implied in a total manner, 'being both physically impossible and 
strategically unnecessary.'111  
 
The evidence suggests that Sykes left Staff College with a disposition towards 
the importance of offensive action to seize the initiative. This was viewed 
through a lens that emphasised the moral / human aspects of warfare. By 
directing these efforts at the enemy's armed forces, a decisive and relatively 
quick victory would be attained. This, in turn, would be an enabling / disabling 
force for friend and foe respectively. It is significant that Sykes's command of 
the MW during the opening campaigns of the First World War, and the content 
of the Training Manual, a project for which he possessed administrative 
responsibility, reflected the ideals emphasised during his time at Quetta. For 
example, a lecture delivered by Sykes to the Aeronautical Society in February 
1913 confirms this contention and suggests the ongoing influence of his Staff 
College experience:  
 
The aircraft of one side will be imbued with greater staying powers, 
greater determination to fight. This side must be ours. It is this spirit 
which, creating moral ascendency [sic], always wins on land or 
sea. It will do so in the air. Thus again, as usual, we come to the 
man, the numbers of him available, his patriotism, self-sacrifice and 
training.112 
 
As Sheffield cautions, Staff College graduates did not enter Camberley or 
Quetta with minds empty of military thought and experience. In some cases, 
such as Haig or Sykes, it could be suggested that a Staff College education 
served only to reinforce existing ideas based on the experience already 
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possessed by individuals: for Sykes, his participation in the German Army 
manoeuvres; and for Haig, his experiences in Sudan and during the Second 
South African war.113  
 
However, this does not detract from the importance of the Staff College 
experience, as it helped to shape Sykes's understanding of warfare via the 
paradigms that were dominant within the British Army. Perhaps more 
importantly, familiarity with such thinking made Sykes fluent in the language of 
the British Army. In turn, he was able to frame his subsequent ideas about air 
power so as to increase the receptiveness of the wider military community to 
his vision. By utilising approved language and concepts, Sykes was able to 
communicate explicitly the role of the MW, including its mission and function, 
as well as its place within the British Army and the wider defence 
establishment. This echoes Corbett's conclusions that 'words must have the 
same meaning for all,' demonstrating that the Staff College system was 
creating a sense of 'uniformity and harmony in the Army.'114 
 
The Staff College Education and the Military Wing 
 
The analysis of Sykes at the Staff College can be used to highlight the Staff 
College education of other important figures within the MW. David Henderson, 
as Director General of Military Aeronautics – the professional head of the MW 
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– was a Staff College graduate, as was his deputy, Sefton Brancker.115 Robert 
Brooke-Popham, as a senior squadron commander and the Wing's most 
important logistician on the outbreak of war, was another graduate, as was 
Herbert Musgrave, squadron commander and officer in charge of technical 
experimentation. Other notable MW Staff College graduates included two 
future Marshals of the Royal Air Force, Geoffrey Salmond and William Sholto 
Douglas. E. B. Ashmore, who was to rise to command the London Air 
Defence Area (LADA) during the first Battle of Britain, also passed through the 
system.116 This seems to support the contention of Robbins that  
 
A relatively small group of pre-war graduates of the Staff Colleges 
at Camberley and Quetta held most of the key positions in the 
BEF.117 
 
It was not necessary to be a Staff College graduate in order to come under 
the influence of the offensive spirit so prevalent in the British Army during this 
period. This supports Sheffield's contention that pre-existing military 
experience could also prove to be a formative educational experience for 
junior officers.118 A figure who came to be synonymous with the RFC's 
offensive spirit, Hugh Trenchard, was not a Staff College graduate, nor did he 
have any significant role in shaping MW doctrine during this period. In 
addition, important squadron commanders, such as C. J. Burke or G. H. 
Raleigh, both of whom made positive contributions to the evolution of air 
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power doctrine during this period, were not graduates of the system. 
However, the effect of the Staff College education was in evidence in a clear 
and concentrated manner during the formative years of the MW, as the 
majority of its senior commanders had passed through the system. Such a 
concentration of graduates gave the MW a remarkably cohesive philosophical 
outlook, based in no small part on the influence of the Staff College 
experience.  
 
It is important to consider Bond's contention that there is limited value in 
considering the influence of the Staff College experience beyond the spring of 
1915. As Bond asserts, by this point, the majority of Staff College trained 
officers had suffered very heavy casualties as the original divisions of the BEF 
were virtually annihilated.119 Thus, a rapidly expanding British Army contained 
few, if any, Staff College graduates. Moreover, the Staff College was closed at 
the outbreak of the war, preventing the addition of new p.s.c. qualified officers 
to the ranks of the British Army.120 In the case of the MW, from 1914 to 1918 
the size of the BEF's air arm expanded rapidly. In March 1912, the British 
Army possessed 21 officers and men capable flying. By March 1913, this 
number had risen to 134. The Army Estimates of 1914 – 1915 made provision 
to raise the number of pilots in the MW to 200. In contrast, by 1918, the RFC / 
RAF had risen to a strength of over 290,000 officers, men, and cadets.121 
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Thus, any influence that could be attributed to a Staff College education was 
diluted by the constant growth of this arm. In addition, the British Army did not 
produce additional Staff College graduates beyond those who had passed out 
prior to the outbreak of war. This meant there were few, if any, staff trained 
officers with which to strengthen the numbers of the MW and its successor 
organisations. However, whilst the RFC may have expanded rapidly, its core 
of p.s.c. qualified officers gained in seniority and continued to hold the most 
important positions within the Corps. Again, to cite the analysis of Robbins, 
'Staff College graduates formed the spine of the BEF in the war years.'122 This 
allowed them to assert a positive influence over the evolution of doctrine and 
the ethos of the organisation. Crucially, this doctrine continued to possess 
core tenets from the original doctrinal manuals, as shaped and created by 
Staff College graduates between 1913 and 1914. 
 
Doctrine and Air Power, 1912 – 1914  
 
During 1912 and 1913, enthusiasm for air power continued to grow, 
particularly as influential figures within the military became interested in 
aviation. General James Grierson's successful exploitation of his air 
component during the 1912 manoeuvres, which was a major factor in his 
besting of General Haig's force, led to his oft quoted remark regarding the 
'mastery of the air.'123 Grierson's comment, based on his very limited 
experience with aircraft, was both dramatic and overstated. Delivered to a 
packed audience in attendance at the Aeronautical Society's meeting of 27 
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November 1912, it was vital in serving to legitimise the need for aerial 
fighting.124 It also highlighted the pre-war discourse and recommendations of 
the Technical Sub-Committee.  
 
Sykes, in attendance at the meeting, made use of the occasion to call for the 
use of armed aircraft to counter the reconnaissance machines of the enemy. 
The enthusiasm for Sykes's comment was reflected in the Flight editorial, 
which noted that the MW's commanding officer had, 'struck the right nail on 
the head.'125 These sentiments were not new, but, as noted, they were put 
forward by increasingly senior and influential individuals. By the outbreak of 
war, Sir John French, the BEF's Commander in Chief (C-in-C), could be 
counted as a supporter of air power. As chair during Sykes's 1913 
Aeronautical Society lecture, he showed enthusiasm and support for the 
potential of aircraft. The progressive and positive views espoused by French, 
who then occupied the role of CIGS, effectively the professional head of the 
British Army, would have done much to further the cause of military 
aviation.126 In spite of gaining such support, Paris highlights the limits of this 
sponsorship. French was quickly replaced as commander of the BEF, whilst 
Grierson died during the opening days of the conflict.127 Haig's attitude to air 
power, like so many other aspects of his military service, divides historians. 
Nonetheless, recent work by Jordan and Sheffield suggests he was 
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something of a technophile, becoming a powerful supporter of military aviation 
during the First World War.128  
 
The performance of the MW during the Army manoeuvres of 1912 was crucial 
in highlighting the potential of aircraft. It was also important for the Wing in 
terms of translating what had been largely intangible support into an increase 
in resources and a more concrete interest in air power. By 1913, War Office 
estimates for aviation rose to £501,000. This was a substantial increase upon 
the total aviation budgets of 1909 – 1910 (£9,000) and 1911 – 1912 
(£131,000).129 Even such a minor increase was telling, given the wider 
economic context of the period and the parsimonious attitude of the 
government toward defence expenditure.130 It was also no coincidence that, 
with the growing awareness of the capabilities of air power, the WO updated 
Field Service Regulations (FSR) during 1912 with a section concerning aerial 
reconnaissance.131 This also demonstrated the inherently organic nature of 
FSR, which provided a framework upon which new concepts could be built. 
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The Doctrinal Culture of the British Army 
 
The historiography of pre-1914 British Army doctrine reveals polarised 
opinions. Whilst noting that the British Army generally rejected the notion of 
prescriptive, formal doctrine, scholars are divided upon the functions and 
merits of FSR. Holden Reid offers that 
 
... a fundamental and instinctive reality in the British Army ... [was] 
a widespread reluctance to formulate scientific, doctrinal 
statements ... [I]t is abundantly clear that throughout the twentieth 
century, the army lacked a coherent doctrinal philosophy.132 
 
Taking such an argument further, Travers suggests that the inbuilt flexibility 
and lack of prescription contained within FSR meant that the British Army 
possessed 'no official doctrine,' a position supported by Brown and by 
Spencer Jones.133 In a critical vein, Bidwell and Graham note that the British 
Army's  
 
rejection of a totalitarian doctrine was sensible but its worship of 
pragmatism and its almost complete rejection of theory was not.134 
 
In contrast, Luvaas characterises FSR as providing the Army with a 'uniform 
doctrine.'135 For Badsey, drills books and manuals such as FSR did constitute 
doctrine, and they came to play an increasingly important role as the British 
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Army approached the First World War.136 In taking such arguments to their 
logical extreme, Winter, in his much criticised study of Haig, suggests that 
FSR was too prescriptive, possessing 'biblical authority in the Army.'137 
Palazzo's Seeking Victory on the Western Front (2000) utilises the notion of 
ethos to explain that the British Army was able to achieve success between 
1914 and 1918 without possessing formal doctrine.138 For Palazzo, the 
absence of doctrine did not reflect an absence of  
 
[a] unifying philosophy, or, more accurately, an ethos that provided 
an equivalent structure for the decision making process.139 
 
This ethos was 'more dramatic and all encompassing than doctrine' and, 
based on cultural factors, 'provided the continuity of thought that welded the 
army into a whole.'140 For Sheffield,  
 
the BEF did evolve and apply a 'doctrine,' albeit a semi-informal 
one, based on the pre-war Field service regulations.141  
 
Thus, FSR, in its evolving editions, provided 'broad principles for action' that 
reflected contemporary debates regarding the maintenance of flexibility in 
command.142 Thus, the British Army's doctrinal culture was well suited, given 
its capacity for evolution, to provide the foundation for the development of air 
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power doctrine. Sheffield's conclusions are supported by the judgements of 
Simpson, who refers to FSR as a framework upon which sat 
 
a set of general principles for application by trained and 
experienced officers.143  
 
Bryson contends that FSR could be considered coherent doctrine, and he 
observes that  
 
pre-war doctrine – both informal and formal – played a significant 
role in informing debate and development.144  
 
It is the word 'informing' that is significant here, particularly if one accepts a 
retrospective interpretation of doctrine based upon Corbett.145 FSR may have 
embraced flexibility and a non-prescriptive approach, to such an extent that it 
warrants the critical reflections of Jones, yet it was more than merely tactical 
doctrine.146 It also provided the Army with a vehicle to articulate its role and 
function to interested parties. In accepting the perspective that FSR 
represented formal doctrine, it is reasonable to conclude that the Army 
constituted an organisation that understood the importance of producing 
material that served one of the important functions of doctrine as defined in 
the introduction: providing a conceptual framework of understanding that 
resulted in 'words hav[ing] the same meaning for all.'147 It is important to insert 
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the caveat that to suggest to contemporary officers that FSR represented 
doctrine would have provoked much condemnation. As Bidwell and Graham 
observe, the very word 'doctrine' 'carried with it unwelcome foreign 
philosophical and political baggage.'148 Such feelings were captured by a 
young J. F. C. Fuller in an article for JRUSI in the latter half of 1914. In his 
characteristically forthright language, Fuller was to remark that  
 
I have no doctrine to preach, for I believe in none. Every concrete 
case demands its own particular solution, and for this solution all 
that we require is skill and knowledge ... If there is a doctrine at all 
it is common sense, that is, action adapted to circumstances.149  
 
As established, however, FSR served some of the very modern functions of 
doctrine, and the use of the term is justified. 
 
The Training Manual: Conception and Birth 
 
For the fledgling MW, having official British Army doctrine updated to include 
the role and tasks of their unit was significant. Yet this update also served to 
push the MW along a particular path. Irrespective of the influence of Sykes 
with regard to shaping the offensive spirit and outlook of the MW, it would 
have been difficult, if not impossible, to manoeuvre the route of the MW in any 
other direction. FSR sat proudly atop the Army's doctrinal hierarchy, and 
subsequent documents would have to adhere to its underlying principles. FSR 
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stated that 'Decisive success in battle can only be gained by a vigorous 
offensive,' whilst  
 
above all a firmer determination in all ranks to conquer at any 
cost, are the chief factors of success [emphasis in original].150  
 
This was the environment in which the MW was being created, and themes of 
aggression, moral superiority, and the value of the offensive were dominant. 
By the arrival of the Army Manoeuvres of 1913, the importance of aerial 
fighting had been accepted as almost routine. The War Office instructions 
issued in August 1913 offered that the most effective method of countering an 
aircraft was 'a superior fleet of aeroplanes to hunt those of the enemy from the 
air.'151 Whilst the specific date is unclear, the intention of the MW to produce a 
Training Manual is evident from the winter of 1912 / 1913.152 Appearing in 
print during 1914, the first part of the Manual was to be produced as a joint 
venture between the Military and Naval Wings, and was to be concerned with 
the technical aspects of flight, including maintenance of aircraft and 
engines.153 Each Wing would also produce a second part to the Manual that 
would, amongst other tasks, set out the separate functions of the Wings in 
wartime.154 Sykes had hoped to have proof copies of the Training Manual 
available for distribution to all of his units in time for the manoeuvres of 1913, 
noting that,  
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When received, the instructions contained in these proofs should 
be carefully studied by all officers, and will be acted on as far as 
possible during these manoeuvres.155 
 
Wrangling over the title of the Manual and its content led to a delay in the MW 
obtaining proofs until September 1913.156 Sykes was still able to forward a 
copy to Major-General Monro for use during the exercises of the same 
month.157 As Sykes observed, it may have been only an early draft, but  
 
It gives ... an idea of the lines on which the aircraft will be working 
during the Army Exercise.158  
 
This achieved the very modern and informative functions of doctrine, as 
highlighted by Sheffield.159 In a letter to Sykes, Brancker, the Assistant 
DGMA, desired that a corrected proof of the Manual would be available prior 
to the training season of the following year (1914), a deadline met by 
Sykes.160 Moreover, Brancker wished the proof to be ready for a General Staff 
conference of January 1914.161 These two requests serve to underline two 
functions of the Manual: first, the rather obvious goal of utilising the material in 
conjunction with training the officers and men of the MW; and second, to 
disseminate information about the Wing to the upper echelons of the Army. 
The latter goal was vital, and the senior command of the MW was aware of 
the importance of ensuring that those with influence and power within the 
Army were kept fully informed of the progress, roles, and functions of the 
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Wing. This position seems to support the contentions of Paris and of Ash, who 
suggest that the MW undertook a proactive campaign to ensure support from 
its parent service.162 
 
In his response of 18 October 1913, Sykes also noted his desire to have 
copies of the proof available for the manoeuvres at the end of summer.163 Not 
only would this attain the training and educational functions of doctrine, but, 
pragmatically, the experience gained could be utilised with regard to 
amending the Manual.164 For Sykes, the production of the Training Manual 
was more than a mere administrative function for which he was responsible. 
As Brooke-Popham was to write when disseminating an early proof,  
 
[the Manual] represents the expenditure of numberless hours of 
toil, much sweat & many tears.165  
 
Sykes, along with his team, understood the importance of producing doctrine 
that encapsulated the theories and philosophies of military aviation, alongside 
evolving the material to increase its relevance and worth. That the draft of the 
Training Manual was subjected to a period of scrutiny and testing is telling, 
and the diligence of Sykes and the MW during this process demonstrates a 
sophisticated understanding of doctrine. Gray highlights one of the traditional 
traits of successful strategic leadership as being able to 'provide and 
                                            
162
 M. Paris, 'The Rise of the Airmen: The Origins of Air Force Elitism, c. 1890 – 1918,' 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.28, No.1 (Jan 1993), pp.134 – 135; E. Ash, 'Air Power 
Leadership: A Study of Sykes and Trenchard,' in Air Power Leadership: Theory and Practice, 
eds. P. W. Gray & S. Cox (London: HMSO, 2002), pp.162 – 163. 
163
 AIR 1/785/204/4/558 – Training Manual, Part II: Suggested Amendments etc. Letter, 
Sykes to Brancker, 11 Oct 1913. 
164
 Ibid. 
165
 AIR 1/785/204/4/558 – Training Manual, Part II: Suggested Amendments etc. Note, 
Brooke-Popham to MW HQ, 14 Jul 1913. 
101 
 
communicate the vision and purpose of [the] new organisation.'166 Gray 
argues that the reality of successful senior leadership is more complex. 
Specifically, he notes the importance of reacting to situations, particularly at 
the interfaces that exist between organisations, and at the interfaces within 
one's own organisation. Such leadership must be tempered by acknowledging 
the practical restraints of the time and responding appropriately.167 It could be 
argued that Sykes's leadership of the MW during this period provides an 
excellent example that supports Gray's argument. Moreover, Sykes's wider 
communicative goal for the Training Manual supplies further evidence with 
which to commend Sykes's leadership during this period.  
 
In a letter to the DGMA, Sykes urged the widespread dissemination of the 
Manual, including personal copies for officers and NCOs, whilst central 
supplies would be held at HQ, squadron, and flying depot level.168 Plainly, 
Sykes wanted to ensure that the message and philosophy contained within 
the pages of the Manual reached a wide audience. Without acknowledging as 
much, Sykes was subscribing to Corbett's belief with regard to the importance 
of language providing a shared meaning and understanding. In another letter 
to the DGMA, on the eve of the training season, Sykes urged the release of 
the approved version of the Manual in time for use during the proposed MW 
camp of June 1914.169 Sykes noted that, without the Manual, the work of the 
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Wing during the camp would be 'very much hampered.'170 The importance of 
the Manual was captured in Brancker's reply, in which 100 uncorrected proofs 
were supplied so as not to hinder the training of the Wing.171 Again, the intent 
of the senior hierarchy of the MW was clear: the message contained within 
the Manual was crucial, and it was vital that MW personnel were familiar with 
its contents. 
 
During the month-long training camp of June 1914, arranged by Sykes, days 
were devoted to both flying training and lectures.172 Never one to miss a 
public relations opportunity, Sykes choreographed the activities of his Wing to 
garner maximum publicity in the press.173 This highlights Sykes's general use 
of the press, a factor upon which he reflects in his memoirs.174 The training 
undertaken at the camp, albeit in a concentrated manner, captured the varied 
work that constituted the routine of pre-war squadrons.175 In the era of the Air 
Battalion, the business of military aviation was very much focused on 
exploring the art of flying and learning the limitations and possibilities of 
aircraft. As Raleigh observes,  
 
the pilots were new to their work, and the triumph was to get into 
the air at all.176  
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Such activities were limited by the small numbers of aircraft available, and by 
an understandably cautious attitude, given that aviation was still a relatively 
new pursuit.177 The work of MW squadrons varied greatly, with No.3 
Squadron, for example, in addition to the normal duties of maintaining the 
flying skills of its pilots, undertaking experimentation with guns and bombs. 
For other squadrons, routine cross-country flights, experimentation, and 
preparation for the summer manoeuvres, were central tasks.178 As Hearn 
suggests, individual squadrons displayed initiative in developing practical 
methods for the utilisation of air power in a military context.179 Such activity 
was in addition to running up and testing new aircraft. As daily orders from the 
period indicate, Squadron commanders had the additional burden, supported 
by HQ staff, of undertaking the logistical and administrative functions to build 
the Wing and its squadrons from scratch.180  
 
It was during the summer training camp of 1914 that the serious likelihood of 
war with Germany was conveyed to the assembled personnel of the MW.181 
Such news did nothing to diminish interest in discussing fighting in the air, and 
it may well have galvanised attention anew, with such activities now 
increasingly likely in the near future. In a talk delivered on 15 June 1914, 
Musgrave was insistent that efforts in developing aerial gunnery were now of 
'paramount importance.'182 In the discussion that followed Musgrave's lecture, 
an important issue regarding the significance of aerial fighting was raised by 
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Major Raleigh, commander of No.4 Squadron. In debating the merits of 
seeking or avoiding combat with enemy aircraft, Sykes made a highly succinct 
point and stressed that, whilst obtaining information was the prime role of the 
MW, this would be the same for the enemy.183 As a result, fighting in the air 
would form an integral part of hindering and disabling the enemy's means of 
collecting information. In essence, Sykes was reaffirming the inter-
dependency of reconnaissance and aerial fighting, established in the 
Technical Sub-Committee's report of 1912. 184  
 
This inter-dependency was formalised during this period with the publication 
of the Training Manual, which confirmed the MW's commitment to aerial 
fighting as the method to establish the control of the air. In line with the 
administrative measures discussed above, this document was widely 
available to MW personnel in attendance at the camp.185 Reconnaissance and 
aerial fighting would go hand in hand as the BEF sought contact with the 
enemy (the strategic phase), and as the enemy was brought to battle (the 
tactical phase). Sykes was not the sole author of the Training Manual, and his 
senior squadron commanders, such as Brooke-Popham, wrote large sections 
of the text. However, Sykes was responsible for the overall content of the 
Manual, and it reflected the ideas to which he gave primacy. As noted, the 
command of the MW was remarkably cohesive, and the pre-war writings of 
Henderson, Burke, Brooke-Popham, and Sykes shared common values, none 
more so than a commitment to an offensive spirit.  
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There was a sense from the Manual that the whole manner of hypothesising 
and codifying ideas concerning aircraft in war was at an early stage. In 
keeping with the doctrinal style of FSR, which rejected prescription, the 
Training Manual served to give a general overview of the capabilities of 
aircraft, whilst enthusing the MW with the correct spirit in which to carry out its 
operations.186 Parton contends that the development of early air power 
doctrine was problematic, because ideas and doctrine were created without 
analysed experience as a basis upon which to theorise. Due to this lack of 
experience, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to make the Manual 
any more prescriptive.187 
 
An important feature of the Manual was the framing of air power in moral 
terms, and its pages provided an apt companion to FSR's focus on moral 
superiority. Fighting against other aircraft would be a moral struggle between 
the pilots of the opposing forces.188 Such fighting would also have a moral 
effect on ground forces, and it was important for friendly troops to see friendly 
aircraft dominating the skies. In being a fitting addition to FSR, the Training 
Manual was authored so as to lead to a receptive response from the hierarchy 
of the British Army. French and Haig's approval and support of RFC 
operational and tactical practice during the First World War (such practices 
based on the doctrine contained within the Training Manual) is perhaps the 
most compelling evidence that, in formulating the doctrine of the MW, Sykes 
and his colleagues had constructed their ideas expertly and consistently, in a 
language that would gain widespread approval from the Army. 
                                            
186
 F. H. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1922), p.39.  
187
 N. Parton, 'The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine,' pp.4 – 5. 
188
 General Staff, AP 144, Training Manual, RFC (Military Wing), Part II (Jun 1914), p.47. 
106 
 
Aggression was another key theme that was expressed with some clarity: 
'Opposing aircraft ... must be relentlessly pursued and destroyed.'189 The 
teaching staff at Quetta would have approved of this language and the 
aggressive intent contained within the Manual. The Training Manual left no 
confusion over the goal of aerial fighting and the tactics to be adopted: 'To 
disable the pilot of the opposing aeroplane will be the first objective.'190 Above 
all, this meant killing the enemy pilot, and MW aviators were under no illusions 
with regard to their duty in the air. The chivalrous nature of early air combat 
may be an image cultivated in popular histories of the First World War, but it 
does not sit comfortably with the content of early air power doctrine.191 
 
Another fascinating element of the Manual was the language used to discuss 
fighting in the air. The 'command of the air' was characterised on page 47 as 
being a struggle between individual and / or pairs of aircraft.192 Successive 
victories would lead to moral ascendancy over the enemy's pilots, which 
would leave friendly reconnaissance machines unopposed. On page 49, use 
was made of the term 'superiority in the air.'193 The intention of using differing 
terms is unclear, but it hints at the realisation that there may in fact be 
differing levels of control in the air. Linguistically, 'command of the air' implied 
an absolute dominance, whilst 'superiority in the air' appeared to be a lesser 
condition, possibly as an intermediate step before total command was 
obtained.  
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It is unclear whether this intermediate condition captured an understanding of 
the impermanence of air power, with the effects of the control of the air being 
limited in both time and space. It is more likely that it reflected the Army's 
focus on the importance of moral factors and the prevalence of the short-war 
myth. The difference at this stage, however, was largely semantic, and it is 
clear that, even if Sykes accepted that an intermediate condition of the control 
of the air was possible, he believed that absolute dominance in the air based 
upon a relentless, aggressive campaign would be decisively achieved in a 
short space of time. The decisive character of this struggle would be attained 
by achieving moral superiority over the enemy. 
 
That only three pages were devoted to 'fighting against other aircraft' was 
entirely proper, given that there was almost no practical basis upon which to 
create doctrine or to provide guidance.194 It would require active operations to 
gain this knowledge, and the tactics and methods for aerial fighting would 
have to be codified once this had been obtained. This is a significant detail, 
and, from its inception, the Manual was conceived as a document that, in 
keeping with the precedent of FSR, would provide a framework upon which 
effective operational methods and tactical solutions could evolve.195 It is 
evident that, in contrast to Winter's assertion that pre-war British Army 
doctrine was prescriptive to the point of dogma, both FSR and the Training 
Manual embraced the organic nature of doctrine.196 A most prudent example 
is captured in the 1914 amendments to FSR, which included a significant 
increase in the material relating to air power and a clearer focus on, and 
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understanding of, contemporary expectations and beliefs concerning the 
control of the air: 
 
By far the most effective method of dealing with hostile aircraft is to 
attack them with armed aeroplanes.197  
 
FSR, along with the Training Manual, was designed to evolve, and was not 
static. Within the Manual, the lengthier sections on reconnaissance did reflect 
the importance of the task, but also that it was more straightforward to 
extrapolate instructions from existing doctrine. Moreover, in Henderson and 
Sykes, the MW possessed two recognised experts in the field. A more general 
criticism of the Manual was its total focus on the MW's operations in 
conjunction with an expeditionary force. As the introduction to this chapter 
established, such a focus reflected the tactical obsession of military aviators. 
Whereas the principles espoused in the Manual could be applied to almost 
any military situation, the failure to include material concerning air defence, a 
task for which the MW possessed at least joint (if not sole) responsibility, is a 
striking omission. Whilst this is explored more fully in the following chapter, it 
is important to note that, throughout the proofing process of the Training 
Manual, there was not a single reference made to air defence. When this 
omission is considered in light of continued War Office attempts to ensure that 
the military possessed responsibility for the aerial defence of the UK, it is 
difficult not to be critical of the WO.198 There was a clear disconnect between 
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the functions of the MW as foreseen by the War Office, and those articulated 
in the formal and informal doctrine produced by Sykes and his senior team.  
 
As Ash states, 
 
The size of the manual and the areas covered by it are less 
important than its influence. It was the air power bible the RFC 
carried into battle.199 
 
Gray cautions against overemphasising the influence of doctrinal publications, 
and, to an extent, Ash may overstate the influence of the Manual.200 However, 
this document reflected the ideals to which Sykes and the command of the 
MW gave precedence. Importantly, the MW conducted its operations in line 
with these ideals. The aggressive spirit evident in the opening encounters of 
the First World War was in keeping with the doctrine contained in the Manual. 
Again, the sophisticated and modern functions served by the Manual are 
further evidence that, in line with Gray's analysis, Sykes was demonstrating 
the traits of successful strategic leadership.  
 
As noted above, Sykes was a great believer in spreading the gospel of air 
power. For Ash, Sykes was 'a salesman to the receptive and a gadfly to the 
sceptical.'201 However, advocating doctrinal concepts to the Army was 
anything but new, and Haig's authorship and promotion of FSR provides 
another example of this process. A crucial element to this strategy was the 
Training Manual and the articulation of the importance of air power via official 
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channels. Yet, Sykes's efforts on behalf of military aviation extended into the 
sphere of the demi-official. For example, Sykes and other senior figures within 
the MW made extensive use of forums such as RUSI and the Aeronautical 
Society to convey their visions for air power. As Sykes noted in a lecture 
delivered in February 1913, he felt it important to disseminate information 
concerning the RFC to the wider public. This would be a vital step in building 
a 'partnership' between the Corps, its parent bodies (the Army and Navy), and 
the public.202 Sykes was hopeful that a 'Royal Flying Corps Journal' could be 
established, in which those interested in service aviation, professional and 
public alike, could submit articles.203 For Sykes, generating widespread 
interest in military aviation was a significant component of his command of the 
MW. 
 
In his memoirs, John Slessor, a future MRAF, recalled a pre-war visit from 
Brooke-Popham to the public school at Haileybury, in which the latter, an 
alumnus of the school, gave out prizes and delivered a brief talk on air power 
to the assembled boys.204 Via official, demi-official, and unofficial channels, 
the MW undertook a vigorous campaign to 'sell' air power to 'interested 
parties.' These included those in the armed forces who would be their 'service 
users' and patrons; the public, who would ultimately foot both the political and 
economic bill for military air power; and young schoolboys, who would be the 
future recruits of the service. Sykes was also to take advantage of royal 
interest in aviation, and, in May 1913, King George V and Queen Mary visited 
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the Corps for the second time. Sykes's memoirs, citing an extract from an 
article in the Morning Post, record the positive impression left with 'Their 
Majesties' as the 'capacity and efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps was 
seen.'205 The MW was even included as part of the 1914 recruiting film, The 
British Army Film, being referred to as the 'fourth arm of the Army.'206 
 
The MW's active courting of the press, generally in stark contrast to their 
naval counterparts, was not always successful. C. G. Grey, editor of the 
Aeroplane, was often hypercritical of the efforts of Britain's military aviators. 
Such criticism prompted Henderson to write to Grey, informing the latter that  
 
I think the Aeroplane is useful and your criticisms are of much 
value ... But with regard to your correspondents ... [I am] rather 
tired of being spoon fed with advice which is so obviously based on 
ignorance and lack of advisory care in reading official 
publications.207 
 
It is interesting to note that this exchange did not sour the attitude of all RFC 
officers, and Trenchard and Grey had a seemingly cordial relationship.208 
Moreover, Grey's negative feelings toward military aviation during this period 
did not find their way into Raleigh's volume of official history, in spite of Grey's 
role in providing notes and reading parts of the study.209  
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Military Wing Weapons Testing 
 
As BR 1806, Third Edition (2004) suggests, doctrine has a role to play with 
regard to the articulation of material requirements and the subsequent 
development and utilisation of technology.210 If the pre-1914 conception of the 
control of the air was based upon the use of armed aircraft to dominate the 
skies, then, in keeping with the doctrine articulated in the Training Manual, the 
MW needed to undertake a programme of experimentation with regard to the 
development of armament suitable for use in aircraft. Neville Jones, the most 
vehement critic of the MW, asserts that  
 
There were, it is true, vague ideas that aircraft might have to fight in 
the air ... [b]ut in August 1914 not even the first steps had been 
taken to make possible such offensive action. 211 
 
As the following section demonstrates, such conclusions require revision. The 
arguments of Goulter and Paris, who criticise the MW for their approach to 
experimentation, not only for a lack of enthusiasm, but also for the 
rudimentary nature of the testing and development that was undertaken, need 
contextualising.212 Unlike their naval colleagues, the Army did not possess a 
culture that embraced material innovation and the professional approach 
required to develop increasingly complex technological weapons and 
systems.213 In addition, there were pragmatic reasons for the manner in which 
experimentation was undertaken by the MW. 
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Serious experimentation with heavy machine guns began during 1913. Far 
from appearing unenthusiastic, Sykes and the MW were frustrated by the lack 
of aircraft and weapons with which to conduct their tests.214 There were 
delays due to concerns regarding the practicalities of mounting a gun in an 
aircraft, which required the greatest care and attention.215 Such delays must 
also be placed within the wider context of the development of the MW. In 
September 1912, Sykes had addressed the officers and men of the MW, and 
noted that 
 
The opening months of our career as a unit have been difficult 
ones. They were bound to be so. There were no cut and dried lines 
or precedents upon which to work ... We are forming a corps with 
great speed, – I suppose unprecedented speed, in peace time.216 
 
Every matter was a matter of concern for Sykes and the MW, and preparing to 
capitalise on the success of the 1912 manoeuvres was a high priority. The 
relatively slow progress made with regard to aerial firing reflected the 
multitude of tasks that required attention, and the pace at which change was 
being driven.217 Establishing a logistical and support infrastructure was a high 
priority, but involved seemingly tedious staff work with regard to the 
development of a logistical infrastructure. Between March and October 1913, 
Sykes also organised the MW's contribution to the Army's summer 
manoeuvres, as well as sitting on various interdepartmental committees.218 
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These tasks were in addition to his work on aerial gunnery. It would perhaps 
be fitting to characterise this, following Ash, as building without any bricks.219 
 
Experiments were undertaken during June and July 1913, but were concluded 
in time for No.3 Squadron to devote its attention to the Army Manoeuvres. 
Woodman is too critical of these efforts, removing them from the wider context 
of the period.220 Progress was necessarily steady, given the unprecedented 
nature of the work and the lack of a data set upon which to build. The 
reliability of the weapons had to be established on the ground before aerial 
testing could take place. Basic questions regarding the stability of the 
aeroplane whilst firing in the air had to be answered, as did the weight 
carrying capability of the aircraft.221 Moreover, before serious testing could 
begin, No.3 Squadron required technical instruction in the use of the 
weapons.222 As a result of testing, important groundwork was laid, and Sykes 
was keen to resume experiments as soon as the pressure of the manoeuvres 
had passed, seeking to relocate future testing to the Musketry School at 
Hythe.223 Demonstrating the bureaucratic fog which can affect the most 
determined efforts, the administrative steps to begin experiments at Hythe 
were somewhat involved, and it took a long exchange of letters between 
Sykes and the School to finalise arrangements.224 The length of time also 
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reflected the important staff preparations needed to ensure the success of 
these experiments, and provisions were made for aircraft sheds and 
accommodation, whilst the ground and ranges at Hythe had to be inspected 
by MW personnel in order to ensure their suitability.225  
 
A more complete schedule of testing was drawn up, and it is clear that more 
comprehensive results were expected than those obtained during the 
preliminary trials.226 Whilst Sykes was to thank the School for the help the MW 
received, the evidence suggests that full and timely co-operation was not 
forthcoming. The Commandant reminded Sykes that his prime responsibility 
was the running of the School, and it was noted in the final report that testing 
could only take place on days when the ranges were not in use.227 It is clear 
that, in conducting these tests, procedural issues, as well as matters of health 
and safety, were factors that did not help facilitate expeditious 
experimentation. These were matters out of the hands of Sykes, and timely 
intervention on his behalf was not forthcoming.  
 
The experiments, taking place between December 1913 and February 1914, 
were hampered by bad weather, whilst basic measures had to be taken to 
provide flyers and gunners with maximum assistance. These were necessary 
because, as the report on such experiments concedes, the science of aerial 
gunnery was in its infancy and had no foundation of pre-existing knowledge 
upon which to build; every experiment was literally exploring uncharted 
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territory.228 For example, experimentation with the Lewis Gun, a weapon that 
showed much promise, needed to be carried out in a thorough fashion. This 
included endurance work to ensure its long-term viability under the strains of 
heavy usage; a point not acknowledged by Paris.229 Testing could not be 
rushed or hurried, as a thorough approach was required in order to ensure the 
development and subsequent deployment of effective weapons.230 That the 
experiments during the summer of 1913 and the winter of 1913 – 1914 were 
disappointing does not make them failures, nor was the lack of success based 
upon a deficiency of enthusiasm. The nature of progress reflected the trial and 
error process that the MW was forced to undergo in order to establish the 
rudimentary knowledge necessary for the successful development of efficient 
aerial weapons. Sykes left the decision regarding the ordering and 
development of future weapons in the hands of the War Office and Directorate 
of Military Aeronautics. The last recorded correspondence in this series is 
dated at the beginning of March 1914. This is the most patent example of a 
lack of urgency, but it must be remembered that Sykes was also involved in 
developing plans for the future mobilisation of the MW, as well as organising 
the summer training camp. Moreover, he did not possess the necessary 
authority to make final decisions regarding the procurement of armament.  
 
In reviewing the progress made with regard to the testing of guns in the air, 
Musgrave produced a paper in April 1914.231 His summary was succinct, and 
within the report was a body of information upon which the MW could take its 
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developmental efforts to the stage of final experimentation and procurement. 
It was conceded, however, that further developmental efforts might have to 
wait until after the training season. This was sensible, given that the steps 
involved in planning and organising the Hythe experiments had been complex 
and lengthy.232 As noted, the summer season of training was overtaken by the 
pace of events, and the MW concluded its concentration camp with 
deployment for war, rather than a further round of experimentation. Even with 
the limited progress made, these experiments constituted an important 'first 
step' in developing the technologies necessary to seize control of the air. 
 
The Air Committee 
 
Another potentially significant development of the recommendations of the 
Technical Sub-Committee was the creation of the Air Committee (AC). This 
body, established in July 1912, and formed of members of the newly created 
RFC and representatives from the Royal Aircraft Factory, as well as senior 
figures in the Admiralty and War Office, was tasked with offering advice to the 
Cabinet on air matters. In addressing the opening meeting, J. E. B. Seely, 
Secretary of State for War and chairman of the AC, commented that he 
envisaged the Committee as an intermediate step prior to the establishment 
of an 'Air Office ... having the same status as the War Office and Admiralty.'233 
Being advisory in nature, the Committee lacked any executive powers and 
was unable to resolve forcibly any disagreements or matters of contention. 
Cooper, in highlighting the increasingly difficult relationship between the air 
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arms of the War Office and Admiralty, is perceptive in noting the detrimental 
effect that this relationship had on the conduct of the air war between 1914 
and 1917, it being a major factor in the creation of the Royal Air Force.234  
 
The origins of these disagreements are found with the AC's lack of executive 
power, which provided the Army and Navy with the opportunity to develop a 
different approach to air power. This in itself was not troubling, as land and 
sea forces saw differing needs for aircraft. However, a lack of centralised 
authority provided the scope for the collapse of the joint military-naval RFC. 
This was due primarily to a duplication of effort and competition for resources 
and responsibilities.235 The AC's lack of decision-making ability also set a 
precedent for the largely ineffective Joint War Air Committee (JWAC) and Air 
Board of the First World War. The AC failed to give adequate support and 
direction to the MW, which was effectively left to its own impromptu 
development. Seely resigned in response to the Curragh incident, and it 
would be interesting to speculate upon the future development of the RFC 
had he continued as Secretary of State for War beyond March 1914.236  
 
A lack of executive authority also saw an intransigent attitude creep into the 
proceedings of the AC. The result was the prioritisation of some relatively 
unimportant issues, which further served to undermine its potentially 
influential role. A debate regarding the nomenclature of aircraft preceded that 
of aircraft armament, and it took over eighteen months from the formation of 
the AC for a serious discussion to take place concerning aircraft armament. It 
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is true that a preliminary discussion had taken place as early as the fourth 
meeting (3 December 1912), but little further direction was offered until 
October 1913.237 As a consequence, the MW was forced into a series of ad-
hoc testing that, whilst forming useful groundwork, failed to deliver results to 
match the theoretical and doctrinal enthusiasm for aerial fighting. Much of this 
work was duplicated by independent tests conducted by the Naval Wing 
(NW). By forcing both the Army and Navy into improvised development and 
evolution, the AC effectively sealed its own downfall as both the Military and 
Naval Wings became accustomed to making their own decisions and deciding 
upon their own direction. This emphasised the superfluous nature of the AC 
as a forum.238 
 
A more generous interpretation of the AC would argue that spending time 
discussing the production and development of aircraft engines was vital, given 
the large gap between the capabilities of Britain's military aviators and their 
European rivals. That the MW had no infrastructure upon which to build was 
another pressure that increased the amount of basic and, at times, seemingly 
trivial work with which the MW and AC had to engage. What is more, naval 
and military aviation had been moving in diverging directions prior to the 
creation of the AC, and it was simply beyond expectations for any committee 
or body to reunite these factions, short of the creation of a centralised 
headquarters for both the MW and NW.239 Nonetheless, the AC did not help to 
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translate the very real enthusiasm for aerial fighting, reflected in ideas, policy, 
and doctrine, into practical, preparatory measures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the discussion of pre-war ideas demonstrated, the importance of aerial 
fighting was noted, and its close links to reconnaissance – as a facilitator and 
disabler – were integral to this discourse. The consensus reached during 
these theoretical discussions was codified into tentative policy, which gave 
primacy to the notion of the control of the air and formalised the inter-
dependency of reconnaissance and fighting in the air. The importance of these 
ideas was only heightened by the interest of influential military figures in the 
development of aviation. These ideas were shaped by dominant military and 
strategic trends, which were typified by the Staff College education of Sykes 
and other graduates within the MW. This education stressed moral superiority, 
aggression, decisiveness, and offensive spirit, and these ideals were 
internalised by Sykes and many of his contemporaries.  
 
Such thinking was internalised and subsequently applied with a consistent 
logic during the formative years of the MW. The result was the influence of 
such ideas over the important Training Manual of June 1914. The writing and 
dissemination of the Manual encapsulated the sophisticated understanding of 
doctrine possessed by the Army. Importantly, it was an aggressive intent that 
remained the most obvious constant to RFC policy, doctrine, and practice 
during the First World War. Significantly, the early experiences of the air war 
121 
 
confirmed the appropriateness of the MW's pre-war decision to link 
reconnaissance and aerial fighting.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE NAVAL WING OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS, AND THE CONTROL 
OF THE AIR: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND POLICY, 1911 – 1914 
 
Introduction 
 
As noted in the first chapter, the Naval Wing of the RFC, later to become the 
RNAS, is characterised by Goulter as a 'very modern force.' 1 Her conclusions 
are supported by Parton, Paris, Neville Jones, and Grove.2 To misquote 
Orwell, the historiographical trend of pre-war aviation in Britain could be 
described as 'Naval Wing good, Military Wing bad.' Again, as noted 
previously, the dominance of such an interpretation is a response to the work 
of Raleigh and H. A. Jones. In particular, historians are troubled by Raleigh's 
contention that, at the outbreak of war, the NW was still an experimentally 
driven organisation that lacked the focus and definitive purpose of the MW.3 
 
This chapter explores the naval interpretation of the concept of the control of 
the air. Unlike most historical analyses of the Naval Wing, this chapter seeks 
to place naval air power within the wider strategic and philosophical context of 
its parent body, the Royal Navy. This is achieved by examining early naval air 
power hypothesising and the codification of these ideas into policy. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the wider philosophical and cultural 
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trends that affected naval attitudes towards doctrine. This serves to highlight 
the dominant 'material ethic' prevalent in the Navy during the decades leading 
to the First World War. This was also reflected in the educational experiences 
of senior members of the Naval Wing, which had a direct impact on the 
production of doctrine and the subsequent creation and maintenance of 
legitimate roles for air power within a naval context. 
 
Naval interest in aviation was varied, complex, and closely wedded to wider 
strategic interests. Naval aviation policy and practice prior to 1914 could be 
characterised as a response to a growing sense of strategic vulnerability, 
reflected in Admiralty papers of the period.4 Historically, the RN had assumed 
significant responsibilities for the strategic defence of Britain's Imperial and 
domestic interests.5 The RN developed aviation policy and practice that 
attempted to acquire a fleet of aerial craft to counter the air operations of the 
enemy. In terms of the control of the air, this led to the adoption of a counter 
offensive strategy in keeping with the aggressive and offensive philosophy of 
the RN. As Paris notes, the sense of a growing threat of German air power, 
based upon a sensationalised perception of the threat of rigid airships, came 
to influence naval aviation policy.6 The role occupied by airships within wider 
German naval strategy is instructive, and Germany's failure to keep pace with 
Britain in the naval arms race of the decade prior to the First World War made 
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the proliferation of airships an important strategic priority for Germany.7 As 
Powers suggests, airships were viewed as a force multiplier for the German 
Navy.8 German airships could undertake strategic reconnaissance on behalf 
of the German fleet, whilst there were also suggestions that they could be 
used for direct attack against British capital ships and the Royal Navy's 
support infrastructure in the UK. These possibilities, which were recognised 
as threatening Britain's naval dominance, and thus Britain's overall security, 
were a significant influence on naval aviation policy prior to the First World 
War.9 Thus, as with the military, at the core of naval aviation doctrine was the 
notion of the control of the air. In the naval instance, pre-war air policy 
emphasised the protection of Britain's strategic interests by countering the air 
operations of a hostile state. The contrast between the tactical emphasis of 
the Military and the strategic focus of the Naval Wing in relation to the control 
of the air is palpable. 
 
Early Hypothesising 
 
As it had for the Army, RUSI and its accompanying journal (JRUSI) provided 
the Navy with a demi-official forum for the discussion of issues relating to air 
power. In the naval instance, there was not the same level of causal 
connection between the establishment of the RFC and pre-1911/12 
hypothesising. By highlighting several prominent naval themed lectures, it is 
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possible to demonstrate this disconnect. It was no coincidence that 1906 
proved to be the year in which a senior naval figure delivered an address that, 
however briefly, touched upon the potential impact of aviation in a naval 
sense. Sir Charles Campbell, delivering his lecture some four months after J. 
E. Capper's offering, concluded that developments in aviation required that 
the Navy give the subject 'serious consideration.'10 Campbell continued by 
suggesting that, once perfected, 'free airships' – i.e. powered and navigable 
balloons – could be utilised in a tactical role to monitor the activities of enemy 
ships or, in a more distant role, the activities within enemy harbours.11 The 
need to gather information relating to enemy intentions and movements was a 
logical role foreseen by most individuals who took an early interest in aviation 
(irrespective of their professional allegiance).12  
 
Toward the end of his lecture, Campbell delivered a seemingly nonchalant 
comment, which argued that improvements in the technical proficiency of 
flying machines could lead to the capital ship becoming the 'sparrow,' and the 
airship, the 'hawk.'13 As with J. E. Capper's 1906 comments, Campbell's 
contention was overstated and underdeveloped, evidenced by the crude 
illustration featured in his article.14 Yet, his suggestion served to highlight the 
potential of aerial navigation and the threat that it posed to Britain's historic 
and vital naval supremacy. In addition, if an airship (or aircraft) had the 
potential to carry and drop explosive ordnance, then the possibilities against 
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which such a weapon could be utilised were not limited to seaborne targets.15 
Without suggesting an antidote to the threat of air power, Campbell observed 
that it might not be too long before discussions took place regarding 'the 
tactics of an aerial battle.'16  
 
Campbell hinted that a contest for the control of the air could be a feature of a 
future conflict, following the likely pattern of a fleet action in the skies. More 
generally, Campbell's lecture touched upon feelings of vulnerability that were 
to affect naval aviation policy prior to the First World War. It is also interesting 
to note that not one of the naval officers in attendance at the meeting felt 
compelled to offer any comment on the threat constituted by air power in 
relation to Britain's naval position. In fact, there appeared to be a general lack 
of interest displayed toward any of Campbell's comments. Only two naval 
officers offered any feedback, and the transcript of the post-lecture discussion 
feels somewhat subdued. This was an unusual occurrence for RUSI lectures, 
which often concluded with a vigorous and, at times, fiery debate.17 As a final 
point, developed further below, it is prudent to comment upon the technical 
composition of Campbell's address. This reflected the organisational focus of 
the RN, which attached high priority to technical innovation and proficiency.  
 
It would not take long, some two years after Campbell's lecture, for the 
attention of the RN to return to the threat of air power. In a translation from the 
German, JRUSI printed an article written by Captain Neumann, an instructor 
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in the German Airship Battalion.18 It is of no small significance that the article 
was translated and forwarded to JRUSI by the RN's Director of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI), and Andrew Lambert praises the role of the Naval 
Intelligence Department (NID) in helping shape defence debates at RUSI.19 In 
developing upon the speculative conclusions of Campbell, and with the 
benefit of a wealth of practical experience, Neumann concluded that the prime 
use of free or motor air-ships was for tactical scouting in conjunction with the 
fleet.20 Of course, he was careful to qualify all his statements, noting that 
aerial navigation was still in an early stage of development.21 However, it was 
with a series of increasingly alarming conclusions that Neumann's article 
attracted the attention of the DNI. First, Neumann noted the relative 
invulnerability of airships from ground fire; second, the ability of the airship to 
carry explosive ordnance; and, most worryingly, that such ordnance could be 
directed against ships (including blockading vessels), land based naval 
establishments, docks, and coastal forts. Such attacks would have a profound 
moral effect upon the side being subjected to such bombardment.22 Moreover, 
these operations could quite easily be conducted during the hours of 
darkness.23 The seriousness of these statements was further heightened by 
                                            
18
 Captain Neumann, 'The Possibility of Making Use of Balloons and Motor Air-ships in the 
Navy,' JRUSI, Vol. 52, No.2 (Jul / Dec 1908): pp.1502 – 1517 and pp.1653 – 1675. 
19
 A. Lambert, 'The Development of Education in the Royal Navy,' pp.48 – 49. On the origins 
of the NID and the DNI, see J. Hattendorf et al., eds., British Naval Documents, 1204 – 1960, 
pp.610 – 612. Minutes by members of Admiralty on proposals for a new department for 
intelligence and mobilization 6 Oct 1886. See pp. 612 – 614 for Instructions for the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, January 1887. 
20
 Captain Neumann, 'Balloons and Motor Air-ships in the Navy,' pp.1502 – 1503 and p.1666.  
21
 Captain Neumann, 'Balloons and Motor Air-ships in the Navy,' p1501. 
22
 Captain Neumann, 'Balloons and Motor Air-ships in the Navy,' pp.1514 – 1515 and p.1670.  
23
 Captain Neumann, 'Balloons and Motor Air-ships in the Navy,' p.1515 and p.1669.  
128 
 
Neumann's observation of the lack of progress made with regard to aerial 
navigation and airship development in England [sic].24  
 
Possibly reflecting the influence of Neumann's articles, the threat of German 
air power was considered by the Admiralty in December 1908 (constituting an 
aerial attack on the fleet as a preliminary to a German invasion), but was not 
thought feasible.25 The threat of invasion, considered unrealistic by the Navy 
throughout this period, was a recurring theme in high-level political and 
strategic discussions.26 These debates achieved little, except to highlight 
feelings of vulnerability that were only aggravated by the German proliferation 
of air power.27 However unlikely, the Admiralty was sufficiently alarmed to 
monitor the situation, and it is very probable that these fears were conveyed 
to Lord Esher's Sub-Committee on Aerial Navigation.28 Esher's Sub-
Committee, which reported in January 1909, concurred with the conclusions 
of both Neumann and Campbell, emphasising the use of airships for scouting 
work with the fleet and stressing their potential with regard to offensive, bomb-
dropping operations.29 Neville Jones noted that the conclusions of the 
Committee were remarkable  
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for the formation of a body of opinion which recognized the growing 
offensive power of the air machine and the extreme vulnerability of 
Britain to air attack.30  
 
Whilst noting Britain's vulnerability, the Committee chose to act cautiously and 
to recommend funds to procure experimental craft for the Navy. This was an 
important decision, as naval aviation strategy, policy, and doctrine could not 
be created without some practical understanding of the nature and capabilities 
of aerial craft. There is obvious similarity here with regard to RN policy in 
relation to the submarine.31 However, it was at the demi-official forum of RUSI 
that further hypothesising took place regarding the control of the air. 
 
F. G. Stone, an artilleryman with an interest in aviation, delivered a paper in 
the aftermath of the Esher report that sought to explore the 'Defence of 
Harbours against Naval Airships.'32 Citing the work of Neumann, Stone's 
March 1909 lecture reflected the now established consensus that naval air 
power, specifically airships, would be utilised to scout for the fleet and to drop 
explosive ordnance on warships and other vital targets. It was, of course, the 
latter contention that continued to galvanise attention.33 In being the first to 
offer serious consideration to the methods for countering airship attack, Stone 
highlighted the difficulties of utilising high angled guns for defence, particularly 
against targets moving through the air.34 J. E. Capper, in the discussion that 
followed the address, delivered what was effectively a mini-lecture on 
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countering the operations of enemy airships.35 Whilst acknowledging the 
importance of ground-based defences, Capper, with rhetoric distinctly 
Mahanian in tone, noted that  
 
you must have an airship fleet in being which can put the enemy's 
airship fleet out of action before it reaches your vital area. It is the 
history of war all through: you must go for the enemy's army; you 
must go for the enemy's navy; you must go for the enemy's air 
fleet. Do not let his air fleet come to you ... we [must ensure we] 
can get to them in their own country and attack them.36 
 
Capper believed that, to counter the air offensive of the enemy, one must 
launch one's own air offensive. These conclusions support Paris's contention 
that a counter offensive air policy was being advocated some time before 
Churchill's speech to the House of Commons in March 1914, in which he set 
out details of British air defence policy.37 Capper's likening of this aerial 
conflict to something akin to a decisive fleet action in the skies was another 
logical conclusion, and was echoed in Campbell's brief offering during the 
post-lecture discussion.38  
 
As with Campbell's 1906 offering, Stone's lecture, which focused upon a naval 
topic, provoked no response from any other naval officer. Whilst it is not clear 
whether any other naval officers were present during Stone's lecture, this 
omission places air power in its correct position within the wider priorities of 
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the RN.39 As Brooks's study indicates, on the eve of the First World War, the 
Navy had much greater priorities than air power, including the crucial issue of 
providing the RN's most prized assets – heavy capital ships – with an 
advanced and capable fire control system.40 What is more, between 1911 and 
1913, only three specific articles and lectures addressed naval aviation 
directly, and one of these was printed in an unofficial journal, The Naval 
Review, which, as explored below, had earned itself a dubious reputation.41 
 
The threat of foreign air power continued to vex the Admiralty, and was the 
subject of a meeting at the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) in January 
1910.42 The perceived vulnerability of cordite factories, particularly to German 
air power, was the focus of the discussion, and, whilst emphasising the 
practical difficulties of aerial bomb dropping, the NID felt the issue was serious 
enough to recommend postponing the construction of new naval magazines.43 
From a practical standpoint, the report recommended a two-pronged 
approach to defence against such attacks, with the provision of both mobile 
and fixed protection. Fixed defences would take the form of high angled guns 
positioned close to important and vulnerable targets, alongside mobile 
defences consisting of aeroplanes, airships, and mobile guns.44 NID 
supported the now established consensus that the most effective counter 
against airships was the airship, although the defensive qualities of the 
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aeroplane, whilst not subject to extensive analysis, were not dismissed 
completely. In fact, Lord Esher was to reverse his position during 1910 as he 
concluded that the development of 'heavier-than-air-craft' had reached such a 
stage as to make them viable and important weapons of war.45 In his October 
1910 paper, submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), Esher 
also urged the consideration of whether a 'corps of aviators' should be 
created.46  
 
In February 1911, the Navy took a further tentative decision and selected four 
officers to undertake flying training.47 Arthur Longmore, later to attain a senior 
rank with the Royal Air Force, was of this number, and, possibly reflecting 
wider attitudes within the RN, his commanding officer offered to have the 
posting overturned as it would ruin a promising career.48 It was no small irony 
that Longmore's commanding officer, Godfrey Paine, rose to the highest 
position within the RNAS, being appointed as the newly created Fifth Sea 
Lord – responsible for naval aviation – during the latter half of the First World 
War. Thus, Raleigh's contention that Paine 'befriended aviation from the first' 
is somewhat misleading.49 It may have been another relatively cautious 
decision, but, by September 1911, the RN was in possession of four well-
trained aviators who could serve to train new pilots and act as a core upon 
which to develop naval aviation. Longmore's visit to France in October 1911 
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further highlighted the gap between the capabilities of British naval and 
military aviation and their counterparts on the continent.50  
 
The Technical Sub-Committee on Aerial Navigation 
 
These steps formed the background to the Navy's participation in the 
Committee, which was established to investigate Esher's concept of a national 
'corps of aviators.'51 As the previous chapter observed, a small Technical Sub-
Committee was tasked with producing practical proposals to take Esher's 
vision forward.52 Parton and Neville Jones highlight the peculiarities of the 
Technical Sub-Committee's report in relation to naval aviation.53 As the report 
concluded, further experimentation was required by the Navy to establish the 
roles and requirements of naval air power: 
 
Until such experiments have proved conclusively how far such 
operations are practicable it is impossible to forecast what the rôle 
of aeroplanes will be in naval warfare, or to elaborate on any 
permanent organisation.54 
 
However, as this chapter has demonstrated, the Admiralty, to a greater or 
lesser extent, was aware of the threat of German air power. As Neville Jones 
comments, pre-1911 hypothesising did not seem to affect the conclusions of 
the Technical Sub-Committee's report. In particular, the need to undertake 
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defensive preparations against enemy air power, a key facet of the control of 
the air, was not considered in any depth.55 The overwhelming tactical focus of 
the report, particularly in relation to land-based air power, reflected the 
composition of the Committee, which was dominated by the military. The 
naval members of the Committee lacked the authority and standing of their 
military counterparts. For example, those signing the report for the War Office 
included Seely, as Under-Secretary of State for War, and Henderson and 
Scott-Moncrieff, both Brigadiers. The Admiralty's representatives consisted of 
Commander C. R. Samson and Lieutenant R. Gregory. 56 
 
Neville Jones, heavily critical of the military throughout his study, does not 
explore this issue, as it was the Admiralty that was responsible for appointing 
such junior officers to the Committee. Furthermore, it was the Admiralty's 
responsibility to ensure that these officers were provided with sufficient senior 
support that, in ideal circumstances, should have constituted an officer of 
equivalent station and standing to Henderson. The Navy would be subject to 
similar criticism during the First World War, as its interaction with air policy 
bodies was characterised by a somewhat intransigent attitude and the 
appointment of officers lacking sufficient executive authority.57 
 
The composition of the Committee is more curious when it is noted that, at 
this time, the Navy's First Lord (Admiralty's political head) was Winston 
Churchill, a renowned 'aero-phile' and committed supporter of the 'corps of 
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aviators' concept.58 Sir John Fisher, former First Sea Lord (Admiralty's 
professional chief) and unofficial advisor to Churchill, was also an enthusiastic 
supporter of aviation.59 The Admiralty lacked senior officers with the technical 
experience of aviation who could match the standing and status of 
Henderson, yet a more concerted effort was required to ensure that early 
aviation policy incorporated the intentions and desires of the RN. It was the 
Admiralty's failure to participate effectively in the production of this early policy 
that laid the foundations for a divergent approach to air power and a 
potentially destructive split from the military, sealing the collapse of the Flying 
Corps concept before it was given an adequate chance to succeed.  
 
It was not the case that the RN lacked preliminary material upon which to 
draw to make policy suggestions during this period. The Admiralty was also 
aware of the need to advise the Committee of their desires and intentions 
regarding aviation. In a letter to Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, 
the secretary of the CID suggested that the RN needed to consider drawing 
up proposals setting out the use of aerial craft in a naval context.60 
Specifically, Battenberg was advised to consult with the two officers who had 
the greatest experience and standing with regard to naval aviation: Murray 
Sueter, who would be appointed as the first DAD; and Charles Samson, who 
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would assume the role of the Naval Wing's first operational commander.61 
Both men were intriguing individuals who seemed to share a restless passion 
for mechanical and technical innovation.  
 
In a lengthy paper written in December 1911, and pre-empting the above, 
Sueter attempted to address the issue of the purpose of naval aviation 
(amongst several other topics).62 Sueter set out seven specific tasks for naval 
air power, which could be grouped under two headings: first, scouting (both 
tactical and strategic), including in connection with naval gunnery; and 
second, the attack of hostile aircraft and airships.63 The latter role 
encompassed air defence, as Sueter commented on the importance of 
ensuring cooperation between military and naval aviators in relation to coastal 
defence.64 As Raleigh observes, Sueter was invited to give evidence to the 
Sub-Committee, and, in doing so, stressed the importance of attaining 
'command of the air.'65 It seems something of an anomaly that Sueter was not 
a full member of the Technical Sub-Committee. Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who 
became Chief of Staff at the Admiralty, also concurred with the importance of 
coastal defence, and produced a paper addressing such an issue.66 Yet, 
Troubridge was not well respected by senior members of the Admiralty, 
possibly reflecting his role in the creation of the Naval Staff.67 
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However, the February 1912 report of the Technical Sub-Committee made no 
mention of the defence of British airspace, a core component of the control of 
the air. This is an interesting development when it is noted that senior officers 
within the RN were producing papers in which significance was attached to 
the subject. In addition, Sueter gave evidence to the Committee that stressed 
the importance of air defence. Thus, if there was a clear causal connection 
between pre-war hypothesising and the policy produced by the Committee in 
relation to military air power, then there was a distinct disconnect in the case 
of naval aviation. It is somewhat cynical, but it appears that the RN may have 
had little interest in the national 'corps of aviators' project from the beginning. 
Churchill was a noted supporter of the idea, yet, in general, the Admiralty 
seemed somewhat aloof in its approach to any discussions with external 
bodies or organisations.68 As both Kennedy and Nicholas Lambert 
acknowledge, this was part of a wider trend as the Navy, after dominating 
defence policy in the second half of the 1800s, became increasingly isolated 
in such debates after 1906.69 However, the Committee's report was approved 
and a Royal Warrant issued in April 1912, leading to the formation of the RFC 
in the following month. For the RN, the implications were the creation of the 
NW, and participation in the joint military-naval Central Flying School (CFS). 
 
In the aftermath of its creation, three simultaneous courses of action were 
now required by the NW. First, there was an urgent need to continue the 
practical development of air power (experimentation, the procurement of 
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aircraft and weapons, etc). Second, there was a need to articulate the NW's 
role and position in relation to the RN and Britain's wider defence 
establishment – above all else, this meant the production of clear and concise 
doctrine. Finally, there was a need to develop policy in relation to the 
application of naval air power.  
 
Naval Wing Air Defence Policy, 1912 – 1914 
 
Sueter's appointment as DAD was appropriate, reflecting the significant 
experience he possessed and his reputation as an officer with proven 
successes in the field of technological innovation.70 For example, Sueter had 
conducted important work with regard to the RN's early submarines, and was 
a noted and published expert on the subject.71 Prior to his appointment as 
DAD, Sueter had served as the Navy's Inspecting Captain of Airships.72 In 
setting out the remit of the post of DAD, the Admiralty assigned Sueter the 
task of developing naval aviation policy, whilst articulating the role and 
functions of the Wing via internal and external communications, including the 
production of formal publications.73 Sueter, prior to his appointment as DAD, 
had produced a paper that essentially restated the conclusions he had 
reached in December 1911. His August 1912 memo reemphasised the two 
important functions of naval air power as: reconnaissance work, both tactical 
and strategic; and the prevention of attacks against vital naval installations in 
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Britain.74 This confirmed that the concept of the control of the air, in the 
strategic and defensive sense of the term, was at the heart of naval aviation 
policy. However, a dialogue continued within Britain's defence community and 
within the Navy itself regarding the relative merits of airships and aircraft.75 
These discussions had clear implications for the implementation of a scheme 
for the practical air defence of vulnerable naval installations and facilities in 
Britain. Churchill's crucial role in these debates, and in shaping naval aviation 
policy, particularly in relation to air defence and the control of the air, is 
discussed below. 
 
Whilst the Navy's own rigid airship programme had resulted in failure, 
developments in Germany refocused naval attention on the potentialities of 
airships and the gap that existed between British and German capabilities.76 A 
report submitted to the CID in July 1912 concurred with the pre-1911 
conclusions of Campbell and Capper, arguing that the most effective counter 
to the airship was a fleet of friendly airships.77 However, in a December 1912 
meeting of the CID, Churchill found himself in a pitched battle with Admiral Sir 
Arthur Wilson with regard to the relative merits of airships and the threat they 
posed. Wilson believed the threat of the airship was overstated, particularly in 
relation to the performance of the aeroplane. Wilson also argued that he saw 
no evidence to suggest that a fleet of airships was the most effective counter 
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to an attack by airships. In The World Crisis, 1911 – 1914 (1923), Churchill 
claimed that he had never believed that the airship was a valuable weapon of 
war.78 However, as the evidence suggests, Churchill was fearful of the threat 
of German airships and expressed such thoughts with great clarity to the 
CID.79 In many respects, this exemplifies the difficulties of relying on 
Churchill's writings. Churchill regularly swings from venomous attacks to 
sympathetic treatments, with scant regard for logic or accuracy. However, his 
writings cannot be dismissed because, in the same measure, it is possible to 
locate significant sections containing balanced, accurate, and insightful 
reasoning.80 Being alarmed by the threat of German airships, Churchill sought 
the development of such craft so as to explore their capabilities. Any data 
gleaned from such developments would be utilised to plan for the defence of 
vulnerable naval targets in Britain.81 What is more, in subsequent discussions 
of the subject, Churchill, in correspondence with Wilson, and in front of the 
CID, continued to highlight the threat of the airship.82  
 
There was logic to Churchill's contentions, and airships did possess attractive 
and threatening qualities, depending on perspective. In comparison to aircraft, 
the airship had greater endurance, range, and weight carrying capability. In 
addition, it could gain height very rapidly, operate with little difficulty at night, 
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and provided a stable platform upon which to mount defensive armament. The 
influence of these factors was heightened by the dearth of practical 
knowledge of the capabilities of airships, which resulted from the failure of the 
pre-1912 rigid airship programme. The airship was also appealing to the naval 
mind at an intangible level. For example, during Burke's November 1911 
lecture to RUSI, a young naval officer made the direct parallel between the 
airship and the battleship, and the aircraft and the torpedo boat.83 Airships 
were to be the capital ships of the skies that, under anything but the least 
favourable conditions, would 'destroy large numbers of aeroplanes with ... 
[their] ... gun fire.'84 As Finlan highlights, the role of the ship is hugely 
important to the RN, whilst individualism is not a trait that is cultivated in the 
service.85 Contemporary aircraft were piloted by a single person, sometimes 
with an observer, and could be considered the embodiment of an antithetical 
culture that was alien to the RN. In contrast, the airship, with its large crew, 
was more attuned to the importance of the ship within the Navy's institutional 
traditions. It is evident in a minute to the Fourth Sea Lord that Churchill 
subscribed to such thoughts, suggesting that, to succeed in airships, a more 
mature officer was needed who possessed an expertise in sea-going skills – 
i.e. resolution, experience, and seamanship.86 
 
Even if Churchill was later to downplay his fear of German airships, he had a 
responsibility as political head of the Navy to take seriously any issues that 
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threatened to undermine the strategic and material dominance of the RN. 
However, Churchill devoted what was a seemingly inordinate amount of his 
energies to ensure the development of Britain's own airship capability, whilst 
he did not seriously digest and analyse Wilson's strong arguments in favour of 
aircraft. In notes relating to the outbreak of war, should such an event occur, 
Churchill listed matters relating to the provision of air defence and air power 
as points twelve and thirteen respectively out of a numbered list of seventeen 
items.87 Churchill may well have been a fervent supporter of naval aviation, 
yet, in his World Crisis, 1911 – 1914, he devoted less than ten pages to its 
discussion. This is important because it places naval aviation, and wider 
aviation interests, within a wider context: the pre-war effort devoted to aviation 
– philosophically and materially – was very slight. 
 
As Roskill notes, Britain was never able to gain a lead in rigid airship 
development, although this did very little harm because the limitations and 
vulnerable nature of the airship became clear.88 Thus, in giving his opinion to 
the CID, Churchill was too dismissive of the improvements in aeroplane 
technology, although the provision of adequate air defence measures was a 
very difficult task.89 If Britain possessed no airships, aircraft of very limited 
performance, and inadequate supplies of ground based air defences, there 
was a very obvious capability gap with regard to Britain's ability to defend its 
own airspace and attain control of the air over vital installations that were 
vulnerable to air attack. Nonetheless, naval interest in air defence did not 
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automatically equate to overall responsibility for such tasks. In an exchange of 
letters over the winter of 1912 / 1913, the War Office effectively claimed 
responsibility for the air defence of the United Kingdom, including the defence 
of ports and, at the request of the Admiralty, magazines and oil storage 
facilities.90 In practice, these arrangements divided the responsibility of air 
defence between the Navy, whose aerial craft would be responsible for 
defence over water, and the Army, whose aircraft would provide localised 
defences over vulnerable land based targets.91 
 
If the WO emerged in at least a partially positive light from the last chapter, its 
performance must be questioned with regard to air defence. It failed to make 
any serious provision to meet such responsibilities; responsibilities for which it 
continued to fight until the outbreak of war.92 As established, the Training 
Manual contained no reference to the task of air defence, and it seems certain 
that there was a doctrinal and policy disconnect between the functions of 
military air power as anticipated and planned for by Sykes, who saw the MW 
as forming an integral component of the BEF, and statements from the War 
Office, in which claims for responsibility for air defence were made.93 Of 
course, whilst Sykes did acknowledge that air defence would become a focus 
of MW policy, he stressed that current efforts were devoted in their entirety to 
honing, developing, and strengthening the MW's expeditionary contingent. 94 If 
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the WO had accepted sole or joint responsibility for controlling the airspace 
over the British Isles, then it did not convey the significance of this decision to 
Sykes.  
 
This exchange, which does not portray the WO favourably, was an extension 
of the struggle for resources and influence that characterised pre-war military-
naval relations. However, the Admiralty seemed content with these 
arrangements and accepted the position of the WO almost without question.95 
Churchill continued to make provisions for ensuring that the Navy was able to 
meet, and go beyond, its obligations with regard to air defence.96 Gollin is 
persuasive when he notes that air defence represented another field in which 
the Admiralty and War Office could continue their fight for influence and 
resources.97 Thus, one could agree with Churchill's post-war suggestion that 
he realised that the WO would not be in a position to assist in the air defence 
of Britain and tried to plan accordingly.98 However, viewed more cynically, and 
in keeping with Gollin's contention, Churchill's efforts could be seen as 
representing the Darwinian struggle between Britain's two defence 
departments, not only at the micro level regarding air power, but at the macro-
level of wider defence responsibilities.99 Taking such a contention further, 
Grove suggests that Churchill grew 'to like the idea of his own air force.'100  
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In February 1913, Churchill put forward a tentative policy suggestion for the 
air defence of Britain. Downplaying the effectiveness of passive defence, i.e. 
defensive patrols and the provision of anti-airship / aircraft guns, Churchill 
argued that the correct course of action was to ensure that enemy airships 
were 'kept away altogether[,] and that would only be done by attacking 
them.'101 This sentiment, whilst lacking in clarity, was the first suggestion that 
the Naval Wing would pursue a counter offensive policy to secure the vital 
interests of the Navy. By June 1913, the Admiralty had adopted Churchill's 
statement as policy, noting the ineffectiveness and costly nature of the 
provision of passive defences.102 In a passage remarkably similar to that 
offered by J. E. Capper in 1909, the Admiralty suggested that the provision of 
extensive passive defences would be 
 
as mistaken a policy as the provision all round our coast of passive 
defences against an enemy's fleet instead of the maintenance of a 
fleet whose function it is to seek out and destroy all hostile ships. 
This argument that applies to warfare on the sea must inevitably 
apply to warfare in the air, and aerial attack must be met by the 
provision of airships and aeroplanes to seek out and destroy hostile 
craft of the same type.103 
 
Since October 1912, the Navy had engaged in the construction of coastal air 
stations that served to facilitate defensive air patrols and coastal 
reconnaissance missions.104 The purpose of such a scheme was captured in 
a policy paper of August 1913, which envisaged the use of these bases for 
defensive patrolling in conjunction with more traditional forms of sea-based 
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operations.105 As Churchill stated in a paper of November 1913, the strategic 
importance of these bases was significant, whilst, in a note of the following 
month, he observed that it was a natural function for the Navy to assume the 
role for the development and operation of these coastal air stations, as they 
could make use of existing coast guard facilities.106 These bases, located at 
various points, but particularly the vulnerable eastern coast of Britain, did not 
fit strictly with the Admiralty's counter offensive vision for air defence, yet they 
served as a foundation upon which to build Britain's air defence network, and 
reflected the insight of Churchill and Sueter.107 In a letter of 1927, Sueter 
noted his interest in coastal air patrols and his role in persuading Churchill of 
the soundness of such a policy.108 This is supported by Grove, who interprets 
the growth and expansion of the RNAS as being driven to a large extent by 
Sueter.109 However, one must treat Sueter's letter with caution, given his 
strong desire for personal recognition, which, at its most dramatic, saw him 
write directly to King George V.110 The development and strategic functionality 
of these coastal bases was closely monitored during the annual reviewing 
process of the RFC, further indicating their importance.111 These measures 
were driven by a realisation of Britain's strategic vulnerability in relation to air 
power. This sense of vulnerability, which, as events of the First World War 
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would demonstrate, was based on an understandable, if sensationalised, 
conception of the threat of contemporary air power, continued to focus the 
Admiralty's mind during the final months of peace.  
 
In March 1914, Churchill delivered the Naval Estimates of 1914 / 1915 to the 
House of Commons, and spent at least a portion of his speech addressing the 
development and policy of the Naval Wing.112 In line with the now orthodox 
position of the Admiralty, Churchill stressed the value of air power in relation 
to scouting, before moving on to the issue of air defence.113 It must be 
remembered that in delivering his hyperbole-riddled statement, Churchill was 
undertaking perhaps the most important political function of the First Lord; 
securing the funding of the RN for the coming financial year.114  
 
As Sumida notes, the pressure upon the Admiralty in relation to the Naval 
Estimates of 1914 / 1915 was profound, and the process by which these 
estimates were scrutinised was unusually thorough and painful, reflecting the 
stark economic and political pressures of the time. In making use of such 
forceful and clear assertions, Churchill was taking heed of his own advice 
issued to the Second Sea Lord in November 1913. In submitting documents 
relating to the NW, Churchill urged the use of clear arguments, including 
comparative references to the provisions of foreign air services. This was 
undoubtedly aimed at securing greater funding for the NW. In a joint 
submission to the Cabinet, Churchill and Seely made use of such 
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techniques.115 In his speech, Churchill highlighted the vulnerability of Britain's 
east coast, before underlining 'the indefinite menace of aerial attacks' to which 
'nerve centres of naval power have ... been exposed.'116 Churchill then 
commented upon the uselessness of passive defence against aerial attacks 
('perfectly hopeless'), whilst stressing the value of the aggressive use of aero- 
and seaplanes to counter enemy aerial raiders (the infamous 'swarm of very 
formidable hornets').117  
 
Both Paris and Powers comment upon the significance of Churchill's address 
to the House, although neither draw the conclusion that the control of the air 
was at the core of naval aviation policy. Using highly effective and 
characteristically Churchillian rhetoric, the First Lord offered that  
 
the only real security upon which sound military principles will rely 
is that you should be master of your own air [emphasis added].118  
 
Another crucial theme of the 1914 / 1915 Navy Estimates was the 
requirement for major financial support with regard to the procurement of oil, 
and an oil infrastructure to support Britain's growing fleet of oil powered capital 
ships. As Churchill noted, oil, the air service, and an increase in personnel 
were major factors in the increased estimates being presented.119 As Marder 
observes, the shift to oil gave a great many benefits to the technical 
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performance of capital ships, although there was one overwhelmingly 
negative strategic implication: Britain lacked a sufficient indigenous supply of 
oil.120 Between 1912 and 1914, Churchill (and Fisher) moved the RN 
inexorably toward a policy of utilising oil as an auxiliary and primary fuel for 
capital ships.121 Whilst a committee headed by Fisher recommended various 
measures, including the purchase of a large number of foreign oil fields, 
Fisher wrote to Churchill in August 1913 to urge the latter to establish vast oil 
reserves in the UK.122 In effect, this created another strategically vital target 
set that was potentially vulnerable to air attack. 
 
As a logical conclusion to this hugely significant change of policy, the 
Admiralty tasked a small Sub-Committee, chaired by Sueter, to investigate the 
camouflaging of oil storage and other vulnerable sites to prevent attacks upon 
the former by aerial craft or gunfire.123 From the outset, the Committee noted 
that it felt compelled to investigate matters outside its reference, as palliative 
methods, such as disguising buildings, would only provide limited defensive 
benefits.124 The conclusions offered in the report were based upon the 
evidence supplied to the Committee by ten NW pilots, including senior 
squadron commanders, who undertook experimental investigations from the 
air.125 In offering practical suggestions, the NW officers generally concurred 
that, in spite of creative camouflaging efforts, vital targets, particularly oil 
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storage facilities, could not be concealed from the air.126 Sampson, 
commander of the NW air station at Eastchurch, recommended the use of 
'active' (guns, aircraft and airships) and 'passive' defences (camouflage and 
construction techniques) to counter enemy operations.127 
 
It was the notion of 'active' defence that seemed to strike a chord with the 
Committee, who observed that they felt it 'desirable' to offer conclusions 
outside their remit, which had been 'forced' upon them as a result of 
'prolonged and careful consideration of the whole subject.'128 Thus, the report 
concluded with a triple-pronged approach to the defence of vulnerable 
strategic targets: localised active defence (i.e. aircraft and guns); localised 
passive defence (i.e. camouflaging); and finally, 
 
offensive attack on the enemy's coast ... a vigorous and offensive 
attack on the enemy's airsheds, &c., and on his aircraft, before they 
are able to reach these shores.129 
 
For Abbatiello, the conclusions reached by Sueter and his Committee fitted 
'naturally' with existing policy.130 In contrast, Tritten does not acknowledge the 
frequency and regularity with which this policy was articulated prior to the 
outbreak of war. 131 The conclusions of this Committee were in keeping with 
the policy espoused by the Admiralty since at least early 1913, and with the 
counter offensive hypothesising of individuals such as Capper. As Powers 
remarks, it was the policy with which the Admiralty undertook the air defence 
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of Britain during the opening aerial campaigns of the First World War, and 
Powers is critical of the effectiveness of what he terms a policy of 'forward air 
defence.'132 However, even if localised air defences came to be effective, at 
the outbreak of war, and in spite of the establishment of a chain of air stations 
and other defensive measures, the NW lacked the equipment to undertake an 
air defence of Britain based solely upon local defences, either plane, gun, 
passive, or otherwise.133 The NW possessed a combined total of only 
seventy-one aircraft and seaplanes, all of which were of limited performance 
and utility in relation to defensive operations.134 
 
What is more, the NW was left in the invidious position, as discussed above, 
of possessing joint responsibility for the air defence of Britain, whilst its 
military partner took almost no active measures to ensure that it could meet its 
obligations. There is additional scope to criticise the War Office in relation to 
air defence policy. In a June 1914 meeting of a Sub-Committee of the CID, 
Henderson continued to argue that the MW should have a major role in air 
defence.135 Whilst conceding that the MW planned to deploy eight squadrons 
with the expeditionary force, its entire proposed strength, Henderson asserted 
that the MW required aircraft to conduct air defence duties around vital 
centres, including ports and coastal locations.136 The meeting ended with 
Henderson's promise that the WO would investigate questions of air defence 
                                            
132
 B. D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule, pp.16 – 17. 
133
 Ibid. 
134
 CAB 14/1, 'Second Annual Report of the Air Committee on the Progress of the Royal 
Flying Corps,' May 1914, 
135
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, pp.148 – 155. Minutes, 
CID Sub-Committee on 'Allocation and Location of Seaplane and Aeroplane Stations,' 25 Jun 
1914. 
136
 Ibid. 
152 
 
and would report back to the Sub-Committee.137 As Roskill comments, two 
further meetings in July 1914 produced no progress, and the matter was 
overtaken by the outbreak of war.138 This is not strictly correct, however, and 
Henderson produced an air defence plan on 29 July 1914.139 In reality, this 
did little more than pay 'lip service' to the subject. Thus, it is far from surprising 
that, shortly after the outbreak of war, it became apparent that, materially, the 
MW were unable to meaningfully assist their naval colleagues with regards to 
the air defence of Great Britain. Further evidence exists of Churchill's foresight 
with regard to the likelihood of assistance from the WO. In a letter written only 
a month after the 25 June 1914 CID Sub-Committee meeting, Churchill 
informed the DAD and First and Fourth Sea Lords that coastal patrolling 
would be only a secondary consideration, and that 
 
naval aircraft are to regard the defence against attack from the air 
as their first and main responsibility. They must be carefully 
husbanded.140 
 
Driven by unproductive meetings and a realisation of the doctrinal inclinations 
of the MW, Churchill had undoubtedly grasped that, at least for an extended 
period, the NW would possess sole practical responsibility for the air defence 
of Britain. Of course, this does not exclude the alternative motivation that air 
defence represented another field in which the Admiralty could erode the 
influence of the War Office. On 3 September 1914, Lord Kitchener, as 
Secretary of State for War, formally requested that the Admiralty assume 
                                            
137
 Ibid. 
138
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, pp.155 – 156.  
139
 AIR 1/511/16/3/59 – Memo, Henderson – Allotment of responsibility for Home Defence, 29 
Jul 1914. 
140
 W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911 – 1914, p.208; W. Raleigh, WIA, Vol. I, p.274; H. 
A. Jones, WIA, Vol.III, p.75. 
153 
 
responsibility for air defence, and, whilst noting the problems this would create 
for his department, Churchill accepted.141 Churchill observed that, if aircraft 
were the answer to the defence against the Zeppelin, he was not in 
possession of sufficient resources at the beginning of the war to affect an 
adequate localised air defence of Great Britain. As Churchill commented, 
aeroplane engines were not powerful enough to reach the altitudes at which 
Zeppelins operated, night flying was in its infancy, and the ground based 
communication organisation necessary to make air defence effective was not 
in existence. Guns and searchlights could be ordered, and the above 
deficiencies rectified with time and development, yet a more expeditious 
response was required.142  
 
Whilst issuing statements regarding the counter offensive, Churchill did not 
neglect localised measures. His memos of 3 and 5 September 1914 made 
further provisions for local air defences, including aerial patrolling, ground 
based defences, and rudimentary air raid precaution measures.143 As H. A. 
Jones remarks, Churchill's 5 September 1914 policy statement concerning air 
defence 'restated and amplified' the conclusions reached by Sueter's 
'camouflaging' Sub-Committee.144 This built upon Churchill's 1 September 
1914 memorandum, in which he provided strategic and operational guidance 
to Sueter with regard to establishing a base on the French / Belgian coast, 
from which to undertake counter offensive and localised defence 
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operations.145 Importantly, the Admiralty's counter offensive policy was not 
adopted solely for pragmatic or logistical reasons. Whilst Admiralty policy had 
noted the difficulties and impracticalities of providing extensive localised air 
defences, its earliest statements embraced the counter offensive because it 
was in keeping with the traditions of the offensive spirit so prevalent in the 
Navy.146 This naval spirit, captured in wider service attitudes that favoured the 
decisive, offensive battle, has been explored by Breemer.147 As Raleigh 
notes, this spirit was in evidence from the very beginning of the war, and the 
RNAS 'sought every available opportunity for offensive action.'148  
 
'The Silent Service:' Naval Wing Doctrine149 
 
To suggest that NW policy was preoccupied solely with air defence is 
misleading. Air defence was one of the few policy areas driven by centrally 
administered directives, yet naval aviators pursued a diverse range of 
experimental and developmental efforts, largely outside the scope of this 
thesis.150 More generally, senior figures within the NW realised that naval 
aviation policy lacked direction and cohesion.151 The lack of coherent policy 
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did not escape the attention of contemporary commentators, and C. G. Grey's 
Aeroplane highlighted the issue.152 This realisation is captured in the 
historiographical consensus that the NW lacked clear policy, whilst being an 
experimentally driven organisation.153 There is no consensus, however, 
regarding the reasoning for this lack of policy. For Goulter, the NW's focus on 
experimentation and diversification was entirely appropriate, as policy and 
doctrine would serve only to constrain innovative approaches to the 
conceptualisation of air power roles and practices, as it had in the case of the 
MW.154 In contrast, and with reference to the lack of NW doctrine, Parton 
counters the suggestion that the underdeveloped state of air power, coupled 
with the diffuse roles foreseen and pursued by naval aviators, precluded the 
production of formal doctrine. As Parton continues, this failure is particularly 
difficult to reconcile with the positive attitude of senior figures within the NW 
toward the production of formal doctrine.155 Yet, due to the dearth of doctrinal 
evidence, Parton feels unable to offer another suggestion for the failure of the 
NW to produce doctrine.156 Later in his thesis, Parton does make reference to 
a possible difference in the value attached to doctrine by the Army and Navy, 
but does not develop this contention further.157 Abbatiello, echoing Overy's 
contention that doctrine is a synthesis of theory, history, and experience, 
contends that a lack of coherent doctrine was logical, given that the NW 
lacked any combat experience: 
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The absence of a coherent British maritime air doctrine — that is, 
an accepted method of applying the air power of the Royal Naval 
Air Service — at the start of the First World War comes as no 
surprise. Theory and history combine to form doctrine, yet at the 
start of the war the RNAS possessed no combat experience to 
provide a guide for operating their tiny force of aircraft against the 
Germans.158  
 
However, a fuller explanation concerning the NW's failure to produce formal 
doctrine can be adduced by engaging with the wider philosophical and cultural 
trends within the RN. The dearth of primary evidence is symptomatic of these 
tendencies. In the case of the British Army, the previous chapter established 
that, whilst polarising historiographical opinion, a moderate analysis of 
doctrinal trends concludes that, prior to 1914, and in the guise of FSR, the 
British Army possessed a semi-formal doctrine that rejected prescription, 
whilst providing a framework upon which effective operational methods and 
tactical solutions could be built. Consequently, MW doctrine, in the form of the 
Training Manual, was produced in accordance with this ethos.  
 
In contrast, naval historians have not devoted the same depth of analysis to 
doctrinal trends within the RN. In his essay concerning the development of RN 
doctrine, Grove argues that the navy of the Fisher era, particularly the Grand 
Fleet under Jellicoe, had 'too much doctrine in Grand Fleet Battle Orders 
[GFBOs].'159 Grove, in basing this contention on Gordon's The Rules of the 
Game (1996), contrasts this with Nelson's intuitive doctrinal approach.160 
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Grove is at pains to establish that Gordon's central thesis does not make the 
case for either doctrine or initiative; rather, it highlights a clash of doctrinal 
styles – one over-centralised (Jellicoe), and the other based on intuitivism 
(Nelson and, to a lesser extent, Beatty).161 In other words, Grove defines the 
pre-1914 RN as being a doctrine-heavy organisation. Yet what does Grove 
mean by doctrine, and how does this contention tally with Parton's discovery 
that naval aviators failed to produce formal doctrine?162 When examining 
GFBOs, it becomes clear that these vast documents are not doctrine as 
defined by Parton or Johnston.163 To take but one of these examples,  
 
... modern writers of doctrine are generally at pains to avoid 
prescribing overly precise, drill-like procedures. They are seeking 
rather to describe the conceptual framework of how best to 
prosecute military operations.164 
 
If GFBOs can be labelled doctrine, then they are more akin to tactical doctrine 
as defined by Parton, 'the "how to do it" questions at the front-line, rather than 
the "why" questions further back,' and cannot be considered the naval 
equivalent of FSR.165 As an officer of the Royal Marines noted in 1913,  
 
the Army have a complete guidance [sic] for their officers in the 
field service regulations [sic], it is greatly to be wished that some 
authoritative pronouncement of the same nature might be issued in 
some form to the Navy.166 
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This contention is supported by current RN doctrine, which stresses that, 
whilst the lineage of tactical doctrine in the Navy extends to over three 
hundred years, non-tactical doctrine was not officially promulgated until early 
editions and antecedents of BR 1806 during the latter half of the twentieth 
century.167 As Tritten confirms,  
 
The Royal Navy ... has primarily devoted its attention to the 
development of service-unique doctrine at the tactical level of war 
... The Royal Navy did not have a coherent doctrine at all levels of 
warfare.168 
 
Tritten finds this lack of doctrine 
 
somewhat surprising, since Britain was involved in global 
conventional war and numerous regional contingencies against 
France and other nations for many years.169 
 
It is clear that Tritten believes doctrine can exist in many forms and at differing 
levels of war. However, his essay does not define what is meant by the term 
doctrine, nor does it offer a working definition. Gordon's Rules of the Game 
does much to strengthen such analysis, suggesting that the Navy's need for 
formal, written doctrine was low because value was attached to experience 
rather than theory. Traditionally, the Navy needed no doctrine because the 
captains of its ships were, in the Nelsonian tradition, a 'band of brothers,' 
commanding with initiative, based on a wealth of practical experience.170 
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However, even with the rise of GFBOs, the Navy of the Fisher era was an 
organisation light on formal written doctrine. Unintentionally, Parton's 'how to 
do' and 'why' questions serve to highlight broader attitudes in the Navy that 
affected this situation. 
 
In an important collection of essays, which offered a more positive 
interpretation of Admiralty attitudes to technology and innovation, Ranft 
argued that, from the mid-nineteenth century, the RN was faced with a 
revolution in technology so profound in its nature that it appeared to 'put every 
accepted concept of naval warfare in doubt.'171 This revolution shaped the RN 
into  
 
a service whose recent history and whose current sense of urgency 
were geared to a material ethic.172  
 
During this era of technical change, the Navy's focus was drawn to producing 
ships that were faster, better armed, and better armoured. This approach left 
a significant gap with regard to the uses of these newly developed ships and 
their wider role within Britain's naval strategy and, at the higher level, national 
grand strategy. Schurman argues that, to a certain extent, the Admiralty's 
focus on technical matters was logical in a period of transition, although he 
concedes that there was a 'preoccupation with means rather than ends.' 173 
For Fisher's navy, this translated into 'a vigorous drive for mechanical 
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excellence,' both in the development of technology and in the mastery of its 
technical application.174 As Marder argued,  
 
the stress was upon the technical and mechanical aspects of the 
profession: gunnery, torpedoes, ship-handling, and so on.175 
 
Put more bluntly, Hunt argues that 
 
The virtual atrophy of the Navy's apparatus had its roots in the 
revolution in technology which, since the mid-nineteenth century, 
had kept naval thinkers' minds almost exclusively with questions of 
ship design and weapons performance.176 
 
Two implications of this approach are particularly relevant to this thesis, and 
the technical and materially dominated outlook of the RN conditioned the 
manner in which its recruits were educated. Undergoing such an education 
restricted the ability of naval officers to produce doctrine. Rather than 
articulating a philosophical vision for the application of naval power, they 
attached the greatest significance to attaining prowess in technical matters. 
Unlike the varied routes of officer cadets into the British Army, naval officer 
recruits of the pre-1914 period generally joined the service as young boys 
(around the age of 13).177 As Dickinson observes, this was a pro-active 
decision by the Navy, who continued to desire the recruitment of cadets at the 
youngest possible age, and it was only in 1955 that cadets had to be 18 to 
join the Navy.178 By recruiting cadets at such an early age, naval educators 
were able to mould and indoctrinate malleable young minds with the ethos 
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and dominant ideas of the contemporary RN.179 Dickinson notes that one of 
the main functions of this initial education was to build (a naval approved) 
character.180 Whilst the relevance of Sykes's educational experience was 
enhanced by its chronological proximity to his appointment to the MW, the 
educational experiences of Sueter, Samson, Paine, and Longmore were 
significant because they took place at a time when their minds were most 
susceptible to influence. 
 
Andrew Lambert, Dickinson, Marder, Schurman, and Hunt observe the 
technical focus of the education provided to young naval recruits, reflecting 
the wider importance attached to technical and material matters within the 
service. For example, the records of both Sueter's and Samson's initial naval 
education demonstrate the highly technical syllabus upon which recruits were 
examined.181 As noted by Lambert and Dickinson, this syllabus was heavily 
focused on mathematical and scientific subjects.182 For young cadets, such as 
Sueter and Samson, their educational experiences, coupled with the Navy's 
wider ethic, translated to a natural pre-occupation with the technical. 
Moreover, the early promotional examinations undertaken by aspiring officers 
retained this technological focus. The records of Samson's promotion to 
Lieutenant demonstrate the desire of the RN to keep its officers focused on 
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the technological aspects of their craft.183 Thus, it seems unsurprising that 
both Sueter and Sampson pursued careers that focused on the inherently 
technical aspects of their profession; Sampson specialised as a gunner, whilst 
Sueter's involvement in the Navy's innovative and technologically driven arms 
has been noted.  
 
A more appropriate comparison with Sykes's experience at Quetta might be 
found via a focus on the Navy's Staff College. However, not a single member 
of the senior command team of the NW attended this course. If they had, they 
would have found the experience to be very different to the teaching offered at 
Camberley and at Quetta. Whilst noting the important example set by the 
Naval Staff College, Lambert argues that  
 
The Royal Navy did not engage in speculative and lateral thinking, 
it did not teach philosophy or logic, and left mid-career officers with 
the impression that there were simple, correct answers to any 
problem they might face.184 
 
As both Lambert and Dickinson record, individuals such as Corbett fought to 
reverse such trends, and with some effect.185 However, for Dickinson, 
Greenwich was not a bona fide higher education establishment, and the Navy 
'defined' the 'higher education of [its] officers ... in technical terms[,]' focusing 
on '"knowledge" rather than "thought."'186 This approach was in stark contrast 
to the education offered at the Army's Staff College. Whilst the 'magical' 
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qualities of the p.s.c. qualification were being emphasised to those attending 
the Army's Staff Colleges, Lambert observes that  
 
the work of the Royal Naval College before 1914 was limited, 
dominated by technical issues and made little contribution to the 
development of naval thought.187 
 
Thus, when discussions on the production of naval aviation doctrine took 
place during 1913, two factors shaped the response of the senior command of 
the NW.188 In the first instance, an obsession with the technical, based upon 
their education and the wider ethos of the RN; and second, the Navy's attitude 
to doctrine, which, during this period, was focused exclusively at the tactical 
level, reflecting a process by which  
 
... war became confused with battle, and the logic of naval strategy 
was confounded with the logic of battle.189 
 
It is not being suggested that talented officers such as Sueter were incapable 
of creative thought; as Lambert argues, 'there were many fine minds in the 
service,' yet such minds had their priorities attuned to the technical.190 In 
referring to the RN as the 'Silent Service,' Churchill argued that it was 
 
not mute because it was absorbed in thought and study, but 
because it was weighted down by its daily routine and by its ever-
complicating and diversifying technique.191 
 
                                            
187
 A. Lambert, '"History is the Sole Foundation for the Construction of a Sound and Living 
Common Doctrine,"' p.47. 
188
 AIR 1/762/204/4/175 – RFC Training Manual, Part I, Correspondence and Proofs, Jan to 
Jun 1913. 
189
 J. S. Breemer, The Burden of Trafalgar, pp.15 – 16.  
190
 A. Lambert, 'The Development of Education in the Royal Navy,' p.54. 
191
 W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911 – 1914, p.93. 
164 
 
Churchill's characterisation suggests that this process was passive, but the 
evidence indicates that the Navy took a proactive decision to focus on the 
material and technical aspects of their profession. In a lecture to be issued to 
H.M. ships, the material ethic of the Navy's approach to aviation was 
evident.192 In a document that could be considered the NW's first attempt at 
the production of informal doctrine, the text of the Air Department's lecture 
was overwhelmingly technical in nature, the first half of which was littered with 
mathematical formulae and detailed, technical drawings and diagrams.193 The 
genuinely innovative sections of the lecture, dealing with what could be 
loosely termed as doctrine, gave primacy to obtaining 'command of the air' via 
a decisive aerial encounter, besting the enemy's craft with one's own 
materially superior craft.194 These statements, however, were qualified with 
the assertion that air power would not revolutionise naval warfare, whilst the 
value of naval aviation would not be known until fully tested.195 In other words, 
the meaningful sections were deposited with a post-script at the rear of the 
text, whilst the majority of the lecture dealt with naval air power via the 
encouraged, demanded, and acceptable technical language in accordance 
with RN ethos. To return to Parton's analysis, there was significant material on 
the 'how to do' and very little on the 'why.' 
 
Parton was the first to highlight that there were figures within the NW who 
wished to produce formal doctrine more akin to the second part of the MW's 
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Training Manual.196 In particular, Paine's letter to Sueter is cited, with the 
former arguing for the production of two manuals, one of which should include 
the 'Strategical Use of Aircraft.'197 Thus, whilst Gordon may argue that the 
Navy valued experience more than theory, senior officers in the NW were 
reflecting on the need for doctrine that was more in keeping with the Army's 
FSR. However, when it eventually appeared, the NW counterpart to the MW's 
Training Manual was in keeping with the technical and material priorities of 
the RN.198 The vaguely doctrinal sections contained within the lecture of 1913 
had been banished, and the entire document was almost completely focused 
on the technological and scientific aspects of flight. This included an entire 
chapter devoted to tables and formulae, whilst the initial sections dealt with 
'Theoretical Principles of Flight' and 'Construction of Aircraft.'199  
 
To a certain extent, a focus on the technical aspects of flight was warranted, 
as flight was an inherently technical subject that could be accurately 
characterised as being in a period of experimentation and transition. 
Nonetheless, a lack of formal doctrine led to a failure with regard to Corbett's 
goal of ensuring that 'words have the same meaning for all.'200 With this 
definition in mind, BR 1806, Third Edition (2004) notes that 
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Doctrine ... serves to inform the wider defence community and 
those with an interest in understanding the role and functions of 
maritime [read air] power.201 
 
In his autobiographical Airmen or Noahs (1928), Sueter argued that, whilst 
being able to offer expert technical opinion on the sciences of gunnery, 
navigation, or seamanship, the Sea Lords 'found themselves quite at sea over 
air matters.'202 Consequently, Sueter suggested that the Admiralty were 
unable to make technical criticism of the air service, focusing their 
condemnation of naval aviators on the independent spirit of NW personnel 
and the non-regimented manner in which the Wing was managed.203 It is 
important to place such criticism in context, and Sueter's opinions were 
influenced by his acrimonious departure from the RN at the end of the First 
World War. Yet, Admiralty attitudes towards aviation continued to polarise 
opinion within the Navy.204 If Sueter's contention regarding the Admiralty's 
ignorance of air power was correct, then Sueter himself had failed in one of 
the central functions of his role as DAD; articulating the role and functions of 
the Wing to both internal and external audiences.205 The NW might not have 
sat within an organisation that understood doctrine in such terms, but, as 
noted, senior figures in the NW clearly felt an FSR like approach to doctrine 
had some merit.206 In line with Corbett's interpretation, a lack of NW doctrine 
had a direct impact on the willingness of the wider RN to accept the legitimacy 
of naval aviation. If language did not mean the same for all, and air power 
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concepts were ill-understood due to a lack of officially sponsored articulation, 
then the failure of Sueter to produce a NW equivalent to the MW's Training 
Manual is a striking condemnation of a naval ethos that overemphasised the 
'how to do' and failed to adequately explore and verbalise the 'why.' This was 
less problematic during Churchill's 'aero-friendly' regime, but, as Cooper 
notes, the post-Churchill administration of Jackson and Balfour unleashed a 
conservative backlash upon the RN and the RNAS.207  
 
However, doctrine did not necessarily have to take the form of an official 
publication, and, as Ash remarks, Sykes and senior figures within the MW 
supplemented the production of formal doctrine for internal consumption with 
a public relations effort driven by the publication of articles and the delivery of 
lectures to further the cause of military aviation.208 In contrast, the NW failed 
to match these efforts. In examining material from contemporary journals and 
forums, an absence of contributions from senior NW officers is evident. During 
the period relevant to this chapter, no evidence could be found of Sueter, 
Samson, or Paine writing an article for, or delivering a lecture to, any external 
organisation. As Messinger highlights, the Navy was held in a cherished place 
by the British public, and so, institutionally, it did not feel obliged to open itself 
to public scrutiny or draw attention to its activities and wider goals.209 
However, as Rüger's more recent study suggests, the Navy made great 
efforts with regards to its public relations activities.210  
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Samson was present during Major Radcliffe's talk, although the tactical focus 
of the discussions seemed to limit his input.211 Prince Louis of Battenberg, the 
honouree guest at the same lecture, did offer some thoughts on the tactical 
aspects of naval air power, although his comments were somewhat 
underdeveloped.212 The lectures and articles that did appear were invariably 
produced by junior officers, who lacked the standing necessary to convince 
senior figures in the RN of the importance of aviation.213 Naturally, such 
lectures were highly technical in composition, with Boothby's paper showing a 
particular affinity for graphs, charts, and formulae. The Naval Review, a 
journal created to invigorate debate on naval policy and strategy (whilst 
countering the technical obsessions of the Navy), was not held in the same 
esteem as JRUSI or The Army Review. As such, its pages were not likely to 
convert wider naval opinion toward the benefits of air power or the NW.214  
 
In discussing one such article, Paris highlights that the author set his 
discussion within the contexts of existing naval strategy, whilst, more 
generally, he attempted to appeal to the naval mind by couching his article in 
conventional naval language and expressions.215 However, this article was 
closely associated with the troubled reputation of its literary medium. The 
progressive and iconoclastic intent of the journal can be succinctly expressed 
with a short quotation from the first issue: 
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The fact that we know how to handle our ship and manipulate her 
gun does not indicate that we are ready to play our part in war.216 
 
Whilst this captured the perspective of the anti-material school, such criticism 
would have been considered sacrilegious by the majority of conservative 
officers in the Navy. As Hunt observes, the unofficial nature of The Naval 
Review led to the journal being viewed with suspicion, which severely limited 
its ability to influence the Navy. As Hunt continues, the Review was heavily 
censored during wartime, and its publication was eventually suspended for 
the duration.217 Nevertheless, if the NW failed to articulate its role and 
functions to interested internal and external parties, this did not hide the 
Wing's informal doctrinal appetite for the technical and for the offensive, 
conceptualised through the lens of a growing awareness of Britain's strategic 
vulnerability. This proclivity was captured in NW attitudes and approaches to 
experimentation, which, in turn, have passed into the historiography with 
uniform levels of praise.  
 
Naval Wing Experimentation 
 
As it was for the military, the need for weapons with which to arm aircraft to 
fight for the control of the air was a central feature of pre-1914 naval 
experimentation. For the NW, this process has been well documented in the 
secondary literature, whilst an excellent primary source summary is available 
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and has been much cited.218 Goulter's summation of this process 
encapsulates the general historiographical trend, which concludes that the 
NW was at the forefront of aviation research because it was supported 'by an 
institution which had a strong tradition in research and development.'219 Thus, 
if the RN's technical obsession served the NW poorly in the production of 
doctrine and the wider dissemination of ideas, concepts, and roles of air 
power, it provided a nurturing environment within which to develop innovative 
aeronautical technologies and techniques.220 As Gordon notes, the Navy 
placed great store in vocational competence, as without such skills officers 
and men were effectively liabilities rather than assets when serving on 
ships.221 
 
If Goulter's contention regarding the advanced material state of the NW is 
irresistible, it is important to place the efforts of both Wings within the wider 
context of their parent services. As noted, one service was historically at ease 
with technological development, the other not so. This was manifest in the 
pre-war experiments of both branches of the Corps, and the MW was 
naturally more inclined to be conservative, and necessarily measured with 
regard to experimentation. Consequently, their experimentation seemed 
rather basic in comparison to the efforts of the NW. Of course, given the extra 
level of complexity in operating aircraft in a naval context, the advanced 
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material state of the NW is perhaps even more impressive.222 However, both 
Wings utilised an identical and logical methodological approach to these 
efforts. As Marder remarks,  
 
Overwhelming changes were pressing on the Navy from all sides 
with very little experience of modern war to guide it. Trial and error 
were inevitable, and were, indeed, not peculiar to the Navy.223 
 
In addition, Grove notes that, at the outbreak of war, the RNAS's limited 
technical capabilities were very probably the most decisive factor in restricting 
the ability of the RN's aviation arm to provide genuine support to the Grand 
Fleet at Sea.224  
 
Conclusion 
 
The de facto separation and collapse of the 'corps of aviators' concept was 
completed during July 1914, as an Admiralty circular confirmed that the 'Royal 
Naval Air Service will form part of the Military Branch of the Royal Navy.'225 As 
Roskill notes, this separation was not officially sanctioned until 29 July 1915, 
although Grove argues that the RNAS remained a formal part of the RFC until 
the creation of the RAF in April 1918.226 As suggested, this reflected a 
separatist intent that was present during the initial Admiralty participation in 
the creation of the Flying Corps and throughout the pre-war period. The 
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administrative impetus to change the name to the RNAS may in fact have 
originated with Henderson, although the term 'Naval Air Service' seems to 
have been first coined by Sueter.227 The NW's decision to modify its name in 
August 1914 to the 'cumbersome' 'Royal Flying Corps, Naval Wing (Royal 
Naval Air Service)' met with some displeasure. Henderson, in a letter of 13 
September 1914, suggested the name be changed to the more 
straightforward RNAS. This met with some resistance, and the Admiralty 
continued to stall until the beginning of 1916. Henderson's motivation may 
have been to simplify the nomenclature, although he also wished to seize the 
title of the RFC for sole use by his military aviators. 228 
 
In effect, Britain entered the First World War with two air forces, a source of 
much friction during the conflict. Whilst materially better prepared and more 
open to the innovative uses of air power, the failure of the NW to produce 
effective doctrine during this period had a profound impact during the First 
World War. As the following chapters demonstrate, it is difficult to dismiss the 
conclusion that, due to differing attitudes to doctrine, and particularly via its 
Corbettian function, the NW's failure to produce doctrine led to the domination 
of the conflict by the views of air power so successfully articulated by the MW 
in the Training Manual. Although it did not possess formal doctrine, NW policy 
was unmistakably focused on the strategic conception of the control of the air. 
For pragmatic and philosophical reasons, this policy was shaped by Churchill 
and Sueter to take the form of a counter offensive. If the NW is to be criticised 
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for its lack of doctrine, then the foresight shown concerning air defence 
preparations, even if very limited in the context of the sophisticated air 
defence system of the latter war years, must be commended.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE CONTROL OF THE AIR ON THE WESTERN FRONT: THE RFC AND 
THE AGGRESSIVE CULTURE OF THE BEF 
 
Introduction 
 
Between 1915 and 1918, the RFC pursued a vision of the control of the air 
that stressed the importance of a constant offensive to seize material and 
moral superiority over the enemy, by utilising armed fighting aircraft on 
offensive patrols deep inside enemy territory. The degree of control attained 
via such operations would allow the RFC to conduct its vital work in tactical 
support of the BEF, primarily reconnaissance and artillery observation. The 
dogged pursuit of this conception of the control of the air has been the subject 
of significant criticism in the historiography. By contextualising this criticism, 
this chapter will seek to redress the historiographical balance.  
 
As the use of air power on the Western Front represented the major theatre in 
which British air power was utilised during the First World War, it is necessary 
to devote significant time and space to its study.1 The chapter begins by 
establishing a working understanding of the RFC's conception of the control of 
the air. This is followed by an examination of the structural and cultural 
pressure generated by the BEF that was at work on the RFC. In establishing 
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the wider context of these pressures, a focus on the control of the air comes 
only during the second half of the chapter. 
 
It is possible to demonstrate that, in spite of significant criticism of the RFC, 
the Corps found itself to be a prisoner of circumstance; trapped by an 
aggressive organisational culture that resulted in a conflict that was 
characterised by high tempo, aggressive, and offensive operations. This was 
a tempo and temperament with which the RFC had little choice but to 
conform. These factors allow the criticism of the RFC, particularly of its 
conception of the control of the air, to be placed in the wider context of the 
conflict. This chapter does not suggest that all criticism of the RFC is 
unwarranted, but that it is necessary to place such criticism in a broader 
context. Importantly, the concept of the control of the air, being so broad, 
necessitates the exploration of a diverse range of subjects, including 
organisational culture, educational experiences, the nature of doctrine, and 
the effectiveness of commanders. However, and unapologetically, this is not a 
narrative of RFC control of the air operations during the war. Operational and 
tactical practices feature only when demonstrating the development of control 
of the air doctrine, or to highlight wider structural and cultural pressures at 
work on the RFC. It is important to emphasise that the RFC was a 
subordinate unit of the BEF and, as such, it did not operate in a vacuum, 
either in a military sense, or in an organisational or cultural sense. The ground 
and air aspects of the campaigns of the Western Front are often divorced, 
which creates an artificial boundary between the RFC and BEF.  
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The RFC and Control of the Air: Background 
 
In spite of the RFC's pre-war commitment to aerial fighting as a means to 
establish the control of the air, the outbreak of war in August of 1914 
interrupted any further preparatory steps, and the Corps was thrown into a 
period of fluid manoeuvre warfare.2 The deployment plans for the RFC, the 
result of involved staff work throughout 1913 and 1914, concluded that four 
squadrons would accompany the Expeditionary Force to France with at least 
one reserve squadron upon which the RFC could draw.3 Morrow offers an apt 
analysis of the RFC's deployment when he observes that,  
 
In August 1914, the RFC's chief planner ... [Sykes] ... was 
convinced ... of a short and glorious war. He threw nearly every 
man and machine into the fray, believing that neither could stand 
more than three months in the field.4 
 
In total, as Raleigh states, the RFC deployed to France with some 105 
officers, 755 men, and 63 aeroplanes. A seemingly large reserve left in 
Britain, of 116 aircraft, contained only 20 machines serviceable and fit for 
purpose.5 A crucial aspect of this deployment came to involve the senior 
command of the RFC scrambling for resources to ensure that they possessed 
armed aircraft capable of fighting for the control of the air.  
 
On 29 July 1914, Brancker informed Sykes that, in addition to the one 
Hotchkiss gun already possessed by the RFC, three Lewis, one Madsen, and 
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one additional Hotchkiss gun would be made available. Fifty service rifles 
would also be issued, whilst orders for 500 light bombs and 200 hand 
grenades had been placed. The following day, Brancker had been able to 
obtain four Vickers-Maxim guns, which would be forwarded to Sykes 
immediately. Sykes must have experienced profound frustration in being 
forced to write to HQ Southern Command in order to seek permission to test 
his new weapons.6 In looking for longer-term solutions, Sykes possessed the 
foresight to request the despatch of a weapons expert from the Musketry 
School to liaise with manufacturers concerning mounting armament on 
aircraft. The expert's visit to Vickers met with some success, and progress 
was made, not only because of his expertise but also because of the base of 
knowledge generated during the tests of 1913 and 1914.7 Important 
modifications and recommendations could be made to manufacturers, 
particularly regarding the mount for the Lewis light machine gun, the secure 
stowage of ammunition, and general safety precautions for the gunner.8 The 
majority of these features had been highlighted during testing in 1913 and 
1914, and almost certainly saved time with regard to providing the RFC with 
effective and efficient aerial weaponry. By December 1914, some 36 fighting 
aircraft, of pusher configuration, were on order from Vickers, each armed with 
a single Lewis gun. Maurice Farman types, specially armed with Lewis guns, 
were despatched to France during September 1914, but confirmed Sykes's 
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pre-war fears that, lacking in lifting power, which severely restricted their 
ability to climb quickly, they were of limited value.9 
 
These steps, however rudimentary, give a clear indication that the RFC 
intended to give more concrete and practical form to the doctrine of aerial 
fighting contained within the Training Manual. By early 1915, this vision was 
somewhat clearer, as the role played by air power was becoming increasingly 
important, particularly in the fields of reconnaissance and artillery observation. 
As such, and confirming pre-war hypothesising, it was apparent that aircraft 
would have to fight for their operational freedom of movement whilst denying 
such freedoms to the enemy.10 By the beginning of 1915, the RFC had arrived 
at a conception of the control of the air that reflected the coupling of pre-war 
hypothesising and doctrine with the priceless experience gained during the 
opening campaigns of the conflict. This conception focused upon constant 
aggressive action to seize moral and material superiority over the enemy.  
 
As a result of the change of command of the RFC in the summer of 1915, with 
Henderson returning to London, and Sykes sent to Gallipoli, it was left to the 
Corps's senior Wing Commander, Hugh Trenchard, to put this vision into 
practice on a sustained and expanded level. Possibly the most zealous 
disciple of the British Army's focus on moral superiority and the offensive, 
Trenchard pursued a dogged vision for controlling the skies. His fighting 
aircraft would push into enemy territory, forcing the German Air Service onto 
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the defensive and, in turn, securing operational freedom for RFC aircraft 
engaged in the vital work of offering direct support to the BEF on the ground.  
 
Captured most clearly in his memorandum of September 1916, Trenchard 
concluded that the aeroplane was an offensive weapon that, if used in the 
correct manner, could allow the establishment of moral superiority over the 
enemy.11 For Trenchard, the correct use of air power was achieved by 
'attacking and continuing to attack.'12 This vision saw the RFC through the 
majority of the First World War, shaping the operational and strategic conduct 
of the Corps from its highly successful contribution to the Somme campaign, 
and the Hundred days of 1918, to the brutal struggles of late 1916 and early 
1917. It is this vision, resulting in heavy losses for the RFC, which has 
become the subject of significant criticism in the literature. Of this criticism, a 
single example is offered for illustrative purposes. Sykes, an individual 
inherently bound to the RFC's concept of the control of the air, wrote that  
 
Spectacular dog-fights over the German lines achieved little 
strategic effect and resulted in grave losses ... [Moreover,] ... some 
R.F.C. commanders accepted too readily the demands of Army 
commanders.13 
 
As the opening chapter recorded, it was such demands that Jones highlighted 
in the official history, touching upon the pressures that affected the RFC's 
approach to the control of the air.14 These pressures were two-fold: the first 
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based on purely operational considerations, and the second based upon the 
aggressive culture of the British Army during this period. 
 
The RFC and the influence of Structural and Cultural Pressures 
 
The brief discussion of Field Service Regulations, found in chapter two, 
emphasised the aggressive doctrine of the British Army. Sheffield offers an 
important overview of the origins of FSR, which was produced under the 
auspices of Haig, serving to establish 'broad principles for action.'15 As noted, 
the nature of doctrine in the British Army during this period is the subject of 
some debate, yet few scholars would disagree that, at its heart, the values of 
aggression, moral superiority, and the importance of the offensive were 
stressed above all others. A typical example of such values, as offered in 
FSR, notes that 
 
Half-Hearted measures never attain success in war, and the 
lack of determination is the most fruitful source of defeat 
[emphasis in original] 
 
More specific advice, such as advancing the firing line toward the enemy, 
reemphasised these core ideals: 
 
... the advance of the firing line must be characterized by the 
determination to press forward at all costs [emphasis in 
original].16 
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Whilst some scholars may be critical of the British Army's focus on the 
offensive, particularly its concentration on the importance of moral superiority, 
these examples are cited to demonstrate that the British Army went to war 
with a doctrine that placed significant weight on aggression, moral superiority, 
and the offensive.17 The sections on defensive warfare within FSR confirm 
this contention and, whilst not dismissing the importance of assuming a 
defensive posture on occasions, the advice is explicit:  
 
... if victory is to be won, the defensive attitude must be assumed 
only in order to obtain or create a favourable opportunity for 
decisive offensive action [emphasis in original].18 
 
As the second chapter also concluded, such values had an impact on the 
doctrine that was produced by military aviators prior to the First World War. 
However, the BEF, including its aerial component, did not have the 
opportunity to dictate terms during the opening engagements and battles of 
1914. As such, it was difficult, if not impossible, to develop an aggressive and 
offensive outlook. From the perspective of the RFC's experience of, and 
contribution to, this period, Baring's R.F.C. H.Q. (1920) gives invaluable 
insights.19 Baring, as assistant to Henderson and later to Trenchard, was in a 
unique position to record the activities of the RFC, and his account of the 
summer of 1914 provides a genuine flavour of the chaotic and fluctuating 
nature of the campaign, in which fluidity, manoeuvre, and a lack of initiative 
were the dominating themes.20 Baring also does an excellent job of capturing 
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the transition from manoeuvre to static warfare and the establishment of a 
routine for the RFC.  
 
With the stabilisation of the front during the winter of 1914, particularly after 
the First Battle of Ypres, the RFC and BEF were able to settle into the rhythm 
and routine of what came to be known as trench warfare.21 As Sykes was to 
comment in his autobiography, when the front became more stabilised,  
 
we were able to give much more time to improving our technique in 
the light of experience.22  
 
In practical terms, this also included the development of a more offensive 
outlook, as reflected in the Corps Training Manual and in line with wider BEF 
policy and practice. Wider BEF policy shifted to a more offensive posture due 
to a combination of factors. High amongst these was the pressure placed 
upon Britain by her French allies. As Edmonds and Wynne highlight, the 
Commander of the BEF, Sir John French, was given specific instructions from 
the WO to 'conform, as far as possible, to the plans and wishes of [the 
French].'23 Such instructions, the result of significant pressure from the high 
command of the French Army, also reflected the wider opinion of the French 
public, who felt that 'the British Empire was not making the utmost effort for 
the common cause.'24 These concerns were legitimate, and the French, 
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whose territory was under occupation, desired an active and aggressive 
strategy that would expel German forces from France in a rapid fashion.25 The 
wider political context of such instructions reflected the nature of coalition 
warfare in which, at this stage, Britain was the junior partner to France.26 As 
Sheffield notes, Britain's decision to deploy significant numbers of troops to 
the Continent ensured that Britain was sending the 
 
right signals, to demonstrate ... that 'Perfidious Albion' was indeed 
committed to the war.27 
 
Justifiable concerns for Sir John French, including a lack of resources and 
manpower, were not deemed sufficient to maintain a defensive posture until 
they had been remedied.28 Other factors that affected the BEF's shift to a 
more offensive policy included the manner in which the BEF's General 
Headquarters (GHQ) viewed the importance of offensive action. This was a 
tangible manifestation of the values found within FSR. The campaigns of 1914 
had been extremely hard on the BEF, and it was deemed vital to shift to the 
offensive in order to boost the morale of the British forces in France.29 This 
offensive policy would aim to assist the French (or take the lead) in large set-
piece battles, whilst launching patrols and raids against German positions on 
a regularly irregular basis. As Ashworth suggests, the move to an active front 
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policy was designed, at least in part, to counter what Holmes characterised as 
the 'sedentary habits of trench warfare.'30  
 
The development of an offensive outlook was driven both by directives from 
GHQ and by ad-hoc initiatives at the lower levels. During the early stages of 
1915, Ashworth suggests that 'elite battalions' helped develop an aggressive 
and offensive posture via a process of innovation and improvisation.31 Senior 
figures within the BEF also continued to press their units to adopt a more 
offensive outlook, based in no small part on the guidance contained within 
FSR. On the eve of being appointed to command First Army, Haig recorded 
the results of a meeting with his divisional commanders and other senior 
officers, in which the importance of local attacks, and an active defence, were 
to be two of the key features of 'carrying on operations under new conditions' 
– i.e. trench warfare.32 Two weeks earlier, Haig had also expressed 
displeasure with the lack of offensive energy displayed by his colleagues in II 
and III Corps. Haig's own Corps had started to improvise with specialist 
weapons for use under these 'new conditions,' and Haig's diary makes 
specific mention of the development and production of trench mortars.33 It was 
not until 7 February 1915 that French issued a formal directive with regard to 
the development of a more vigorous policy at the front. This directive called 
for the undertaking of active raiding and patrolling against the German 
positions opposite British trenches: 
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The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires me again to draw 
attention to the importance of constant activity and of offensive 
methods in general in dealing with the enemy opposed to us.34  
 
For Edmonds and Wynne, this directive was the result of the continued and 
worrying display of initiative by the German Army. For French, a more 
aggressive policy would serve to recapture the initiative and establish moral 
superiority over the enemy.35 From a more practical standpoint, raiding and 
patrolling also allowed the BEF to blood its inexperienced new drafts whilst 
gathering useful intelligence for future operations, conclusions supported by 
Ashworth and Sheffield.36 Griffith, in discussing this process ('battle 
inoculation'), also stresses the importance of raids in allowing new technical 
and tactical concepts to be tried.37 Reflecting the restricted resources of the 
BEF during this period, French's directive was careful to stress the desire to 
avoid aimless operations that would result in an unnecessary loss of life for 
limited tactical gains. Consequently, such operations 'must invariably be well 
thought out beforehand ...'38 Ashworth, in developing his thesis on the 'live 
and let live system,' suggests that French's February 1915 directive sought to 
counter the tendency for trench warfare to descend into long periods of 
inactivity, governed by informal or tacit truces coupled with ritualised 
aggression designed to avoid casualties.39 For Ashworth, this directive did not 
instigate the formal British policy of active trench warfare (that came later 
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under Haig), yet the 'memo did establish the principle of active trench warfare 
[emphasis in original].'40  
 
The impact of French's directive was limited by the lack of technical and 
tactical expertise required to issue highly specific orders. In line with the 
command principles of the British Army during this period, general directives 
were issued from GHQ, which were given greater specificity as they 
descended the chain of command from the strategic to the tactical level.41 As 
a consequence, by the time the directive had reached the level at which such 
operations would be executed (battalion, company, and platoon level, 
depending on scale), it may have been watered down to the extent that local 
commanders were able to circumvent the spirit of the directive and continue to 
adhere to a system of live and let live.42 The focus on husbanding resources, 
a factor that severely limited French's conduct of the conflict during his time as 
C-in-C, BEF, was another element that restricted the impact of his directive.43  
 
The RFC and the BEF's Offensive Posture 
 
Whilst French's directive was focused on the conduct of British troops in the 
trenches, the sentiment contained within its paragraphs had significant 
implications for the RFC. It is no coincidence that, during this period, the 
senior command of the RFC wished to record that their unit was already 
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adhering to a more offensive outlook. On 2 February 1915, five days before 
French's directive was issued, Sykes was to observe that 
 
The principle of attacking hostile aircraft whenever and wherever 
seen ... has been adhered to and has resulted in the moral fact that 
enemy machines invariably beat immediate retreat when chased.44 
 
These echoed similar sentiments expressed by David Henderson some days 
earlier:  
 
...with regard to fighting in the air, there has been a considerable 
amount of it; but the great difficulty has been to bring the enemy to 
action. The German when tackled usually bolts straight for his 
home and the protection of his anti-aircraft guns. Nevertheless we 
have managed to bring down a good many, usually by the fire of a 
rifle carried by the observer.45 
 
Whilst it has not proved possible to discover primary, documentary evidence 
that recorded the response of Sykes, Henderson, or the RFC to French's 
directive, this does not preclude drawing certain conclusions based upon a 
wider understanding of the close links between GHQ and the RFC.  
 
Sir John French was an early supporter of aviation within the British Army, 
and had chaired a talk delivered by Sykes to the Aeronautical Society in 
February 1913. Whilst French has been criticised for his seemingly antiquated 
views on warfare, his thoughts about aviation, offered at the conclusion of 
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Sykes's lecture, were both positive and progressive.46 He believed that 
aviation had much to offer the commander, particularly in the realm of 
operational and tactical intelligence; helping to 'dispel the "Fog" of war.'47 He 
was also perceptive in drawing the parallel between the clash that often took 
place between friendly and enemy cavalry reconnaissance units, and the 
'battles in the air,' which would undoubtedly be a feature of future conflicts. 
This indicates that French had an understanding of the concept of the control 
of the air, even if only in a rudimentary fashion.48 At something akin to a 
philosophical level, Sir John was also significantly impressed with the spirit of 
the RFC. The bravery of the pilots was stressed, particularly in light of the 
pioneering nature of their work.49  
 
Thus, it is unsurprising that French had a good understanding of what he 
could expect from the RFC during the opening campaigns of the First World 
War. This was due not only to French's own personal interest, but also to the 
efforts of Sykes and the Corps in spreading the gospel of military aviation in 
the years 1912 – 1914.50 What may be termed an affinity with the RFC 
explains French's decision to take time out of his enormous workload to 
inspect the squadrons of the RFC as they arrived in France in August 1914.51 
French was to remark that he was  
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much impressed with the general efficiency of the aircraft force. I 
saw the Squadron Commanders and told them so.52  
 
On a personal level, French was also on good terms with the senior command 
of the RFC, having supported the Corps in the pre-war era. In particular, he 
had a long professional relationship with Sir David Henderson, an officer of 
whom Sir John 'thought highly.'53 Such relations reflected wider trends within 
Britain's defence establishment, as officers often belonged to competing 
cliques or cabals. As Travers argues, senior officers would have favourite 
subordinates and would promote or protect these individuals, as long as loyal 
service was forthcoming.54 Recent analysis by Connelly and Bowman has 
sought to revise such conclusions, stressing the limitations of patronage 
within the British Army.55 Whatever the limits of their influence, cliques existed 
within both the Army and Navy of this period, and examples include Admiral 
Fisher's 'fishpond,' and the competing groups headed by Lord Roberts and 
Lord Wolseley during the time of the Boer War.56  
 
During 1914 and 1915, Haig and French came to represent rival factions 
within the BEF, and the RFC did not escape this phenomenon.57 At a macro 
level, Henderson and Sykes could be considered as part of French's clique, 
whilst Trenchard became a 'Haig man.' Sykes's early connection with, and 
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sponsorship by, Henry Wilson was another association that did much to 
shape the career of the former.58 At a micro-level, cliques existed within the 
RFC. In John Salmond, Trenchard possessed a loyal subordinate whom he 
groomed into a suitable successor. Sykes had his own cabal, including P. R. 
C. Groves, and, on assuming the role of CAS in April 1918, the former was 
able to promote its members to important posts. It is important not to 
overemphasise the close relations between French and the RFC, but it was 
clear that, in Sir John, the RFC had a commander who believed in the 
capability of air power and the efficiency of the Corps. French's faith in air 
power was rewarded and enhanced by the RFC's performance during the 
Battle of the Marne, and his despatches to the WO during the autumn and 
winter of 1914 consistently praised the performance of the BEF's aviators.59  
 
As Sykes suggested, the RFC, at the behest of French and GHQ, operated 
with a high tempo and under significant pressure.60 On occasions, French 
would make specific requests of Sykes and his pilots. These included 
ensuring liaison between the much pressed I Corps and II Corps, 
communicating with the besieged city of Antwerp, and conveying messages to 
the high command of the French Army.61 In other words, the RFC, with close 
relations to its overall C-in-C, was an integral part of the BEF. French's 
February directive attempted, in a general sense, to enthuse the BEF with a 
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more aggressive outlook. As a subordinate unit of the BEF, the RFC was no 
exception to such a directive. Had Sykes or Henderson not been performing 
in line with the wider policy directives issued by French, who took a close 
interest in the activities of their unit, then the C-in-C could have replaced them 
with more aggressive officers.  
 
As was the case in the wider BEF, it did not always require directives from on 
high to ensure that all units were acting aggressively, and it appears that, 
even prior to French's February directive, the RFC were inclined to be 
aggressive. To a large extent, the aggressive intent of the RFC was curtailed 
only by material considerations. Throughout 1915, the Corps lacked efficient 
armament for their aircraft. As Jones asserts, up until early 1915, the primary 
weapon of the RFC was the service rifle.62 This reflected pre-war logistical 
decisions that made no provision for squadrons to be provided with machine 
guns, with aircrew relying on service revolvers and rifles.63 This is confirmed 
by the reflective comments of Sholto Douglas, recorded during his time at the 
RAF's Staff College in the post-war period.64 Despite lacking in efficient armed 
aircraft, it was aggressive intent that was the constant of RFC operations 
during the first twelve months of the conflict. The first recorded attempt at 
aerial fighting took place on 22 August 1914, as pilots from No.2 Squadron 
attempted to engage a low-flying German reconnaissance machine that 
passed over their airfield. Louis Strange, a noted pre-war pilot and daredevil, 
attempted to give chase in No.5 Squadron's Maurice Farman armed with a 
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Lewis Gun. As Strange's biographer records, the sheer weight of the Lewis 
Gun (and passenger) made climbing to engage the German craft an 
impossible feat.65 The rifle-armed aircraft from No.2 Squadron also made an 
abortive attempt at engagement.66 The early and limited results obtained did 
not obscure the fact that RFC pilots were exceptionally keen to grapple with 
the enemy. For example, on 25 August 1914, No.2 Squadron attained its first 
success, although without weapons. Achieving results via the aggressiveness 
of their flying, a German observation plane was hounded by three British 
machines and forced to make a landing, upon which the German aircraft was 
promptly burnt.67 That the first battles in the sky were essentially moral 
contests reflected not only the lack of weapons, but also the spirit with which 
the RFC had been indoctrinated since its earliest existence, manifest in 
clearest form in the Training Manual. Moral superiority could not achieve 
success on its own, and Henderson, in correspondence with his deputy, 
concluded that 
 
Any fighting machine is wanted, but not Henri Farman's: these 
cannot climb fast enough. Any machine sent out must be able to 
climb really fast.68 
 
Henderson's request, coupled with these early encounters, confirmed the 
validity of pre-war hypothesising and of the doctrinal importance attached to 
aerial fighting. With reference to early combats, Raleigh's taste for literary 
flourishes is apt: 
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the confidence and determination with which ... [RFC aviators] 
attacked [often] did the work of a machine-gun and brought the 
enemy down.69 
 
From an evidential standpoint, firsthand accounts of aerial combats during this 
period are sparse, and, as Wise notes, squadrons began to submit formal 
reports after mid-April 1915.70 For example, Nos.1 and 5 Squadrons began 
submitting formal combat reports during April 1915, whilst No.3 Squadron 
began submitting reports in May.71 However, Jones records several occasions 
during early to mid-1915 in which successful aerial combats took place.72 
Such aggressiveness did not go unnoticed by French, and his despatch of 2 
February 1915 recorded that 
 
Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the 
ground, and it would appear probable that others, though they have 
managed to reach their own lines, have done so in a considerably 
damaged condition.73 
 
Much of this material was 'borrowed' from Sykes's report of the same day, 
indicating that French continued to take a keen interest in the reports and 
work of the RFC.74 French's decision to highlight the appalling weather 
conditions under which the RFC continued to operate also captured French's 
admiration and appreciation of the efforts of the Corps. Such efforts were 
undertaken with the correct 'active' and aggressive mindset deemed crucial by 
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Sir John.75 Thus, as French pressed the BEF hard during the winter of 1914 / 
1915, there was little for the RFC to do but to match these efforts and conduct 
their operations in keeping with the wider aggressive culture of the BEF, 
captured in FSR (and the Training Manual) and pushed further with French's 
February 1915 directive.  
 
Importantly, there were additional battlefield implications, which affected the 
tempo at which the RFC was forced to operate. After the impressive 
performance of the Corps during the opening encounters of the conflict, senior 
BEF commanders came to rely on air power as a source of information, not 
only to monitor the movements of the enemy, but in the planning and 
execution of friendly ground operations. With the expansion of the BEF in the 
winter of 1914, the RFC undertook a corresponding reorganisation, 
encouraged by the support of French.76 As the BEF grouped its Corps into 
Armies, the RFC grouped its squadrons into Wings. Each Wing, comprising 
two squadrons, was attached to an Army, with the Wing responsible for 
meeting the air power needs of its parent Army.77 This decentralisation of air 
power demonstrated the responsive nature of the RFC's commanders, who 
grasped the expanding nature of the conflict and the need to ensure that the 
British Army was supplied with effective air support.78 It was during the BEF's 
offensive battles of early 1915 that the RFC came to be relied upon to perform 
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a variety of tasks.79 The planning for the Neuve Chapelle offensive, for 
example, was the first to make extensive use of aerial reconnaissance and 
photography to locate German trenches, gun emplacements, and firing 
positions. These locations were then transposed onto trench maps, which 
were utilised in planning the operation.80 The initial success of the battle was 
due in no small part to the information gathered by the RFC.81  
 
From the perspective of the control of the air, the increasingly important 
contribution made by air power meant that it was becoming vital to ensure the 
freedom of action of friendly aerial units, whilst denying such benefits to the 
enemy. Reflecting the evolving nature of aerial operations on the Western 
Front, operational orders issued to No.16 Squadron (First Wing) on 29 March 
1915 were the first to order a formal offensive patrol aimed at the destruction 
of hostile aircraft in the air.82 As Wise remarks, further orders of this kind were 
issued to First Wing squadrons on 1, 7, 12 April and 7 May 1915. By 24 June 
1915, fighting patrols had become a formalised element of operations 
conducted by First Wing squadrons.83 During the fighting around Hill 60 in 
mid-April 1915 (part of the wider Neuve Chapelle operation), No.1 Squadron 
had been transferred to the area with the specific instructions to keep 
'German aircraft away from the hill.'84 The work of the RFC during Neuve 
Chapelle received warm approval from French, who commended the high 
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tempo of their operations in the face of difficult weather conditions.85 In 
French's eighth despatch, issued during the summer of 1915, the C-in-C was 
to write that  
 
[the] Royal Flying Corps is becoming more and more an 
indispensible factor in combat operations.86  
 
In observing the significant increase of German air power at the front, French 
praised the consistent activity of the Corps. Aerial combat was on the rise, 
and French was delighted with the moral superiority the RFC had established 
over their German counterparts, with such engagements 'invariably [taking 
place] over or behind the German lines.'87 The display of initiative, aggression, 
and activity by the RFC was in keeping with French's directive of February 
1915, the wider doctrinal culture of the British Army (FSR and the Training 
Manual), and the practical dictates of the operations on the ground. Thus, it is 
apparent that it was not only the aggressive culture of the BEF that shaped 
the tempo and nature of the response of the RFC during this early period. 
Battlefield considerations, and the increasing importance of air power to the 
successful conduct of ground operations, forced the RFC to fight for the 
control of the air.  
 
It is important to draw a direct parallel between the RFC and BEF during the 
first twelve months of the conflict. Both Sir John French and the senior 
command of the RFC were forced to curtail their naturally aggressive instincts 
because they lacked adequate resources. French, and the pairing of Sykes 
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and Henderson, established the offensively driven philosophy that would 
guide the BEF and RFC throughout the conflict. This philosophy was based 
on pre-war doctrine contained in both FSR and the Training Manual. 
However, it was left to their successors, Haig and Trenchard, to put this 
philosophy into more widespread practice. This reflected their affinity with 
offensive measures and the significant increase in material and manpower 
resources (not available to their predecessors). For example, the size of the 
RFC expanded from its initial deployment strength of four squadrons in 
August 1914 to seven squadrons and a flight in March 1915. By September 
1915, this had risen to twelve squadrons, and, by the opening of the Somme 
campaign in the summer of 1916, RFC strength stood at 27 squadrons.88  
 
The Arrival of Trenchard 
 
It was during the reorganisation of November 1914 that Hugh Trenchard was 
appointed as Commander of First Wing. Up to this point, Trenchard occupied 
the post of Assistant Commandant at the RFC's Central Flying School. From 
an administrative and logistical perspective, Trenchard undertook important 
work in establishing the school and shaping its practices.89 On the outbreak of 
war, Trenchard was appointed as Commandant of the RFC forces left in the 
UK, and he made a vital contribution in preparing additional squadrons for 
deployment to France.90 Boyle characterises this period as one of 
improvisation for Trenchard, whilst stressing the latter's good working 
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relations with Lord Kitchener.91 In contrast, Trenchard's contribution to RFC 
doctrine, particularly the production of the Training Manual, was slight to nil, 
and his hand is absent from the archival record.92 Yet, this did not mean that 
Trenchard did not adhere to such doctrine. Trenchard was an ardent disciple 
of the offensive spirit stressed in the pages of FSR and the Training Manual.  
 
Trenchard's appointment to First Wing coincided with the appointment of Haig 
as Commander of the First Army. This was the beginning of a close working 
relationship, built on the foundation of a shared vision that placed significant 
emphasis on the importance of aggressive, offensive action.93 In December 
1914, Trenchard met Haig for the first time. After a brief discussion on the 
merits of air power, Trenchard considered Haig to be a 'believe[r] in the Air 
though he did not understand very much about it.'94 These reflections may 
have been shaped by Trenchard's affinity for 'The Chief,' but it is apparent 
that, at the very least, Haig was starting to take a more positive interest in air 
power.95 
 
If Haig was the BEF's most aggressive ground commander between 1914 and 
1915, then, in Trenchard, he had found his equal in the air.96 As his 
biographer notes, Trenchard arrived in France with the intention to undertake 
'more positive action in the air.'97 The close cooperation between Haig and 
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Trenchard during the battles around Neuve Chapelle is well documented.98 
The increased prevalence of aerial combat did little to douse Trenchard's 
appetite for the aggressive. As Boyle records,  
 
One day soon, he [Trenchard] vowed, the Germans would be made 
to fight in the air.99 
 
Trenchard's frustration was not due to a lack of offensive spirit within the RFC, 
nor was official sanction lacking for a more offensive posture. As noted above, 
his Wing was the first to undertake deliberate fighting patrols. However, 
material and manpower considerations undermined the ability of the RFC to 
be more aggressive in the air, and to instigate a systematic policy by which 
the control of the air would be actively sought via aerial fighting. As Boyle 
asserts, Sykes was to complain directly to French that Trenchard's operations 
during Neuve Chapelle were incurring 'too many casualties.'100 Boyle is 
dismissive of Sykes's complaint, citing Haig's own unconcern in the matter. 
Sykes was not being unfairly critical, and, as Ash notes, he tempered such 
criticism by praising the efforts of Trenchard's Wing in the war diary of the 
RFC.101 Sykes approved aggressive operations, and was infused with an 
offensive spirit. However, as part of the senior command team of the RFC, he 
had a better understanding of the challenges of sustainability facing the 
Corps. Boyle dismisses the 'light' casualties suffered by Trenchard's Wing, but 
does not acknowledge that losses of six aircraft and twelve men, representing 
half the effective frontline strength of a squadron, were significant, given the 
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relatively small size of the RFC at this time. In addition, Haig, at this stage a 
commander fairly inexperienced in the use of air power, was not an authority 
to cite regarding the sustainability of aerial operations. 
 
In March 1915, the RFC possessed less than 90 frontline aircraft, deployed in 
seven squadrons (plus one flight).102 Given the scale of casualties during this 
period, twelve personnel lost represented a significant amount. Between 
August 1914 and May 1915, the RFC lost 134 officers and observers. Of this 
number, 62 were lost via sickness or accidents. The loss of twelve members 
of First Wing represented close to ten percent of the entire losses of the RFC 
during the opening ten months of the war. This may have been 'light' in 
comparison to the losses of 1916 and 1917, but, in the context of the period, 
Sykes was right to worry.103 Sustaining the operations of the Corps was a vital 
task, to which Henderson devoted a significant proportion of his energies. His 
discussions with Brancker, captured in a document of September 1914, 
demonstrate that the RFC faced a range of logistical issues that threatened 
the sustainability of operations on a meaningful level.104  
 
However, Sykes, who at the time was frequently left in charge of the RFC, 
had ultimate responsibility for the manner in which Trenchard utilised his 
Wing. At the very least, and whilst accepting that Wings had a significant 
degree of operational autonomy, Trenchard's aggressive use of his squadrons 
was in keeping with the pre-war military aviation doctrine that Sykes played a 
significant role in shaping. 
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Trouble at the Top: Sykes and Trenchard 
 
This exchange highlights the troubling personal relations that were a factor of 
the command of the RFC during this period. With the RFC being such a small 
'community,' personality clashes were difficult to disguise. In writing privately 
to the editor of the Aeroplane, a senior instructor at the CFS was to observe 
that '[t]he Lord only knows who is commanding – I don't.'105 Ash notes the 
difficult relationship between Sykes and Trenchard and, eventually, Sykes and 
Henderson.106 Much of this material comes from Trenchard and his 
biographer, and it is important to treat such evidence with care.107 With 
distance from events, the hostile nature of the Sykes-Trenchard relationship 
seemed only to increase.108 For example, Sykes's post-war criticism of Haig 
can be viewed through the prism of the latter’s close relationship with 
Trenchard.109  
 
One of the major disputes between Trenchard and Sykes focuses on the 
former's handling of the RFC. This was described by Sykes as Trenchard's 
use of 'battering-ram tactics.' In turn, Trenchard and his biographer spend 
significant time defending the RFC's offensive policy, whilst characterising 
Sykes as an intriguer, a loner, and a poor leader of men.110 This debate 
reflects questions relating to the ownership of the RFC's conception of the 
control of the air, and the origins of its offensively driven doctrine. In reality, 
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both men were firm believers in the offensive use of air power, and both 
adhered to the same vision of the control of the air: to establish moral and 
material superiority over the enemy via pro-active aerial patrolling with armed 
aircraft.111 For pragmatic reasons, Sykes wished to distance himself from the 
concept because he did not wish to be associated with the heavy losses 
suffered by the RFC in the second half of the conflict. Sykes also came to 
view air power in far-reaching terms, as a force that could be put to wider use 
than offering auxiliary support to ground forces.112 Thus, Sykes's post-war 
attempt to distance himself from the offensive doctrine and policy of the RFC 
is somewhat disingenuous. To quote Ash's conclusions,  
 
Historians have condemned Trenchard's offensive policy from 1915 
to 1917, but he merely maintained the policy Sykes had 
established before the war ... [T]he goal was to obtain mastery of 
the air ... In all, Sykes was guilty of letting his enthusiasm for 
morale blind him to the realities of modern warfare.113 
 
Ash was not the first to stress this point, and Cooper observed that the  
 
offensive ethos which characterised ... [RFC] fighter operations 
later in the war [was established before Trenchard rose to 
command the RFC].114 
 
French and Sykes sought to develop the offensive outlook of the BEF and 
RFC respectively, yet the combination of Haig and Trenchard would take the 
conception to its logical extremes.  
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Haig, the BEF, and Raiding: A Study in Aggression115 
 
Before establishing the nature of the relationship between Haig and 
Trenchard, it is first necessary to expound briefly upon Haig's rise to 
command of the BEF, and his strategic vision for the organisation as it moved 
forward into 1916. To begin, it is important to record that Haig, as Director of 
Staff Duties at the WO between 1907 and 1909, was responsible for the 
production of Field Service Regulations (1909). As noted above, this 
document played no small part in shaping the aggressive culture of the British 
Army. As the officer with primary responsibility for the production of FSR, it 
would be appropriate to assume that Haig was a commander who placed 
great store in offensive action, aggression, and moral superiority.116 Haig's 
development of French's active trench warfare policy demonstrates such a 
contention. 
 
For both Sheffield and Ashworth, Haig's appointment as C-in-C, BEF was 
highly significant to the BEF's offensive posture, and raiding became a central 
tenet in his wider policy of attrition.117 Ashworth, who labelled Haig the 
'thruster in chief,' characterises this process as the institutionalisation of 
aggression, with the issuing of directives and orders followed by the 
establishment of specialist training schools to instruct in the art of raiding. 
Such steps were supplemented by the publishing of specialist instructional 
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manuals.118 The formalisation of trench raiding began in early 1916, and 
Haig's diary entry of 14 January 1916 records his belief in the value of 'winter 
sports' as a crucial component of his strategy as C-in-C.119 There were other 
localised factors that encouraged GHQ to pursue such a policy. In the spring 
of 1916, a stretch of the Western Front was passed from French to British 
control. As Edmonds observes,  
 
When the British took over from their Allies, they generally found a 
kind of unofficial suspension of arms or truce prevailing ... With a 
view to cultivating an 'aggressive spirit,' ... G.H.Q. did not allow the 
state of affairs to continue. Sniping, fire surprises and raids were 
ordered and encouraged.120 
 
In his first despatch as C-in-C, written in May 1916, Haig, who had not yet 
launched a full-scale offensive, was to note that his troops had been  
 
... far from idle or inactive. Although the struggle in a general 
sense, has not been intense, it has been everywhere continuous, 
and there have been many sharp local actions.121 
 
For Haig, these local actions, including raids that would be launched 'twice or 
three times a week,' were the method with which the enemy would be 
dominated, and both the initiative and moral superiority attained. In stressing 
the immensity of the conflict, Haig was to concede that such operations were 
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seemingly insignificant on an individual scale. However, they relieved the 
'comparative monotony of th[e] struggle,' whilst having a 
 
... cumulative effect [which], though difficult to appraise at its true 
value now, will doubtless prove hereafter to have been 
considerable.122 
 
The cumulative effect was the attrition of the enemy's strength on the ground, 
both physically and morally. The official history provides an example of a 
'model' raid, which was conducted by a unit of Haig's First Army, shortly 
before his ascension to the command of the BEF. The brigade and battalions 
in question, units of the 1st Canadian Division, part of the wider Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, had a noted reputation for innovation and improvisation, 
as well as for their fearsome battlefield performance.123 The rather sterile 
language of the report belies the aggressive intent of the operation, although 
the objectives do provide some hints.  
 
The raid would have specific localised objectives, including the capture of 
prisoners. More generally, losses were to be inflicted upon the enemy, his 
moral [sic] lowered, and, importantly, the continued domination of the ground 
up to the enemy's front line trench attained.124 The raid was considered a 
huge success, and, in summing up the lessons of the operation, the report 
was to stress that the German forces opposing the Canadians had shown 
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poor discipline, poor military skill, and a lack of co-operation.125 Perhaps most 
importantly, German forces had failed due to a '[c]omplete lack of active 
patrolling and the surrender of the initiative.'126 All of the negative factors 
stressed by the report were the evils that a policy of active raiding were 
designed to counter. 
 
Haig's despatch and report cited above provide many insights into the policy 
of constant raiding. Haig embraced the core tenets of French's February 1915 
directive, yet the formalisation of raiding took another step in March 1916 with 
the publication of Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare.127 The very 
notion of issuing notes and pamphlets of this kind conformed to wider practice 
within the British Army. As Sheffield notes, the nature of FSR meant that it 
provided the basis upon which tactical and operational best practice could be 
built, in the form of training pamphlets and manuals (notably the S.S. series of 
pamphlets).128 Whilst offering specific tactical advice, the March 1916 
pamphlet reinforced the importance of constant aggressive activity, which 
 
... always results in an ultimate mastery ... achiev[ing] the double 
purpose of raising the moral [sic] of our own troops whilst lowering 
that of the enemy's.129 
 
Such a tempo of activity also served to foster the offensive spirit in officers 
and men who, under the conditions of trench warfare, had the 'insidious 
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tendency to lapse into a passive and lethargic attitude.'130 Haig was to benefit 
from the accumulation of manpower and resources that allowed this policy to 
be pursued in a more widespread and vigorous fashion. For example, at the 
outbreak of war, the BEF deployed to France with four infantry divisions and 
one cavalry division. By 1 January 1916, less than a month into Haig's new 
command, the BEF comprised 38 infantry and five cavalry divisions, just short 
of a million men in total.131 As the table below demonstrates, raiding was to 
undergo a marked increase between 1915 and 1917, before reducing in 
frequency in 1918 as the BEF shifted to the defensive while suffering the 
effects of a manpower shortage. These statistics, compiled from a range of 
sources, are not comprehensive but are given to indicate the important role 
raiding played under Haig's command. 
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Table One 
Period 
Number of 
Raids 
19 December 1915 – 30 May 1916 63 raids 
Late June 1916 43 raids 
July – Mid-November 1916 310 raids 
9 April 1917 – Mid-November 1917 270 raids 
8 December 1917 – 21 March 1918 125 raids 
 
BEF Raiding in France, December 1915 – March 1918 
Sources: J. E. Edmonds, OH, 1916, Vol. I, p.242 and p.310; W. Miles, Military Operations: 
France and Belgium (OH), 1916, Vol. II (London: Macmillan & Co., 1938), p.544; J. H. 
Boraston, ed., Haig's Despatches, p.135 and p.181. 
 
It is instructive to note that such raiding took place in addition to the enormous 
ground campaigns and battles of 1916, 1917, and 1918, and losses during 
conditions of 'active trench warfare' remained high. For example, from 19 
December 1915 to the end of June 1916, the BEF suffered casualties 
amounting to 5,845 officers and 119,296 men.132 These figures were not 
entirely made up from casualties suffered during trench raiding, but they do 
indicate the effects of more 'active' conditions at the front. The scale of trench 
raiding was reduced only when a manpower crisis threatened the BEF. This 
was aggravated by the threat of a massive German offensive in the spring of 
1918.133 Even then, Fifth Army Commander, General Hubert Gough, upon 
whom the weight of the German attack would fall, continued to utilise raiding 
as part of his policy of active defence. As Edmonds notes, some divisions 
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instigated a policy of friendly competition between their battalions to see who 
could undertake the most successful raiding.134 In sum, Haig was an 
aggressive commander, with the result that, as H. A. Jones suggests, the BEF 
undertook 'almost continuous fighting,' which was 'mostly offensive' in 
character.135 Not only did the BEF possess an aggressive culture, captured in 
FSR, but it possessed commanders in French and, more profoundly, in Haig, 
who actively cultivated this spirit. As such, Haig expected the behaviour and 
performance of subordinates to match his ideals. In Trenchard, he found a 
compliant disciple. 
 
Haig and his 'Magnificent' Trenchard 
 
In his final despatch as Commander of the BEF, Haig was to write:  
 
I recall with gratitude the magnificent work done during the fighting 
of 1916 and 1917 by ... Trenchard, at that time commanding the 
[RFC]. The influence exerted by this able and distinguished officer 
upon the moral and the development of the British Air Service and 
in the creation of its splendid traditions can scarcely be 
exaggerated.136 
 
Such sentiment was not restricted to public documents. On being faced with 
Trenchard's redeployment to Britain, Haig, in a letter to Lord Derby, Secretary 
of State for War, was to offer his frank opinion: 
 
The importance of Trenchard's personality with the Flying Units in 
the Field and its direct effect in maintaining the offensive spirit in 
the air so vital to the success of our Armies in the Field is not, I 
                                            
134
 J. E. Edmonds, OH, 1918, Vol. I, p.97.  
135
 H. A. Jones, WIA, Vol. VI, p.553. 
136
 J. H. Boraston, ed., Haig's Despatches, p.353. 
210 
 
think, fully realised at home ... I have no hesitation in saying that it 
is more than probable that the removal of Trenchard from active 
command in the Field would, in a short time directly impair the 
offensive fighting efficiency of the [RFC].137 
 
On another occasion, whilst having his portrait painted by William Orpen, 
official artist for the War Office, Haig was to insist that Trenchard too must be 
immortalised. As the artist recalls, Haig stated that, 'Orpen must see "Boom," 
he's great.'138 Such feelings were more than reciprocated. In his 
autobiographical notes, Trenchard was to record that 'I can safely say here 
that he [Haig] made me all I rose to in France.'139 In the post-war battle of 
reputations, Trenchard was an ardent supporter of 'The Chief,' writing a 
glowing foreword to Davidson's biography of Haig's time as Commander of 
the BEF.140 As Jordan and Sheffield have suggested, the close relationship 
between Haig and Trenchard was based upon a shared vision of warfare that 
stressed the primacy of aggressive, offensive action aimed at achieving moral 
superiority.141 More specifically, both Haig and Trenchard believed that the 
only path to victory lay in the defeat of the German Army in France and 
Flanders. Trenchard placed his units at Haig's disposal in order to achieve 
such an aim, whilst Haig drove the expansion of the RFC.142  
 
When the possibility of an independent air force was mooted in some earnest 
during 1917, Trenchard, who stood to gain significantly from the creation of a 
separate service, opposed the move on the grounds that it would undermine 
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the aerial support that would be available to the BEF.143 As Boyle offers, one 
of the reasons Trenchard reluctantly accepted the post as CAS of the new 
Royal Air Force was out of a wider loyalty to Haig. Trenchard, who wished to 
remain in France, was, according to both Boyle and Trenchard, forced into the 
role of CAS by Lord Northcliffe and the designated Secretary of State for Air, 
Lord Rothermere. The Harmsworth brothers threatened to launch a bitter 
campaign in the press against Haig if Trenchard did not accept the post of 
CAS.144 This incident serves to demonstrate the loyalty and close professional 
relationship between Haig and Trenchard. 
 
Cooper emphasises Trenchard's hero-worshipping of Haig, and the latter's 
total dependence on the former for specialist advice regarding air power.145 
This is echoed in the latest biography of Haig, in which Sheffield stresses 
Haig's deference to his subject matter experts. In the case of Trenchard, 
Sheffield suggests that Haig provided his air power commander with 
considerable latitude in running the RFC and developing its policy.146 This is 
supported by both Jordan and Cooper, who note the free hand provided to 
Trenchard by Haig.147 However, such conclusions have a tendency to 
downplay Haig's responsibility for the aggressive conduct of the RFC. Of 
course, at the tactical and operational level, Haig could not hope to possess 
as deep an understanding of air power as Trenchard, his subject matter 
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expert. Yet, it must not be overlooked that the RFC was a subordinate unit of 
the BEF for which Haig retained ultimate authority. As such, the RFC's 
conduct was governed via the prism of the wider organisational ethos of the 
British Army. This ethos, stressing constant aggressive action, was actively 
cultivated by Haig.148 Moreover, to suggest that Trenchard operated with 
autonomy is misleading. Haig had an appetite for RFC reports and memos, 
and commented upon their contents with favour and regularity. For example, 
Haig's comments on Trenchard's report of 7 October 1916 are revealing. 
Sections relating to the high tempo of Corps operations received clear 
approval via the generous application of Haig's blue pencil. At the bottom of 
the report, Haig wrote of the RFC's '... highly credible performance in view of 
the weather conditions.'149 In a report written at the height of the Somme 
campaign, Trenchard was to note that 
 
My chief point at present is to try to keep German machines from 
crossing our lines or interfering with photography, contact patrols, 
or wireless work with artillery.150 
 
Such sentiment received Haig's endorsement and appreciation, again marked 
in his thick blue pencil.  
 
Requests to rest squadrons were also sent to Haig. Two examples in early 
August 1916, again annotated with Haig's comments, approved Trenchard's 
decision to rest hard-pressed squadrons. On 3 August 1916, such a request 
was met with the following response from Haig: 'Certainly – They thoroughly 
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deserve a [rest].'151 These comments, a feature of many RFC reports and 
memos forwarded to Haig, are instructive. They demonstrate that Haig was 
aware of the tactical and operational conduct of the RFC, and he commended 
the spirit and tempo with which their operations were undertaken. His decision 
to allow RFC squadrons periods of rest, not in keeping with his reputation as a 
'butcher,' is also illustrative. The receipt of such approval is more surprising, 
given as it was at the height of the Battle of the Somme, when the forces of 
the BEF were engaged in the largest and most intense period of operations in 
the history of British Army (up to that point).152 Such a decision shows that 
Haig felt the RFC were fighting hard, and that squadrons that had suffered 
heavily were perfectly entitled to rest, as their operations had been conducted 
in the correct spirit. In contrast, during the height of the Passchendaele 
offensives, French aviation units working under Haig were chastised because 
many French pilots did not 'mean business.'153 Whilst Haig could not override 
French orders to withdraw a 'group of machines,' he recorded his displeasure, 
hinting that they did not require a rest because they were operating with a lack 
of offensive spirit.154 
 
In noting the heavy losses suffered by the RFC, Mason draws a direct parallel 
with the catastrophic casualties experienced by the wider BEF, particularly 
during the Battle of the Somme. As Mason suggests, Trenchard would have 
been well aware of the losses being suffered by the BEF, whilst  
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He would have expected little sympathy [from GHQ] for an RFC 
casualty rate measured in tens rather than thousands.155  
 
As D. R. Jones records, loss statistics for the RFC, compared to the ground 
components of the BEF, were miniscule. Between August 1914 and 
December 1915, the BEF lost 85,598 ground troops on the Western Front. 
During the same period, the RFC lost 89 men to enemy action. Even during 
July 1916, and with the institutionalisation of fighting in the air, only 42 RFC 
personnel died.156 It is important to note that Haig would also have been 
aware of such losses. As Mason contends, the RFC was exceptionally 
proficient at recording its losses, whilst Haig himself noted the 'difficulties in 
the air' being experienced by the RFC.157 The reporting of losses was very 
often juxtaposed against those supposedly inflicted upon the enemy. Thus, 
the heavy losses experienced by the RFC were almost always offset by 
claims of a higher rate of attrition against the German Air Service. Such 
sentiment was captured in Brancker's letter to Trenchard, in which he noted 
that  
 
I rather enjoy hearing of our heavy casualties as I am perfectly 
certain in my own mind that the Germans lose at least half as many 
again as we do.158 
 
Whilst difficult to ascertain whether Haig was provided with an accurate 
statistical picture of the aerial conflict that raged above the Western Front, he 
                                            
155
 T. Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, pp.28 – 29. 
156
 D. R. Jones, 'Flying and Dying in WWI: British Aircrew Losses and the Origins of U.S. 
Military Aviation Medicine,' Aviation Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Feb 
2008), p.139. 
157
 T. Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, p.30; Sheffield & J. Bourne, eds., Douglas 
Haig, Haig Diary, 18 Aug 1917, p.318; AIR 1/758/204/4/119 – Combats in the Air, Summary 
of Results, 20 June – 29 Dec 1915; War Office, Statistics, p.505. 
158
 Trenchard Papers, RAFM, MFC 76/1/7 – Letter, Brancker to Trenchard, 22 Sep 1916. 
215 
 
was aware of the heavy losses being suffered by the RFC, and yet continued 
to support Trenchard and commend the efforts of his Corps. In his despatch 
of December 1916, Haig praised the 'varied' and 'admirable' work of the RFC. 
Rather than focusing on the operational or tactical achievements of military 
aviators during the Somme campaign, Haig was careful to emphasise the 
spirit in which such operations were carried out. Much as his predecessor, 
French, had done, Haig stressed the 'bravery,' 'daring,' and 'determination' of 
the Corps.159  
 
As the war moved into 1917, Haig met more frequently with Trenchard. This 
reflected the increasing importance of air power, particularly in the sphere of 
spotting for artillery.160 As was the case during this period, massive artillery 
bombardments were deemed the necessary prerequisite for success on the 
Western Front.161 Such sentiment was captured in Haig's despatch of 
December 1917 when, in relation to operations around Arras (April – May, 
1917), he was to write of the importance of gaining 'local supremacy in the 
air.' Haig offered praise and noted that  
 
... the offensive tactics most gallantly persisted in by our fighting 
aeroplanes secured our artillery machines from serious 
interference and enabled our guns to carry out their work 
effectively.162 
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This built on the experiences of 1916, captured in General Horne's 
assessment that  
 
the operations on the Somme had proved that tactical success is 
largely dependent on superiority in artillery and supremacy in the 
air.163 
 
Haig's awareness of the importance of air power continued to grow throughout 
1917, and, as he records in his diary, the preparations and execution of the 
BEF's main offensive of 1917 (Third Ypres) depended to a great extent on 
establishing 'supremacy in the air.'164 As the BEF's operations expanded in 
scale, the nature of air support that the RFC was required to provide 
underwent a subsequent and natural increase.165 In attempting to meet the 
rapid growth of the BEF, particularly its infantry and artillery components, the 
RFC underwent a further expansion during early 1916. Developing on the 
reorganisation of late 1914, an additional echelon of command was created 
between RFC HQ and Wing level, and thus the RFC Brigade was born.166  
 
As noted, on the eve of the Battle of the Somme, the RFC comprised some 27 
squadrons. On the eve of Third Ypres (July 1917), RFC strength in France 
stood at some 50 squadrons.167 Such an expansion was forcefully pursed by 
Haig, who chaffed and harassed the War Office from late 1916 and 
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throughout 1917.168 On Trenchard's recommendation, he pressed for an 
additional 20 fighter squadrons, aiming for a ratio of two fighting units to one 
army co-operation squadron.169 That the RFC was constantly below the ideal 
strength advocated by Trenchard and Haig prompted the latter to send letters 
of complaint to the WO.170 As Sheffield observes, Haig's requests for 
resources were insatiable, and largely unrealistic, given the global nature of 
the conflict.171 Trenchard was also guilty of following Haig's example in this 
regard. The tables below demonstrate the expanded scale of the aerial effort, 
driven by Haig's desire for increased aerial support for the BEF. 
 
Table Two 
Period 
Casualties 
(Killed or 
Missing) 
Hours Flown 
Hours Flown Per 
Casualty 
July – Dec, 1916 419 88,300 206 
Jan – June, 1917 917 141,500 193 
July – Dec, 1917 997 169,000 172 
Jan – Jun, 1918 1077 238,215 222 
 
Hours Flown / Casualties suffered by RFC / RAF. Western Front, September 
1916 – June 1918 
Sources: Statistics generated from War Office, Statistics, p.505. 
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Table Three 
 
Period Strength of RFC, Officers and Men 
August 1914 1,200 
December 1914 2,280 
March 1915 3,666 
August 1915 7,234 
December 1915 15,023 
March 1916 22,980 
August 1916 42,185 
December 1916 54,731 
March 1917 65,349 
August 1917 87,603 
December 1917 111,955 
March 1918 144,078 
 
Strength of RFC (Officers and Men), August 1914 – March 1918 
Sources: War Office, Statistics, p.227. 
 
Haig did rely heavily on Trenchard with regard to advice on all air power 
matters.172 Haig's reports and letters to the War Office concerning aviation are 
a feature of the primary documentation in the area. These are often 
accompanied in the file by a draft report written by Trenchard and his staff. 
The material Haig would forward to the WO was based almost verbatim on 
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the drafts provided by RFC HQ.173 Yet, via his regular meetings with 
Trenchard, and his close interest in the activities of the RFC, Haig could be 
said to be a commander that had a reasonably firm grip on his air power 
component.174  
 
Even if Haig left air power matters largely to Trenchard, and was influenced 
by the latter to some extent, Haig would not have devoted considerable time 
and effort, and utilised precious resources, to expand the BEF's aerial 
component if he did not think it was producing tangible benefits for the wider 
execution of his strategy on the Western Front. Specifically, Haig might not 
have understood the intricate details of the use of air power, but he 
understood the importance of having air power assist the artillery in their all-
important work.175 As he noted in his diary, by fighting for the control of the air,  
 
our artillery airoplanes [sic] are free to carry out their important 
duties ... unmolested.176 
 
The following chapter suggests that Trenchard was able to deliver a view of 
air power that was acceptable to GHQ.177 However, had Trenchard's use of 
air power been unacceptable to GHQ, then its use could have been stopped 
and modified. Take, for example, the various points at which concerns were 
raised over the heavy losses being suffered by the RFC.178 This criticism, of 
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which Haig was aware, did not compel the Commander of the BEF to force 
his air power commander to change his policy or methods.179 Haig may be 
accused of failing to grip Trenchard, yet he retained ultimate authority for the 
manner in which the RFC was utilised. That Trenchard pursued a consistent 
vision of the control of the air, which resulted in heavy losses for the RFC, 
reflects that Haig felt Trenchard was utilising the BEF's air component in the 
most appropriate manner. Again, these conclusions appear at odds with those 
of Sheffield, and, during his time as Commander of the BEF, Haig had a clear 
grasp of the nature of RFC operations and the consequences of an offensive 
strategy in the air. Moreover, Haig expected high tempo, aggressive 
operations from all his commanders. His trench raiding policy reflected this 
reality, which, in turn, reflected Haig's wider vision of warfare. If commanders 
did not meet these expectations, then Haig could be a ruthless leader.180 The 
example of Haig's handling of Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston, 
Commander of VIII Corps, is instructive in this regard.181 
 
Assessing Haig's management of subordinates – promoting or 'degumming' – 
is challenging. Sheffield highlights the very mixed success Haig had in this 
field, over-promoting and protecting some less able officers, whilst 
simultaneously choosing a series of very able officers for other positions.182 
Hubert Gough had a particularly close relationship with Haig, whilst the latter 
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provided significant patronage to the former.183 Gough, a controversial 
commander during 1916 and 1917, received strong support from Haig until his 
failings during Third Ypres could not be ignored. As Sheffield and McCartney 
suggest, when Gough gave a 'generally creditable' performance during the 
German offensives of 1918, he was made a scapegoat for British reverses.184 
Conversely, Haig's relationship with another of his subordinates, Rawlinson, 
who was to rise to command at the Army level, demonstrates Haig's 
ruthlessness and his ability to re-establish good working relations.185  
 
In the case of Trenchard, whilst Haig had clear admiration for the manner in 
which he commanded the RFC, there were alternative officers available to 
replace Trenchard, should Haig have felt that the former was not utilising air 
power in the manner he deemed appropriate. For example, John Salmond, 
who came to replace Trenchard, was a suitable and able alternative. David 
Henderson was a viable, if unlikely, candidate, as he was a noted confederate 
of Sir John French. In many respects, Haig's vision of warfare embraced 
Travers's notion of the moral battlefield, yet without neglecting the 
technological. Travers comments that the 
 
paradigms [of the moral and technological] did not confront each 
other, but simply slid past each other.186  
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Yet, in many respects, Haig, and his chief disciple, Trenchard, were able to 
partially bridge the gap between the moral and technological battlefields. 
However, the importance of the moral battlefield to both men cannot be 
overstated. During the crisis of the German spring offensives of 1918, 
Trenchard wrote a private letter of support to Haig, sent via the latter's private 
secretary. At a time of such significant crisis, it is illustrative that Trenchard 
was to write that 
 
It is only for him to know that at any rate I am still imbued with the 
right spirit which he instilled into me of attacking the enemy.187 
 
Conclusion 
 
In expanding upon the conclusions of the official history, it is possible to 
demonstrate that the RFC's vision of the control of the air was fashioned, at 
least in part, by wider structural and cultural pressures. These pressures 
consisted of the aggressive culture of the BEF and, in turn, the 
aggressiveness of its two C-in-Cs. This resulted in a conflict characterised by 
a high tempo offensive spirit, placing a correspondingly high tempo pressure 
on the RFC. This was shaped further by the close personal interest taken in 
aviation by both French and Haig, and the value they placed in ensuring the 
ground component of the BEF was provided with efficient aerial support.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE WESTERN FRONT AND THE CONTROL OF THE AIR: THE RFC, ITS 
ALLIES, AND ITS USE OF INFORMATION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As established, the RFC, and its approach to the control of the air, is the 
subject of significant criticism in the historiography. In large part, such 
criticism focuses on several factors, including doctrinal inflexibility, the 
dogmatic application of offensive air power, and an inadequate training 
regime. To take but one example, criticism of RFC training is a feature of most 
studies.1 Trenchard's command, characterised as stubborn and 
unimaginative, is often attributed as the root cause of such difficulties. An 
analysis of the RFC on the Western Front is often given a final critical twist by 
juxtaposing these factors against the tactical and technological superiority of 
German aerial forces in the theatre. This is coupled with the flexible and 
progressive manner in which Germany conceptualised air power roles and 
utilised its aviation resources. 
 
The areas of technology, tactics, and logistics are well covered in the 
literature, whilst studies by Morrow, Corum, and Cuneo provide an excellent 
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overview of German air power on the Western Front.2 Hallion's examination of 
the technological evolution of fighting aircraft demonstrates the importance of 
possessing high-performance aeroplanes, and the role of such aircraft in 
establishing tactical initiative in combat.3 From a logistical standpoint, 
Morrow's Great War in the Air (1991), a generalist history of air power during 
the First World War, is particularly strong on the importance of logistics and 
the creation of an efficient aeronautical production base.4 In addition, Dye's 
forthcoming thesis on the RFC's logistical system on the Western Front will fill 
a significant gap in the historiography.5 Even from a policy and doctrinal 
standpoint, there is a sizeable body of literature already present. Jordan's 
thesis examines RFC policy in some depth, whilst Cooper's study offers 
significant insights into Trenchard's command of the RFC and its impact on 
policy and practice.6 What is more, Parton's exploration of RFC doctrine 
during this period analyses the subject in considerable depth.7 
 
Thus, when seeking to explore RFC doctrine and policy on the Western Front, 
it is necessary to shift the focus in an attempt to offer new interpretations, as 
the debates concerning the control of the air have become rather entrenched. 
As with the wider BEF, of which the RFC was an integral component, British 
military air power possessed a progressive attitude toward such matters as 
the production of doctrine and the dissemination of information that would aid 
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in the learning process.8 Yet, it was in its relations with the French Army's Air 
Service that the RFC's most progressive attitude was on display. These 
relations are explored via the prism of the historiography on coalition warfare 
during the First World War. This focus provides further opportunities to revise 
the characterisation of the RFC as a blunt and unsophisticated instrument. As 
with the previous chapter, it is necessary to establish the wider context in 
which the RFC conceptualised and developed its understanding of the control 
of the air. As such, a direct discussion of the control of the air is a feature of 
the second half of the chapter.  
 
Finally, it is important to recall the unprecedented nature of the use of air 
power in warfare. Whilst some small-scale, peripheral operations had been 
undertaken prior to the First World War, the 1914 – 1918 conflict saw the first 
significant application of air power, on both a large scale and over an 
extended period of time.9 Understandably, the use of air power was often 
governed by existing paradigms of warfare. In the case of the MW (and 
subsequently the RFC), air power doctrine was shaped by the themes of 
moral superiority, offensive action, and aggression, which were stressed 
above all in British Army doctrine of the period. RFC control of the air doctrine, 
for the majority of the First World War, was created with this structural / 
institutional pressure in mind. The offensive use of air power is still given 
precedence, even in contemporary doctrine, which reflects that the RFC had 
discovered the correct theoretical application of air power.10 
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The Coalition Context: The RFC and its French Allies 
 
Kennedy suggests that the First World War was a conflict defined by 
coalitions.11 Neilson has stated that 
 
Britain did not fight alone. Instead, Britain was part of an alliance, a 
fact which meant that strategic decisions were made within the 
context of group endeavour.12 
 
Neilson's conclusions stem from the contention that 'coalition warfare is a 
complex and complicated matter.'13 Literature that explores the Anglo-French 
coalition during the First World War does so effectively, yet without reference 
to the extremely close relations that developed between military aviators in 
Britain and France during the conflict.14 Greenhalgh's Victory through 
Coalition (2005) is a model study that develops the general historiographical 
outlook established by Neilson's examination of the Anglo-Russian alliance of 
1914 – 1917.15 Greenhalgh could be termed a post-revisionist, and is resistant 
to interpretations that stress the more positive aspects of the BEF's 
performance during the conflict. For example, her interpretations of Haig's 
command, and the British campaign on the Somme, are at odds with the 
revisionist perspective put forward by Philpott.16 This translates into an 
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analysis of the Anglo-French coalition in which she does not acknowledge 
some of the genuinely progressive aspects of the relationship, such as air 
power.17  
 
It is the theoretical framework Greenhalgh establishes for the nature of 
coalitions and liaison that makes her study so vital to this chapter. As she 
suggests, there are two supportive functions to liaison within a coalition. The 
first is based on practical, logistical support, and the second, where allies 
attempt to promote an authentic understanding and closeness; a process 
Greenhalgh terms 'binding.'18 As she asserts, the former was the most 
common type of support provided by the coalition, whilst the latter was largely 
out of reach during the conflict.19 In the field of air power and, more 
specifically, in relation to the control of the air, the close cooperation between 
the RFC and the French Army's Air Service embraced the practical aspects of 
liaison, whilst providing a genuine example of 'binding' at the doctrinal / 
philosophical level. The process by which liaison and cooperation was 
established between the two services mirrored wider trends in Anglo-French 
relations before and during the First World War. Dye, in an article that 
examines Anglo-French aviation relations during this period, utilises a similar 
framework, noting two aspects of cooperation: the material contribution, and 
the 'moral / intellectual' contribution.20 In this regard, Dye is able to 
demonstrate that the British drew heavily from the French in both regards, yet 
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he does not set his conclusions explicitly in the wider context of coalition 
warfare during this period. Nor does he assess the manner in which such 
relations reflected the progressive attitude of the RFC. 
 
Anglo-French Cooperation in the Pre-War Period  
 
As Kennedy observes, wartime coalitions are very often defined by the 
peacetime relations between the states involved.21 In the case of Britain and 
France, closer relations developed in the pre-war period as a result of specific 
self-interests. In the case of Britain, France provided land-based power to 
counter the continental threat posed by Germany, whilst an alliance with the 
French Navy freed additional resources for deployment against the growing 
German naval threat in the North Sea.22 For France, the financial and 
industrial muscle of Britain was vital, as was its naval strength and powerful, if 
latent, manpower resources.23 Informal staff talks during 1906 saw the 
establishment of closer working relations between the British and French 
Armies.24 As Strachan acknowledges, it was the appointment of Henry Wilson 
as Director of Military Operations in 1910 that gave 'substance' to the 1906 
staff talks.25 This also saw the development of closer relations between British 
and French military aviators during 1911.  
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On completion of his Staff College training, Sykes was appointed as a staff 
officer in Wilson's directorate.26 Sykes possessed useful language skills, 
having spent eighteen months in Paris to learn 'French and as much German 
as might be possible,' and was granted the appointment on the proviso that he 
would qualify as an interpreter of German.27 In Sykes, Wilson saw a valuable 
asset as an intelligence officer, whilst the latter did much to aid the former's 
interest in aviation. As Ash records, Wilson despatched Sykes to the 
Continent during 1911 to visit Spain, Italy, and France. Sykes was to report on 
how European armies were approaching the business of military air power.28 
Sykes's report on French aviation, written in the winter of 1911, covered a 
variety of topics, and both Dye and Ash emphasise the importance of the 
paper in relation to the early organisation of the MW.29 It is likely that Wilson 
intended Sykes's visit to include intelligence gathering aspects, as well as 
promoting closer relations with the French.30 Even without such objectives in 
mind, the opportunity to discuss the practical elements of flight, or the sheer 
novelty of the experience, could have done little to harm relations between 
British and French aviators. The importance of French aviation did not escape 
the attention of the fledgling Air Battalion, and one of its founding members 
wrote an article for JRUSI that offered thoughts on the subject. These touched 
on at least some of the themes contained within Sykes's report. 31 As the 
second chapter records, JRUSI was an important forum for the military to 
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discuss air power topics. Barrington-Kennett's article indicates that, even 
before 1914, a coalition context was already creeping into the debate. 
 
Sykes's paper also contained material that could be defined as loosely 
doctrinal in nature. His experiences in France seemed to confirm ideas 
already prevalent amongst Britain's military aviators, and he concluded that 
fighting aircraft would be a necessary adjunct to air forces in order to establish 
control of the air.32 Christienne and Lissarague's authoritative study on French 
aviation inadvertently highlights that the development of early control of the air 
doctrine in Britain and in France was remarkably similar.33 However, it is 
impossible to state categorically if this was the result of an overt cross-
fertilisation of ideas. Senior officers within the British and French Armies 
focused on the use of aircraft as a means to gather information, whilst, at the 
lower levels, ad-hoc efforts were made to experiment with armament in both 
air services.34 Both British and French air power practitioners grasped the 
significance of reconnaissance. In obtaining such information, they also 
realised that an integral aspect of the task would be to seize control of the 
air.35  
 
Sykes clearly appreciated the value of the experience, and, after the creation 
of the Flying Corps, he encouraged his officers to visit France to study how 
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the French used air power and organised their aviation units.36 As he 
recorded in a letter of June 1914, visits to the French (and, if possible, the 
German) manoeuvres would result in '[v]ery considerable benefits.'37 Several 
officers had visited France during May of 1914, and a detailed report, written 
by Brooke-Popham, was circulated.38 The majority of the report focused on 
the technical aspects of flight, such as developments in aero-engines, new 
airframes, and the latest maintenance practices. As military aviators were 
supplied with the majority of their equipment from the French, this was entirely 
fitting.39 However, Brooke-Popham also reflected on the importance of 
including sufficient 'spare time' in the itinerary. This provided visiting officers 
with the opportunity to speak to a range of personnel associated with military 
aviation in France. It was by  
 
meeting all classes of men & by looking into odd corners, that 
information ... [could] ... be gleaned on new and unexpected 
subjects.40  
 
Such meetings were the foundations for the close cooperation and relations 
that would develop between the air services during the First World War. That 
the report was circulated to all squadrons within the MW, as well as to the 
relevant sections of the War Office, further reflects the value that was placed 
upon information gained from the French.41 
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This was not a one-way process, and French officers were permitted to visit 
British establishments. For example, the administrative steps taken to ensure 
a French officer could attend the trials of the Astra Torres airship demonstrate 
that Britain made genuine efforts to promote cooperation and liaison between 
the respective aviation services.42 In addition, ensuring close cooperation with 
the French went further than a desire to secure material resources to help 
grow and expand the fledgling Flying Corps. As Prete records, one of the 
historic problems of coalitions was managing the impact of cultural 
differences.43 As pioneers of military aviation sharing the dangers of a new 
medium of combat, there was a genuine closeness that characterised the 
relationship between British and French aviators. This closeness even 
extended to the respectful dynamic that existed between the opposing air 
services of the conflict.44 As a junior pilot of the RFC recorded, 
 
flyers on both sides have ... [their] ... own code in this nasty war ... 
We don't hate each other ... Hun pilots and observers are just the 
same types as we are in the RFC ...45 
 
In the realm of aesthetics, British and French pilots were able to draw on a 
shared culture, and both possessed reputations within their respective parent 
services as Corps d'elites, reflected in their unique uniforms. For the French, 
this constituted a dark blue jacket with a close-fitting collar and special 
insignia.46 For the British, it was the striking double-breasted maternity style 
jacket, coupled with the prominent 'Wings,' which singled out the wearer as an 
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elite military pilot.47 Such cultural closeness was absent from the more 
general military relations of the two powers. 
 
Language Skills and Personal Relations  
 
A shared medium of combat, and a reputation for elitism, could only balance 
cultural differences to a certain extent. As the historiography records, the 
problem of language greatly hindered effective cooperation and liaison 
between the British and the French.48 In turn, such cultural difficulties could 
affect the nature of personal relations that were so vital to a coalition that 
lacked formal integrated mechanisms of command and decision making.49 As 
Reynolds notes, even a common language could not ensure that a coalition 
would function without difficulties, although, in the case of UK-US relations, 
shared language helped facilitate greater cooperation and understanding.50  
 
French, the recognised language of international relations during this period, 
was the official language of the Anglo-French coalition. It was only in the 
aftermath of the conflict that English became the dominant language of 
international politics.51 As Greenhalgh records, it was the English language 
skills of French officers that tended to be lacking. For example, only 21 
percent of French Generals (promoted to the rank between 1889 and 1914) 
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had a language qualification in English.52 Of course, this does not include 
those Generals who possessed language skills without a formal qualification. 
As Greenhalgh continues, the willingness of British officers to speak French 
was a vital aspect of the coalition.53 Staff College training could be a useful 
adjunct in this regard, and the assessment and study of a modern language, 
French being a more common requirement when attending Camberley, was a 
feature of both the entrance examination and the course material.54 As the 
Training and Manoeuvre Regulations (1913) noted, 'a knowledge of foreign 
languages is necessary for admission to the Staff College.'55 The manual 
continued by suggesting that  
 
It is of importance that officers should acquire a knowledge of 
French and German sufficient to enable them to converse and to 
read with facility the many excellent military treatises published in 
those languages. Commanding officers should encourage their 
young officers to become interpreters in these languages as early 
in their service as possible.56 
 
Whilst the range of language skills possessed by officers in the RFC is not 
clear, given the high concentration of Staff College graduates amongst their 
number, at least some of the Corps's senior positions were filled by those that 
could speak French. As noted, Sykes had proficient skills in French, whilst, 
with the addition of Maurice Baring to the staff of RFC HQ, the senior 
command team gained a linguist of some renown.  
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Contrasting examples of the impact of proficient language skills can be found 
in the experiences of the BEF's two C-in-Cs, French and Haig. As Holmes 
notes, Sir John French took an enthusiastic interest in the French language, 
and made repeated attempts to improve his language skills.57 Unfortunately, 
his abilities in French 'remained extremely shaky, and always broke down 
under pressure.'58 During the retreat in 1914, the result of this weakness was 
evident in Sir John's dealings with the Commander of the French Fifth Army, 
General Lanrezac. The narrative of their stormy encounter in August 1914 
highlights Sir John's poor language abilities, which only exacerbated the 
acerbic, Anglophobic tendencies of Lanrezac.59 The interaction of French and 
Lanrezac during this period did much damage to the harmony of the Anglo-
French coalition, and Holmes records that the experience left in Sir John 
'seeds of distrust which, from time to time, bore bitter fruit.'60 In contrast, 
General Foch grasped the importance of warm personal relations for the 
smooth running of a coalition.61  
 
Greenhalgh also indicates that Haig understood this reality. Often critical of 
various aspects of Haig's command of the BEF, she praises Haig's efforts with 
regard to learning French. As she notes, when breaks in fighting occurred, 
Haig spent two hours daily conversing and learning French with his French 
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liaison officer.62 During the planning for the Battle of the Somme, Haig was 
able to hold his own in conferences with senior French Generals and 
politicians without the aid of an interpreter.63 More generally, the change of 
command of the BEF also helped to spur on closer working relations with the 
French. Whilst Greenhalgh is generally critical of British command efforts in 
relation to the Somme, she does concede that improvements were 
forthcoming in British liaison with the French during this period. Even with 
such improvements, based on improved language skills and better personal 
relations, the high command of the BEF were somewhat distrustful of their 
French allies. Haig's diary contains several references to his negative feelings 
towards the French, including their Air Service.64 This seems to support 
Greenhalgh's conclusions that, whilst practical cooperation and liaison 
improved during the conflict, there was an absence of genuine 'binding,' as 
both the British and the French continued to possess significant strategic and 
doctrinal autonomy. The result of this autonomy was at least some level of 
distrust, often manifesting itself in somewhat xenophobic sentiments. As Prete 
argues, knowing the language and culture of one's ally allows one to avoid 
drawing on existing stereotypes.65 The case of relations between the RFC and 
the French Army's Air Service were quite different, and, at a strategic, 
operational, and tactical level, there was a process of 'binding.' As Dye 
suggests, this was the result of the fusion of 'theory, experience and 
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analysis.'66 This was in addition to the practical and material cooperation that 
was a more common feature of the coalition. 
 
The RFC and the Control of the Air before Verdun 
 
As the official history records, during the autumn of 1915, Trenchard met with 
Commandant Paul du Peuty.67 Commandant du Peuty, who would rise to 
command the French Army's Air Service, had been appointed to command 
the air assets of the French Tenth Army, and it was in this capacity that his 
association with Trenchard began.68 It is not clear if records were kept of their 
meetings, although, as H. A. Jones suggests, the nature of their discussions 
appears to have been largely informal at this stage.69 As Jones continues, it 
was during such meetings that the policy of the offensive and strategic use of 
fighting aircraft was 'thrashed out.'70 Trenchard brought with him to these 
meetings a set of ideas that were based on a combination of factors, including 
the RFC's own experiences during 1915. 
 
It is important to restate that, in the Training Manual, the RFC possessed 
clear, if underdeveloped, doctrine that stressed the need to fight to establish 
the control of the air.71 In line with such doctrine, the RFC was infused with an 
offensive spirit that resulted in its pilots and commanders cultivating an 
aggressive attitude in the air. Such sentiment was captured in Sykes's report 
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of February 1915, in which the principle of an active aerial offensive against 
the German Air Service was recorded.72 In line with the wider doctrinal 
principles of the British Army, which shaped the manner in which RFC 
doctrine was produced, the broad ideas contained within the Training Manual 
could be supplemented with more specialised reports and pamphlets distilled 
from the experiences of the conflict. This mirrored the doctrinal relationship 
between FSR and the S.S. series of pamphlets.73 For example, in February 
1915, Brooke-Popham produced a report that summarised the limited 
experiences of aerial combat up to that point.74 The paper, disseminated to 
the level of flight commander, offered tactical advice that focused on the 
importance of the concentrated and efficient use of firepower, the significance 
of manoeuvre (both offensive and defensive), and the difficulties of command 
and control once airborne.75 By codifying the early lessons of aerial combat, 
Brooke-Popham's report served as a supplement to the Training Manual. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, it was with Trenchard's arrival as 
Commander of First Wing that aerial fighting became a formalised element of 
the RFC's tactical itinerary. The first operational order of this kind was issued 
in late March 1915, and the words '[p]atrol ... to attack any hostile aircraft' 
appeared with increasing frequency during April and May.76 Again, as noted, 
during April 1915, a squadron was moved into the Neuve Chapelle region with 
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the specific task of establishing control of the air over a specific locality.77 The 
appearance of the Fokker monoplane, the first operational fighter with an 
efficient interrupter gear (allowing bullets to pass safely through a spinning 
propeller), brought into sharp relief the importance of the control of the air.78 
The reputation of this aircraft, a significant feature of pilot memoirs, belies its 
operational effectiveness.79 As Cuneo notes, the Fokker was a 'tricky' 
machine to fly, whilst its introduction to the front was a slow process. By mid-
July 1915, only eleven of the type had reached the Western Front.80 This is 
supported by H. A. Jones, who observes that the successful use of the Fokker 
depended almost entirely on the skill and experience of its pilot.81 Once a pilot 
had gained a good technical and tactical understanding of the use of the 
Fokker, it could be an effective weapon, yet its limited numbers severely 
curtailed its material impact.82 However, it was still possible to survive 
encounters with the Fokker, even in the RFC's much derided BE2. 83 
 
Other than the important technical innovation of being able to attain accurate 
fire by aiming the synchronised machine gun with the whole plane, the major 
impact of the Fokker was in the realm of morale.84 The confidence it provided 
to German fighter pilots allowed them to shift from their timid attitude, as 
recorded by Henderson in January 1915, to a more aggressive approach that 
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made the importance of the control of the air even more relevant.85 In a letter 
of 31 July 1915, Brooke-Popham wrote to E. B. Ashmore, the latter 
commanding the UK-based Administrative Wing of the RFC, noting that  
 
The German aeroplanes are becoming far more active and are 
making a regular habit of attacking our machines when on 
reconnaissance, and we are now having to fight for all our 
information.86 
 
In his memoirs, Douglas suggests that it was the impetus of the superiority of 
the Fokker that compelled the RFC to engage in discussions regarding the 
importance of aerial fighting.87 However, the RFC was already examining its 
practices in relation to the control of the air, and Brooke-Popham's paper of 
February 1915 provides clear evidence of this process. Further evidence is 
found in the RFC's desire to re-evaluate the contents of the Training Manual, 
a process driven by the accumulation of practical air power experience.88 The 
new edition of the Manual saw an expanded section on 'Fighting in the Air,' 
which absorbed the lessons of 1915. The updated content was lifted almost 
verbatim from Brooke-Popham's report of earlier in the year.89 As Parton 
records, the balance of the Manual had shifted, as the role of artillery 
observation came to oust reconnaissance as the central function of the RFC. 
That only seven percent of the Manual addressed fighting in the air did not 
represent a lack of interest from the RFC.90 On the contrary, the material 
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contained within the 1915 edition of the Manual was expanded from the 
previous version. It also reflected that, up to mid-1915, aerial fighting, whilst 
increasing in importance and frequency, was still a relatively rare occurrence. 
It was not until the appearance of the Fokker that losses started to mount, 
and, even then, they were still relatively slight when compared with wider 
losses on the ground, or with aerial losses in the latter half of the conflict. 91 
 
As the correspondence relating to the correction of the Manual highlights, 
there was often a significant delay in codifying experience into doctrine. This 
stemmed from the administrative time necessary to evaluate newly acquired 
experience and to assimilate the lessons in written form.92 As Parton records, 
this reflects a recurring trend, as updated doctrine manuals were often out of 
date as soon as they were issued to units.93 It was within this wider context, 
the accumulation of tactical experience with regard to fighting in the air, 
coupled with increasing German technical and tactical superiority, that 
Trenchard and du Peuty came to discuss air power matters during the autumn 
of 1915.  
 
Trenchard, du Peuty, and Verdun: Liaison and Cooperation  
 
First, it is important to stress that neither Trenchard nor du Peuty were fluent 
in the native language of the other, thus, Trenchard's multilingual assistant, 
Maurice Baring, had a vital role to play in facilitating effective communication 
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between the two men.94 Dye stresses the importance of close personal 
relations, which is in keeping with the wider historiography on the effective 
functioning of the Anglo-French coalition.95 For H. A. Jones, the result of the 
meetings between Trenchard and du Peuty was the development of the policy 
of the 'Strategic Air Offensive,' in which the moral effect of attacking aircraft 
was to be utilised to protect tactical aircraft engaged in direct support of 
ground operations.96 In practice, fighting aircraft were to undertake distant 
offensive patrols deep inside enemy territory, occupying enemy air power 
resources and, in turn, facilitating the safe operation of Corps aircraft in the 
localised airspace over the battlefield.97 From late 1915 to early 1916, and in 
rudimentary form, it was such an approach that came to dominate control of 
the air doctrine and policy for the crucial campaigns of Verdun and the 
Somme. For the British, it was this embryonic approach that shaped their 
entire understanding of the control of the air for the remainder of the conflict.  
 
As Dye suggests, Boyle overstates the influence of Trenchard upon du Peuty, 
and upon the conception of the strategic offensive.98 The idea was not 
uniquely Trenchardian, and it was the result of a combination of existing RFC 
doctrine, the general analysis of air power experience up to this point, and, to 
an extent, Trenchard's personal experience as an aggressive air power 
commander, particularly during his time leading First Wing. The German 
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offensive at Verdun, launched in February 1916, shattered the wider Anglo-
French strategy for 1916 and moved the war onto an overtly attritional 
footing.99 As Buckley notes, the shift to attrition on the ground was matched in 
the air.100 This campaign also provided the catalyst and opportunity for 
Trenchard and du Peuty to test and develop the conclusions reached during 
their informal discussions. The use of German air power at Verdun is derided 
in the literature, and, after accumulating the highest concentration of fighting 
aircraft in the conflict to this point, the German Air Service threw away its 
opportunity to maintain control of the air during the campaign.101  
 
As noted by Christienne and Lissarague, German planning for Verdun had 
embraced the importance of controlling the air, specifically in terms of limiting 
the effectiveness of French aerial artillery observation.102 German planners 
also recognised the importance of artillery observation to increase the 
effectiveness of their own guns.103 By massing 180 aircraft in the region, the 
Germans were able to establish localised control of the air.104 As Cuneo 
observes, the German approach was unsophisticated, and no real thought 
had been given to how to seize control, other than by placing large numbers 
of aircraft in the area.105 Any advantage to be gained by concentrating such 
aerial strength was dissipated as the Germans conducted wasteful defensive 
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'barrage' patrolling.106 Nonetheless, the initial shock of the ground assault was 
mirrored in the air. General Pétain, Commander of the French Second Army, 
summoned one of his senior aviation officers and instructed him to '... sweep 
the skies clean for me, I am blind.'107 Within days, the French had organised 
their fighter units into a combat group of six squadrons, whilst, on 29 February 
1916, orders were issued that instructed the units to 'seek the enemy in order 
to engage and destroy him.'108 
 
On the eve of Verdun, du Peuty stationed a liaison officer with Trenchard. 
During the campaign itself, RFC HQ received regular reports from its own 
liaison officers; Captains R. A. Cooper and J. P. Sewell.109 As Baring 
recorded, the services of the French liaison officer, F. C. La Ferrière,  
 
proved invaluable, ... and he did almost more than anyone to bring 
about good feelings between the French and English Services.110  
 
This liaison network did much to facilitate the smooth flow of information and 
cooperation during this period. In keeping with Greenhalgh's two-pronged 
approach to coalition and liaison, the RFC was able to provide support of a 
more practical nature. As Boyle records, Trenchard realised that, as part of 
the coalition, the struggle at Verdun was also his struggle.111 Boyle notes that 
Trenchard provided French units with supplies of guns and ammunition, and 
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the Lewis Gun was particularly valued by du Peuty.112 Trenchard also utilised 
his own air power resources to place pressure on German units facing the 
British, in an effort to prevent additional German resources from being 
deployed to the Verdun region.113 The conclusions of Wise offer much needed 
context in this regard, and he describes the air operations on the British sector 
during this period as 'desultory,' particularly in comparison to Verdun.114 
 
From a resource perspective, the information that flowed toward RFC HQ was 
highly significant. Most important were reports written by du Peuty, 
supplemented by material from Trenchard's liaison officers. In the first of two 
reports, du Peuty detailed for the British the manner in which the battle for the 
control of the air had evolved from mid-March to early April 1916. The French 
response to the German air threat had been decisive, and, by massing their 
fighting squadrons into one combat group, they had ensured freedom of 
operation for their Corps aircraft.115 It was not concentration alone that proved 
to be decisive, and, as du Peuty was to write,  
 
It is by combat, by constant offensive, by the quasi permanency of 
offensive patrols that the French Aviation has succeeded in 
maintaining the undoubted superiority.116 
 
The result, as du Peuty continued, was that German Corps aircraft had to 
operate in groups in order to improve their chances of survival. Even then, 
operating from behind their own lines, they were forced to conduct their 
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ground support operations at a disadvantage.117 The second of these reports, 
which Trenchard forwarded to the War Office in May 1916, was purportedly 
described by the RFC's Commander as 'the most significant paper on air 
fighting so far produced.'118 The report reiterated the importance of 
concentrating fighting aircraft and pursuing a continuous and aggressive 
offensive, targeting enemy aircraft deep behind their lines. This would occupy 
the aviation units of the enemy, and allow friendly Corps aircraft to go about 
their duties over the battlefront free from interference.119  
 
The report was not without stark warnings of the operational realities of this 
strategy. Operating over enemy territory would result in heavy losses, as 
friendly aircraft would be exposed to hostile ground fire and would have longer 
distances to fly and fight. The intensity of constant offensive action was also 
apparent, and, as du Peuty recorded, 'it is a wearing out method for pilots and 
observers.'120 Yet, du Peuty remained confident that, whilst friendly losses 
may be heavy, those of the enemy would continue to be heavier. In another 
section, du Peuty reflected upon the impermanence of air power, the 
attritional nature of the struggle, and the importance of concentration. As he 
observed, hostile aviation could not be annihilated, as the struggle for the 
control of the air was ceaseless and attritional.121 Even weaker forces could 
concentrate their aerial resources to establish localised control of the air. A 
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strategic offensive, as recommended by the report, could never attain 
absolute control of the air. Determined hostile aircraft could always penetrate 
friendly airspace.122 
 
There were further lessons available to the British, and, as the BEF's official 
report summarised, the nature of the control of the air was characterised by 
measure and counter-measure.123 When one side was under pressure due to 
superior tactics, technology, doctrine, or organisation, they would take 
remedial steps to rectify the situation; an example of what Gordon has called 
the 'historical process of challenge and response.'124 Both du Peuty and 
Cooper record that the Germans reorganised and centralised their fighter 
forces during the course of the battle.125 It was at such a moment that a true 
contest for the control of the air emerged, as French Corps aircraft found 
themselves under increased pressure. In turn, this affected the experience of 
French ground forces, whose air support was not as effective.126  
 
As Cuneo records, the offensive orders of late February were now 
questioned. At the behest of increasingly worried ground commanders, 
French fighters were dispersed and ordered to provide localised defensive 
protection to their Corps aircraft.127 As du Peuty's report concluded, this 
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allowed a brief resurgence of German air power, demonstrating to the former 
the importance of maintaining an offensive posture and the need to resist calls 
for localised defensive measures.128 As a riposte, the French regrouped their 
fighters and regained control at the front. For du Peuty, when both sides 
adopted an offensive strategy in the air, it would be the side with superior 
morale that would triumph, and, in spite of heavy losses, French aviation 
continued to dominate in the Verdun sector until the focus of Anglo-French air 
power shifted to the Somme.129 
 
The RFC, the Somme, and the lessons of Verdun 
 
For Trenchard, du Peuty's conclusions confirmed aspects of existing RFC 
doctrine, as well as many of his own thoughts. These he developed during his 
time as Commander of First Wing, and on into his appointment as head of the 
RFC in France. Many of du Peuty's conclusions were not necessarily original, 
and their importance lay in being concepts that had been put through the 
severe test of extended operations at Verdun. For example, the moral benefits 
to be accrued from the offensive use of air power were a significant feature of 
pre-war RFC doctrine, and the experience of Verdun served to confirm the 
validity of such thinking, as did the RFC's own experiences during 1915.130 
What is more, the need to 'fight for information' was now an established 
axiom, which featured in Trenchard's letters to GHQ.131 
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From a tactical standpoint, Verdun had seen the move from individual aerial 
combat to the use of fighters in formations.132 Whilst such moves were 
designed to improve offensive efficiency, Trenchard had encouraged a similar 
use of formations in January 1916.133 By insisting on an escort ratio of three 
aircraft to one reconnaissance / observation machine during operations, 
Trenchard hoped to overcome the effectiveness of the Fokker, at least until 
the RFC possessed better fighting aircraft.134 Trenchard, often derided for 
refusing to utilise escort aircraft, was, in fact, following established RFC 
tactical doctrine that encouraged the use of multiple aircraft to increase the 
concentration of fire they were able to bring to bear on enemy aircraft.135 
Trenchard's decision demonstrates the pressure being placed on the RFC 
during this period, and the use of escorts degraded the operational capability 
of the Corps.136 However, Trenchard was already aware of the benefits of 
formation flying, and, as the Fokker situation eased, he continued to 
encourage his squadrons to make use of formations of fighting aircraft.137 
Again, the experiences of Verdun only confirmed the importance of formation 
flying. 
 
From an organisational and operational perspective, moves to group fighting 
aircraft into homogeneous squadrons were favoured by the senior command 
of the RFC. However, due to the limited number of fighters available, they 
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were dispersed amongst all the RFC's squadrons.138 For Hallion, creating 
single-type fighting squadrons was 'contrary' to British doctrine.139 However, 
the record indicates that, during the pre-war period, discussions in the MW 
focused on the need to group aircraft into homogenous squadrons based on 
both their type and function.140 As H. A. Jones notes, it was for practical and 
logistical reasons that such a change took time to implement.141 For example, 
it was only at the beginning of 1916 that significant numbers of genuine 
fighting aircraft were available to group into specific squadrons, with the first 
single-type fighting squadron established in January 1916, and the second in 
February.142 Before the lessons of Verdun crystallised, Trenchard had already 
decided to regroup fighting aircraft into specialist squadrons, whilst removing 
all such squadrons from Corps duties.143 The lessons of Verdun served to 
confirm the validity of such thinking in time for the planning and execution of 
the Somme offensive.  
 
Greenhalgh asserts that  
 
British planning for the Somme ... ignored the valuable lessons that 
the French had learned [at Verdun].144  
 
Citing the example of French interest in the use of the tank during the 
Somme, she also contends that the French were particularly skilful at learning 
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from the British, whilst, other than some limited initiative at the Corps level, 
the British did not match these efforts.145 Revisionist scholars, such as 
Philpott and Griffith, would take issue with such sentiments, and the latter 
describes the British as 'assiduous' in their efforts to learn from both their 
allies and enemies.146 Moreover, Greenhalgh's assertions do not consider the 
air power aspects of the battle, which clearly demonstrate a 'binding' of Anglo-
French concepts in relation to the control of the air. Philpott's Bloody Victory 
(2010) records that the British learnt lessons from the French, but overstates 
when highlighting Trenchard's role in 'suggest[ing]' the strategy to the French 
in the first instance.147 
 
The planning for the Somme took place during the first half of 1916, and was 
affected by the German offensive at Verdun. Whilst the debate concerning 
British intentions on the Somme is outside the scope of this chapter, it is 
important to note that the RFC was determined to provide effective air support 
to the British units involved in the battle, whilst, from a 'binding' perspective, 
French lessons from Verdun had been fully incorporated into the RFC's 
approach to the campaign. The more practical aspect of coalition was on 
display throughout this period, and regular liaison meetings took place from 
mid-1916 onwards with regard to issues of supply and logistics for the RFC 
and French Air Service.148 
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The RFC's presence on General Rawlinson's Fourth Army front was 
significant. As Wise records, some 400 aircraft were mustered to support 
operations for the Somme. This included 76 of the latest generation of fighting 
aircraft; assets that were more than capable of besting the Fokker.149 
Absorbing the lessons of aerial fighting up to this point, including those gained 
from close liaison with the French, these fighters were grouped into specialist 
squadrons with the objective of patrolling aggressively over and behind the 
German lines.150 Faced with overwhelming numerical inferiority, and an 
enemy with superior aircraft, organisation, and doctrine, the situation for the 
German Air Service was made worse by their own organisational deficiencies 
and their wasteful tactics based on defensive patrolling.151  
 
By the opening of the battle, the RFC was dominant in the air, facilitating the 
opportunity to provide effective ground support for the BEF, whilst denying the 
benefits of such support to German forces.152 This was a golden period for the 
RFC as its morale soared in direct correlation with its effectiveness and 
dominance.153 Tactical evolution was ongoing during this period, and the 
British developed effective methods for formation flying.154 Excellent morale 
also characterised relations between British and French aviators. Capturing 
the confident and relaxed atmosphere resulting from overwhelming 
superiority, Trenchard and his French counterparts felt able to place a friendly 
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wager concerning the destruction of German observation balloons during the 
opening of the battle.155 Captured in Haig's diary, the difficulties experienced 
in connection with the ground campaign could not overshadow the RFC's 
achievements during this period.156  
 
Another strand of the RFC's strategy for controlling the air over the Somme, 
also highlighted in Haig's diary, involved the use of bombing aircraft to attack 
targets in the German rear.157 Directed initially at communications and HQ 
targets, such operations polarise opinion. Jones offers evidence for their 
effectiveness, whilst Edmonds suggests otherwise.158 The primary objective 
was to inflict material damage, but it was hoped that bombing targets in the 
German rear would also divert German air power resources to defensive 
tasks. This would assist in keeping the localised airspace over the battle free 
for use by friendly Corps aircraft.159 However, as was a recurring theme of the 
control of the air during this conflict, dominance produces a riposte that sees 
the balance of power change hands.160 As Jones suggests, by September 
1916, the RFC was under significant pressure in the air.161 Several factors 
explain the slow decline of the RFC and the rise of the German Air Service, 
and Duffy makes an important distinction in this regard. He notes that, whilst 
German dominance seemed the product of rapid improvement, it was the 
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culmination of various developments, including new fighting aircraft and the 
reorganisation of the German Air Service.162  
 
The Somme became the new focal point in the West as the German high 
command re-oriented its strategy. In the air, this saw large numbers of fighting 
aircraft redeployed to the region.163 Now under the command of a single 
General Officer, the fighting squadrons of the German Air Service were also 
reorganised, and the RFC's control of the air was to be targeted in a 
deliberate fashion.164 Isolated defensive patrolling was stopped, and large 
formations of fighters were to be used to seize localised control of the air from 
the British.165 Confirmed by Trenchard's meetings with Haig during the late 
summer of 1916, German air power was starting to 'show more activity.'166 By 
September 1916, RFC bombing operations were being directed at the 
German air threat. Given the increasing scale of the threat, Trenchard's 
rhetoric was more subdued when in meetings with Haig.167 As with du Peuty, 
Trenchard felt the importance of moral superiority only increased when the 
opponents fighting for the control of the air became more closely matched in 
terms of equipment, tactics, numbers, and organisation. It was at this point 
that the force with the greatest offensive spirit and determination would 
prevail. For operations on 15 September 1916, Trenchard briefed his aviators 
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with 'aggressive fire.' Characterised by Wise as a 'day of maximum effort,' 
operations were to place an even greater emphasis on moral superiority.168  
 
Even with Trenchard's overwhelming emphasis on the moral battlefield, it is 
telling to note that pressure was being brought to bear on the RNAS during 
this period. The RNAS, whose fighting aircraft were of the latest type, were 
directed to assist the RFC on the Somme.169 As Henderson was to record in a 
letter to Haig, the demands from the RFC on the front were seemingly 
insatiable, and the production capability of Britain was not unlimited.170 
Henderson went on to question the soundness of Trenchard's offensive 
policy, noting that  
 
I am not quite sure that some of the casualties are not incurred in 
enterprises which are not of the first importance with regard to your 
general operations.171 
 
For Trenchard, Henderson's sentiment was an example of the most vital 
lesson to emerge from Verdun, and, when the contest for the control of the air 
entered a more trying period, it was crucial to maintain and increase the 
RFC's offensive posture. This was particularly important when faced with calls 
at the local level for defensive sorties to protect Corps aircraft. In an early 
draft of GHQ's official report on air power at Verdun, part of the following 
section was marked in red pencil: 
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The unity of command of fighting squadrons and their offensive 
tactics gave the French a clear ascendancy in the air over the 
German and save in exceptional circumstances Corps Squadron 
machines now do their work singly and without local support 
[emphasis in original].172 
 
In particular, it was the efficient use of unescorted Corps aircraft that 
interested the reader of the document. Whether applied by the hand of 
Trenchard or not, the highlighting was done with his vision of air power in 
mind. As his biographer records, the greatest mistake made by the French 
during Verdun was to allow local ground commanders to dictate terms to 
fighting aircraft and to insist on localised defensive patrols at the expense of 
offensive operations.173 For Trenchard, the defensive application of air power 
was the great evil. Calls for localised protection had to be resisted, whilst the 
pressure on the enemy had to be increased via more intensive offensive 
operations.  
 
The German Air Service was able to reassert its influence when French air 
power began heeding requests for defensive sorties. In contrast, when the 
French returned to an offensive strategy, they returned to a dominant position 
in the air.174 Thus, whilst ensuring effective support for the BEF during the 
Battle of the Somme, Trenchard's other task was to persuade those around 
him of the soundness of his offensive strategy. It was with such a task in mind 
that the RFC's Commander began what was an information offensive directed 
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toward the BEF, War Office, and anyone else that would care to listen. As 
Baring questioned,  
 
would the RFC be strong enough to resist the pressure of other 
arms which was certain to be exercised in asking for defensive 
measures?175 
 
Such thinking influenced the evolving nature of RFC doctrine that, as Parton 
suggests, now attempted to explain why 'the RFC was perhaps not doing 
quite what the rest of the Army expected.'176 
 
The RFC and Information: Collating and Disseminating 
 
Information has always been used to help armies fight, and the RFC was an 
efficient collator and disseminator of a range of information. Tactical thoughts 
and material were distributed regularly, whilst the activities of hostile air 
services were monitored and analysed. Reports from frontline pilots were of 
great interest, and intelligence was gathered on German aerial capabilities 
from the earliest days of combat in the air.177 The sophistication of such 
material improved over time, and, by 1917, reports on German aircraft types, 
including those captured during operations, were produced in great 
numbers.178 Unsurprisingly, such activities featured a wider coalition context, 
and the views of allies were sought. For example, French thinking on the 
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development of fighting aircraft was circulated via the translation of a report 
that analysed French aircraft needs in relation to current German types.179 
Reports giving details of German aircraft captured by the French were also 
made available. This was particularly helpful when the Fokker monoplane was 
in the ascendancy, and French reports helped demonstrate the very limited 
capabilities of the type, aiding the restoration of British morale.180 Copies of 
French operations orders were also provided to the RFC, and made available 
to study, whilst statistics were kept on the nature of French aerial 
operations.181  
 
Training, an aspect of RFC policy criticised widely in the literature, also 
featured an information context that was enhanced by cooperation with the 
French. As with most features of the BEF's war effort, RFC training improved 
during the duration of the conflict, reflecting another aspect of the wider 
'learning processes' experienced by the British. The inadequacies in the 
training regime had been highlighted during 1915 and 1916, whilst calls for 
improved aerial combat training began in late 1915.182 This culminated in the 
establishment of the Smith-Barry regime at Gosport.183 This scheme not only 
provided specialised and advanced instruction for recruits, it also improved 
the standard of training received by instructors.184 Trenchard must accept at 
least partial responsibility for pushing the RFC in an unrelenting manner from 
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late 1916 until mid-1917, but, by 1918, the quality of pilots arriving with the 
RFC had improved significantly. Trenchard must be given considerable credit 
for this improvement, particularly via his support of Smith-Barry.185 Always 
seeking to enhance the system of training on offer, and by taking advantage 
of the coalition context, Smith-Barry was sent to France to report on the 
French training regime.  
 
Smith-Barry's report, produced in November 1917, commented favourably on 
various aspects of the French system, including their efficient use of aircraft 
and the centralised nature of their training establishments.186 However, Smith-
Barry did not shy away from criticising specific instances of poor instruction or 
the low morale of cadets.187 In addition, Smith-Barry recommended sending 
additional officers to make specific studies of the administration of the French 
system, as well as establishing a team of officers to keep abreast of the latest 
French ideas relating to training.188 Whilst noting some degree of difficulty in 
obtaining the fullest cooperation, Smith-Barry was able to make important 
comparisons with his advanced air school at Gosport, and the rate of 
accidents amongst RFC pilots under training was significantly less than their 
French counterparts.189 After some slightly tense administrative wrangling 
(smoothed over by the polished pen of a French liaison officer), Smith-Barry 
made the findings of his report available to the French, whilst he also 
produced an extra memorandum that made more explicit comparisons 
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between the British and French systems.190 In a letter to the Air Ministry, the 
French made a request for a temporary exchange of four Smith-Barry trained 
instructors, whilst they were more than willing to provide four of their own 
instructors in return. As was noted in the letter, it was not only the exchange 
of skills that was important. By spending time with their allies, the British and 
French would only multiply the good feelings that both Armies had for one 
another.191 Training, again, demonstrates the RFC's progressive attitude 
toward information and the coalition, which embraced both aspects of the 
'binding' process.  
 
The RFC's efforts also extended to the translation and distribution of captured 
German material, which included pamphlets and reports on a range of air 
power topics.192 Copies of captured German Sixth Army standing orders 
relating to fighting in the air were amongst the most valuable finds, whilst Der 
Rote Kampfflieger (1917), a book written by Germany's most successful 
fighter pilot, Manfred von Richthofen, was translated in September 1917, 
some months before a commercial translation was available in English.193 
Brooke-Popham, an officer whose role in the information war was vital, 
particularly with regard to early RFC doctrine, understood the multifaceted 
nature of the air war. His abilities as a pilot were limited, as were his qualities 
as an operational squadron leader. However, he was a graduate of 
Camberley, and had an excellent grasp of logistics, an ability to write in 
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coherent and accessible English, and a strong belief in the importance of 
producing informational material. Take, for example, his report on the latest 
German aircraft types, written in May 1917.194 More important than its content 
was the intention behind its production. As Brooke-Popham noted in a 
covering letter to the Technical Department of the Air Board,  
 
I have been wasting a few hours compiling some general notes on 
German aeroplanes. I think something of this nature, amplified and 
corrected where necessary, would be worth while getting out.195 
 
By expanding and developing his notes, Brooke-Popham felt that 'we might 
get something worth printing.'196 Brooke-Popham's activities were clearly not 
wasteful, and his intention was to disseminate helpful information widely 
within the RFC and BEF. This was not merely an abstract administrative 
exercise, and he hoped to ensure that those concerned with fighting for the 
control of the air were as well informed as possible with regard to the 
technical capabilities of the hostile air forces opposing them. Such activities, 
including studying both friend and foe, were progressive and sophisticated, 
and provide further context to the generally critical historiography on the RFC.  
 
Trenchard and his Information Offensive 
 
There was a different strand of the RFC's information war that was directed at 
its own side. Here, the goal was to 'market' a very specific vision for the 
'correct' application of air power. This goal became even more vital as 
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German air power at the front grew in strength and effectiveness and opinions 
at home began to question the soundness of the offensive strategy in the 
air.197 Trenchard did not have to worry about the opinion of Haig, who, as the 
last chapter established, shared the former's belief in the offensive use of 
military power.198 Haig's letters to the WO of September and November 1916, 
followed up vehemently in February 1917, offer clear evidence that Haig and 
Trenchard were of one mind when it came to air policy.199 Yet, for those with 
the ability to influence the conduct of the RFC, either those with greater 
strategic power than Haig, those who controlled the supply of men and 
equipment, or those at the lower levels who could bring cumulative pressure 
to bear, Trenchard had to ensure that the 'correct' use of air power was well 
understood. It was with such an objective in mind that Trenchard launched a 
textual assault that would be a continuous feature of RFC policy until the war's 
conclusion.200 As Ash writes,  
 
Trenchard's forte was in repeating and enforcing strategic concepts 
expressed by others, and then fighting tenaciously and successfully 
for them.201 
 
Given its most clear form to date in a paper of September 1916 entitled 
'Future Policy in the Air,' Trenchard drew heavily on du Peuty's lessons from 
Verdun, stressing the importance of offensive air power and the ineffectual 
nature of purely defensive measures, particularly given the expansive nature 
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of the air.202 Evidentially, the French experience from Verdun was cited as an 
unquestionable example of the importance of maintaining an offensive 
posture, even when faced with significant pressure from local commanders to 
provide direct support to their Corps aircraft.203 In an important concluding 
section, Trenchard speculated as to the most appropriate course of action if 
the German Air Service were to adopt an offensive posture similar to the RFC. 
The answer was not to switch to defensive measures, but to 'increase our 
offensive.'204 As Trenchard predicted, the German Air Service did adopt a 
more aggressive policy in the air, and Trenchard could cite his September 
1916 paper to demonstrate his foresight and his deep understanding of the 
application of air power.205 Whilst the experience of Verdun did offer clear 
evidence for the importance of offensive air power, Trenchard's foresight was 
not as clairvoyant as it appeared. By September 1916, the German air 
strategy at the Somme had already undergone a shift, by which defensive 
patrolling was abandoned in favour of a more aggressive stance. On the day 
after Trenchard's paper was produced, the former highlighted the growing 
offensive potential of German air power in a letter to Henderson.206  
 
Cooper notes that Trenchard's paper offers clear evidence of the latter's 
intuitive approach.207 For example, Trenchard asserted that, because of its 
defensive strategy, Germany's use of air power was less effective than that of 
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the British by a ratio of '4 to 100.' Such conclusions had no empirical basis.208 
As with much material produced by Trenchard during this period, the intuitive 
approach was designed to appeal to the dominant trends within the British 
Army. When faced with a superior enemy, or one of equal standing, the key 
was to establish moral superiority. Trenchard did not discount the importance 
of equipment, tactics, organisation, or weight of numbers, yet the deciding 
factor would always be moral conviction and the desire to attack the enemy. 
This was in keeping with the doctrine of the British Army, as found in FSR, 
and continued to shape RAF doctrine in the post-war period.209 
 
The RFC's position in the air, eroded during September 1916, continued to 
diminish as the war moved into 1917. For the success of offensive operations 
during the spring and summer, air power came to be viewed as a vital factor 
for increasing the efficiency of the BEF's artillery.210 The French were 
reaching similar conclusions, and, in a letter to Joffre, Foch was to write that  
 
Superiority in aviation alone allows the necessary superiority in 
artillery to give superiority in the present-day battle [emphasis in 
original].211 
 
With largely inferior aircraft, and the growing effectiveness of German air 
power, Trenchard's offensive strategy was vulnerable to criticism. Haig's letter 
of February 1917, which detailed the problems facing the RFC with some 
alarm, was evaluated by Henderson as being overstated. This 
characterisation was also endorsed by Robertson in a letter to the Secretary 
                                            
208
 AIR 1/718/29/1 – Future Policy in the Air, 22 Sep 1916. 
209
 J. C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, p.10. 
210
 AIR 1/520/16/12/1 – Haig to War Office, 18 May 1917. 
211
 Foch quoted in E. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, p.236. 
265 
 
of State for War.212 It is probable that Henderson's advice to Robertson, not 
included as part of the letter, continued in the critical vein put forth by the 
former in his letter to Haig of September 1916.213 Such criticism was no doubt 
influenced by the letters Trenchard was sending to Henderson during early 
1917, which adopted an increasingly urgent tone.214 As Boyle notes, such 
letters strained the relationship between Trenchard and Henderson.215 
 
The period that was to follow, often described as 'Bloody April,' was the RFC's 
lowest point of the conflict, and Trenchard's own recollections do not shirk the 
difficulties faced by his Corps.216 In his letters to Henderson, he stressed the 
hard fighting and heavy losses that were a common feature of RFC 
operations during April 1917. However, he noted consistently that such a 
strategy facilitated the activities of Corps aircraft.217 In Trenchard's opinion, it 
was whilst under the greatest pressure that moral superiority and the 
importance of vigorous offensive action were at their most vital. Conversely, it 
was during such periods that the greatest pressure would be brought to bear 
on the RFC with regards to adopting a more defensive policy, resulting in calls 
for direct protection to Corps aircraft. As Wise notes, April 1917 saw an 
increase in requests from Corps and Divisional commanders for protection for 
their Corps aircraft.218  
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In many respects, moral superiority was required to best the enemy in the air, 
but also to counter the 'misunderstanding' that was prevalent amongst ground 
commanders in relation to the most 'effective' use of air power. In what 
became a trend during this difficult period, Haig's Chief of Staff issued 
guidance notes to the BEF's Army commanders concerning the RFC's policy 
in the air.219 The first of these letters was clearly based upon material 
provided to GHQ by Trenchard and his staff. Take, for example, a similar 
letter written in August 1917, located in a file with an almost identical paper 
submitted to Haig's staff some three days before.220 This earlier paper 
emanated from Trenchard's staff, and both the April and August letters 
reiterated the RFC's policy statement of September 1916. Adopting the 
standard line, the French example of Verdun was cited in order to highlight 
the importance of offensive action. As the German Air Service had now 
adopted more aggressive tactics, the correct response was to 'pursue an even 
more vigorous offensive.'221 This included the use of offensive fighting patrols 
and the employment of bombing aircraft to force the enemy to divert air power 
resources to defensive duties.222  
 
The objectives Trenchard established for his information offensive were 
largely successful, and, during this most difficult period for the RFC, his 
offensive policy was maintained with little challenge. When legitimate 
criticisms were put forth, Trenchard continued to cite the experience of the 
French at Verdun, and the British successes at the Somme, to demonstrate 
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the correctness of his policy. When faced with challenges to the RFC's vision 
for the control of the air, Trenchard made efficient use of his staff, who he 
termed his 'English Merchants.'223 To craft his ideas into lucid prose, he could 
draw upon the expertise of individuals such as Baring. On the heels of GHQ's 
paper of early August 1917, Trenchard reviewed the situation in the air since 
the Somme campaign.224 For Trenchard, arguing his case with consistency 
and conviction was another element of the wider offensive strategy with which 
his Corps fought. Importantly, his citation of evidence, and his ability to point 
to his foresight, did little to hamper the appeal of his conclusions. As his 
review stated, one of the vital aspects to winning the war in the air was  
 
a more widely spread education with regard to the functions of the 
newer weapon [air power].225  
 
This was an overt reference to the RFC's information offensive. Those calling 
for a more defensive aerial policy, including close protection for Corps aircraft, 
did not fully grasp the 'true' nature and functions of air power. Trenchard was 
also willing to criticise his coalition partners, and his decision to do so can be 
viewed as an attempt to demonstrate that even the French, co-creators of the 
strategic air offensive, had deviated from the 'correct' use of air power.226 The 
delicate nature of reporting on one's allies was highlighted by Trenchard, who 
noted that  
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My relations with the French have been of the closest and I think it 
important that these relations should be maintained, and I am 
uneasy that if this report became known it might strain them.227 
 
Trenchard praised the French for the material support they offered to their 
allies, whilst he noted their proficiency at conceptualising air power. The 
specific example of aerial fighting was cited, with Trenchard noting the 
intellectual debt owed to the French in this regard.228 However, Trenchard 
questioned the discipline of the French Air Service, and, whilst French 
operational orders stressed the importance of the offensive, in practice, 
French pilots were rarely 'bold,' and attacks were only made under the most 
favourable of circumstances.229 As if to drive home this lack of aggressive 
zeal, Trenchard included statistics at the end of the report to demonstrate 
that, comparatively speaking, the French made much less effort in the air than 
the RFC.230  
 
The RFC's tactical pamphlets of this period also took advantage of the 
opportunity to reiterate the 'facts' about air power. In bridging the gap between 
the Training Manual and tactical material such as Brooke-Popham's paper of 
February 1915, the pamphlet, 'Fighting in the Air,' was produced by the 
General Staff in March 1917.231 Parton ascribes great significance to this 
publication, suggesting that its decision to emphasise aerial fighting at the 
expense of other tasks was a marked shift from previous examples of 
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doctrine.232 In a more general sense, there was nothing extraordinary about 
the pamphlet's emphasis on offensive air power, and it was in keeping with 
Trenchard's wider 'educational' efforts of this period. For Parton, such efforts 
had the clear objective of keeping the RFC on the offensive, whilst ensuring 
that Trenchard maintained centralised control of the strategic elements of his 
Corps.233 
 
Trenchard's efforts during 1917 also mirrored Haig's struggle to maintain 
control over wider British strategy.234 For Haig and Trenchard, the war could 
only be won on the Western Front. As Haig stated,  
 
our military policy in aerial, as in other respects, must be based on 
the principle that a successful end of the war can be brought about 
only by a decisive victory over the enemy's forces in the field.235 
 
The redeployment of strength to other theatres, or a shift to a more 
conservative strategy, played into German hands. In many respects, 
Trenchard's policy papers of 1917 served as an integral element of Haig's 
wider efforts during the year. For example, at the height of the Passchendaele 
campaign, a Trenchardian pamphlet, produced under the auspices of the 
General Staff, continued to emphasise the importance of maintaining an 
offensive strategy in the air.236 With the introduction of fighting types such as 
the SE5a, the Sopwith Camel, and the Bristol Fighter, the RFC possessed the 
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equipment necessary to overturn German superiority.237 Increased tactical 
flexibility, a focus on large-scale formation flying, and improvements in the 
RFC's command and control network, which increased operational 
responsiveness, were important factors that saw a swing in the balance of 
power.238 However, with the RFC's position growing in strength, it was vital to 
maintain the force of the information offensive. If anything, this period saw a 
marked increase in its intensity.  
 
In the wider context of the conflict, the RFC was faced with pressure to divert 
resources to defensive duties, other theatres, and strategic raiding against 
Germany. Haig and Trenchard had managed to resist such pressure during 
1916, and the information offensive had been successful. Air defence 
schemes put forward between March and May 1916 were reduced in scale 
during July 1916, with the vast majority of resources forwarded to squadrons 
operating at the front.239 For example, on 22 July 1916, No.39 (Home 
Defence) Squadron was informed that its strength would be reduced, as 
engines were to be removed from some of its aircraft and sent to squadrons 
operating with the BEF in France. An optimistic closing sentence noted that  
 
New engines will be available shortly, and will be issued to No.39 
Squadron so as to bring them up to establishment.240 
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However, strategic raiding by German 'Gotha' bombers during the summer of 
1917 threatened to undermine the efforts of both Haig and Trenchard.241 In 
response to frenzied criticism in the press, the government discussed air 
power matters with Haig at a meeting of the War Cabinet on 20 June.242 In 
providing feedback to the government on the air defence situation, Haig 
based his arguments on a paper drawn up by Trenchard, which noted the 
importance of maintaining an offensive posture and the need to avoid wasting 
resources on purely defensive measures.243 This built upon the arguments of 
Robertson, who, in addressing the War Cabinet on 14 June, noted the 
difficulties of providing effective localised air defence against fast moving 
German aircraft.244  
 
As Philpott notes, Haig, Robertson, and Trenchard used the occasion to press 
most vigorously for an offensive in Belgium, which would achieve several 
objectives, including denying Germany air bases close to the UK.245 In many 
respects, Haig presented his offensive plans for the late summer of 1917 as 
the solution to a range of strategic difficulties facing the British, including the 
German submarine threat.246 Even in the face of extreme political and public 
pressure, particularly in the aftermath of the 7 July 1917 raid against London, 
the force of Haig's and Trenchard's arguments did not abate, and they 
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managed to reduce the number of RFC squadrons diverted to defensive 
duties to the bare minimum, resulting in the redeployment of the extremely 
inexperienced No.46 Squadron.247 
 
Nonetheless, they could not prevent all redeployments or the creation of the 
RAF. The creation of an independent air force was another factor that, in the 
eyes of both Haig and Trenchard, threatened to undermine the efforts of the 
BEF on the Western Front.248 With such pressures in mind, Trenchard 
continued to stress the primacy of his offensive policy in support of the 
BEF.249 When the War Cabinet gave Trenchard direct instructions to 
undertake strategic raiding against Germany, Trenchard did not miss the 
opportunity to utilise such endeavours to stress the continued importance of a 
Western Front first strategy.250 As Parton observes, Trenchard's paper of 
October 1917 utilised subtle tactics by which 'facts' about the use of air power 
were, in reality, based on inherent assumptions that served to validate and 
rationalise the existing offensive strategy of the RFC.251 The section providing 
an historical overview of aerial fighting during the conflict is characterised by 
this approach.252 Such pamphlets were supplemented with regular updates 
from the front, and Trenchard would often forward evidence of the operational 
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effectiveness of his offensive strategy. His update of October 1917 used the 
example of the previous month to demonstrate the frenzied activity of his 
Corps, including some '9,209 [individual] offensive patrols.'253 In a cover note 
to Haig, he urged that the report be forwarded to Robertson for submission to 
the War Cabinet.254 The result of the RFC's efforts during September had 
been to push the German Air Service onto the defensive, securing control of 
the air for Corps artillery aircraft.255 
 
Moving into the Final Year of the Conflict 
 
The RFC was but a small cog in the BEF, and, as British strategy shifted to a 
more conservative position during the winter of 1917 / 1918, Trenchard was 
asked to reflect upon RFC policy. In particular, the build up of German forces 
in the West during early 1918 gave clear indication that Britain and France 
would be compelled to act defensively for a significant period. Trenchard was 
tasked with examining the role of the RFC during such operations, and 
produced a sophisticated paper that, whilst reemphasising the standard 
position on the value of the offensive, made concessions with regard to the 
value of purely defensive operations.256 Trenchard also noted that, if the 
German Air Service was to seize control of the air, the RFC would be able to 
ensure the continued work of Corps aircraft at the most crucial times, by 
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massing forces and seizing control of the relevant local airspace.257 This 
demonstrates that, whilst Trenchard still believed strongly in the importance of 
offensive air power, he was willing to embrace tactical and operational 
nuances based on accumulated experience.  
 
In fact, the main historiographical criticism of Trenchard's offensive policy 
focuses not on the principles upon which it was based, but rather its 
operational and tactical execution.258 Such criticism, in rather gentle form, is 
even found in the generally positive official histories, and Jones reflects upon 
the lack of imagination displayed by the RFC.259 However, Jones is quick to 
insert the caveat that such criticism is based on 'details,' and that the 
'principle' of offensive air power 'was and is sound.'260 Yet, 1917 and 1918 
evidenced significant evolution in this regard, a process often clouded by the 
consistency with which Trenchard enumerated the principles of offensive air 
power.  
 
It was not that Trenchard was opposed to modifying the execution of the 
strategic offensive. The 'Fighting in the Air' pamphlet of March 1917 contained 
clear tactical evolution from previous publications, stressing the importance of 
formation flying, whilst concessions were made with regard to the use of 
escorts for bombers.261 Moreover, tactical evolution was a feature of 
operations during 1917. The example of the attack on Hill 70 in August of that 
year, a diversionary operation launched as part of the Passchendaele 
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campaign, demonstrates the RFC's growing sophistication when controlling 
the air. High level offensive patrols were supplemented with aircraft kept at 
forward airfields designed to counter the low-flying operations of the German 
Air Service.262 Patrols now also penetrated German airspace to varying 
depths, and at varying altitudes, with close and medium altitude patrols 
offering greater protection to Corps aircraft. In addition, low-flying patrols 
ensured coverage against penetrations made at ground level.263  
 
In seeking to improve techniques and practices, Trenchard was not afraid to 
ask for advice from operational level commanders. In a paper of December 
1917, Trenchard concluded with a series of questions that sought to provoke 
debate on the tactical use of large formations.264 In attempting to make 
suggestions to modify RFC policy or practice, a degree of diplomacy was 
required. Thus, in characterising Trenchard's policy of offensive patrolling as 
'feeble,' the Commander of the RFC's Fourteenth Wing missed a valuable 
opportunity to utilise the experience of his unit to attempt to modify RFC policy 
in a positive manner.265 Understandably, Trenchard's response was not 
receptive, and, whilst being remarkably constrained given the tactlessness of 
the Wing Commander, he highlighted genuine concerns regarding the 
command and control of increasingly large aerial formations.266  
 
As Cooper highlights, Trenchard's strategy often misread an offensive posture 
as evidence of domination over the enemy, while ignoring the important 
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principle of concentration.267 However, Trenchard's paper on defensive 
operations demonstrates that his conception of air power evolved, and he 
grasped that concentration at certain localities, and at specific times, was a 
viable tactic that could overwhelm a more powerful enemy.268 Such thinking 
was not new, and du Peuty had reached similar conclusions in his reports 
from Verdun. 
 
With the birth of the RAF, Trenchard was appointed as the first CAS, leaving 
the RFC / RAF units in France in search of a new commander. This was 
found in the guise of John Salmond, who had been a close ally of Trenchard 
throughout the conflict. They kept up continuous correspondence, both official 
and unofficial, until the close of the war.269 A change of command did not see 
a change of the principles governing the use of the RFC / RAF. The final 
edition of 'Fighting in the Air,' produced just as Trenchard resigned as CAS, 
made clear the continuation of policy from one command regime to the 
next.270 As Parton suggests, the April 1918 edition of this pamphlet continued 
to stress old principles.271  
 
However, there was a clear evolution of practical concepts in this last edition, 
and distance offensive patrols, once described as the 'backbone' of the 
offensive strategy, were now to be supplemented with close patrols directed 
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at contesting the airspace over the battlefront.272 This demonstrates marked 
sophistication, and the 'blunt' instrument of the RFC / RAF was being refined 
to include a multi-layered approach to controlling the air. Moreover, it must be 
remembered that pamphlets such as these were, as Parton observes, 
generally out of date as soon as they were produced.273 They were a 
snapshot of approved policy and practices, and they often followed 
developments at the front. The process of measure and counter-measure was 
a fluid part of the battle for the control of the air, and its nuances could not be 
captured fully in written form. 
 
Such evolutionary concepts did not abandon the principle of offensive air 
power, and, in a paper written after April 1918, the RAF continued to fight the 
information offensive in keeping with Trenchardian tenets. As the paper noted, 
a trend had developed where German aircraft were refusing combat with the 
offensive patrols of the British.274 This reflected the more general aerial 
strategy pursued by the German Air Service during this period. German air 
power remained a threat until the end of the war, but it could not match British 
and French numerical superiority. As such, it was forced to pick and choose 
its fights carefully.275 As the paper suggested, a specific objective should be 
selected for the offensive patrols to attack, and a counter air offensive against 
German aerodromes was recommended. By utilising such tactics, it was 
hoped that the German Air Service would be compelled to give battle under 
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tactically unfavourable circumstances, thus returning the initiative to the 
attacking forces. However, if battle was refused, 'considerable damage both 
material and moral will be inflicted.'276  
 
The sentiment behind this document was hugely significant. Compelling an 
enemy to fight under tactically unfavourable circumstances was a vital 
element of controlling the air, and continued to be so during the Second World 
War. Strange's command of 80 Wing during the closing months of the war 
demonstrates such thinking in practice, and sophisticated attacks on German 
airfields became a speciality of this Wing.277 Contrasting examples from the 
Second World War include the successful use of long-range fighter aircraft by 
US forces as part of the Combined Bomber Offensive. British fighter sweeps 
launched against targets in France during 1941 and 1942 demonstrate the 
converse, as German fighters could not be compelled to join battle on 
anything but their own terms.278  
 
A final factor affecting the conduct of the RFC / RAF was the development of 
the ground attack role for fighting aircraft. Whilst ground strafing had been a 
feature of RFC operations from as early as the Somme, it took on real 
significance during the latter half of 1917. Operations at Cambrai featured the 
extensive use of British fighter aircraft, utilising their machine guns against 
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German troops, trench lines, and other ground targets.279 Losses during such 
operations were extremely high, even for the RFC, and, as Jones records, 
they averaged 30 percent of the aircraft used.280 Whilst Jones cites evidence 
to demonstrate that the ground components of the BEF placed high value on 
the RFC's direct intervention against enemy infantry and defensive positions, 
he is also at pains to emphasise that such operations placed great strain on 
fighting squadrons. Not only did it keep them from their primary function of 
controlling the air, but it also subjected units to a significant degree of attrition, 
which could cripple an experienced and highly valuable asset in as few as 
four days.281 As Jones continues, such a rate of wastage could only be 
justified in an 'extreme emergency,' or if the ground operations during which 
they took place were of a 'decisive kind.'282 It was just such conditions that 
were present during the massive German offensives of the spring of 1918, 
and Haig's infamous 'backs to the wall' order applied with equal validity to the 
BEF's aerial contingent.283  
 
On the day the RAF came into formal existence, 1 April 1918, Foch issued 
orders to coordinate the efforts of British and French aerial resources. He 
noted that the prime function of fighting aircraft was now direct assault against 
enemy ground troops. Fighting against enemy aircraft was 'not to be sought 
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except so far as necessary for the fulfilment of this duty.'284 As Jones 
observes, operational orders issued to RAF units had to interpret Foch's 
instructions in line with the active fighting patrols launched by the German Air 
Service during this period. For example, Ninth Wing orders for 4 April 
instructed its fighting squadrons to patrol offensively, with the sole object 
being to 'seek out and destroy enemy formations.'285 Whilst it was difficult to 
resist the ground attack role when faced with critical conditions at the front, 
the RAF did not wish for such duties to distract from their prime function of 
controlling the air. Such sentiment was clearly a motivating factor in the 
production of an RAF policy paper that appeared post-April 1918.286 As the 
paper stated,  
 
A conflict of interest thus arises between the requirements in the air 
and the requirements on the ground, but the latter being dependent 
on the former, it stands to reason that the primary task of the 
R.A.F. must be to gain and maintain superiority in the air, as 
without such superiority the effective cooperation of aircraft with the 
other arms is hindered, and the Army may be deprived of all 
assistance from the air at a time it is most needed.287 
 
In many respects, this was another strand of the information offensive that the 
RFC / RAF had been fighting since it encountered its first serious difficulties in 
September 1916. Boff sides with the RAF's interpretation, noting the 
importance of maintaining control of the air as the BEF moved to the offensive 
in the summer of 1918.288 Of course, it is entirely possible that such 
documentation was issued with an eye to maintaining the independence of 
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the new service. Stressing the importance of the control of the air gave the 
RAF a strategic role on the battlefield that was outside of the purely auxiliary 
roles of ground attack, reconnaissance, and artillery observation. As Parton 
records, such an assumption was at the core of the RAF's first post-war 
doctrinal publication.289  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered some different perspectives on the RFC and the 
control of the air over the Western Front. In the first instance, the coalition 
context was highlighted, and, by using Greenhalgh's analytical framework, it 
was suggested that Anglo-French relations in the field of air power were some 
of the closest of the coalition, embracing the notion of genuine intellectual, 
philosophical 'binding.' Second, by examining the RFC's attitude to 
information, a further strand of the Corps's progressive attitude was illustrated. 
This included learning from both friend and foe, whilst ensuring that the BEF 
was fully informed about the functions and capabilities of its air power 
component. 
 
Trenchard was an extremely shrewd operator during this period, and he 
possessed a sophisticated understanding of the importance of information. 
During his time as Commander of the RFC, his personal and unrelenting 
battle to 'educate' all those with an interest in aerial policy mimicked the 
incessant operational conduct of his Corps. If moral superiority was the crucial 
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factor in the success of warfare during this period, then Trenchard was not to 
be found wanting, and he commanded his Corps with zeal and determination. 
The criticism of the Corps that focuses on the execution of control of the air 
policy is not dismissed, but the tangible tactical and operational nuances that 
developed are often over-shadowed by the consistency and force of the 
Trenchardian rhetoric of the offensive. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE AND THE CONTROL OF THE AIR 
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
Introduction 
 
In the pre-war era, naval aviators had engaged with the concept of the control 
of the air, focusing on its strategic implications. During this period of 
experimentation and transition, a failure to produce coherent doctrine and 
policy saw the RNAS diversify its activities to a significant degree. The 
feelings of strategic vulnerability, present in pre-war naval hypothesising, 
continued to manifest themselves during the conflict, and, for senior 
operational commanders of the Royal Navy, the control of the air over the 
Grand Fleet was a serious concern. Successive commanders of the Grand 
Fleet came to see the RNAS as an obstacle to the successful application of 
naval air power. In the words of Grove, the RNAS was an increasingly 
autonomous service that became 'a law unto itself.'1 With Churchill as First 
Lord, such attitudes and initiative were encouraged. In the aftermath of the 
Dardanelles / Gallipoli campaign, Balfour, as First Lord, brought the Admiralty 
to heel. As Roskill records,  
 
If the whole Navy suffered from the change, it was its youngest 
branch, the Air Service, that was to be the worst afflicted.2  
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By emphasising the 'naval' at the expense of the 'aerial,' the RNAS was more 
closely controlled by the Admiralty.3 Yet, in spite of Balfour's attempts to 
discipline the unruly crew of the RNAS, the Grand Fleet felt so poorly served 
by its aerial branch, particularly in terms of controlling the air over the fleet, 
that, when the creation of an independent air service was mooted with 
increasing seriousness during mid- to late-1917, its Commander-in-Chief was 
an enthusiastic supporter of the idea; a move the Navy would come to regret.4 
On 8 January 1914, a meeting was convened at the Admiralty, under the 
Chairmanship of the Fourth Sea Lord, Captain Cecil Lewis.5 In opening 
proceedings, Lewis remarked that  
 
... there appeared to be some lack of definition at present as to the 
functions of the Naval Wing. The time had come when it must pass 
from the experimental stage to take a definite place in the Naval 
organisation ...6 
 
Some three and a half years later, the RNAS still lacked a sense of clarity as 
to its wider purpose and functions. In August 1917, Admiral Sir David Beatty, 
then Commander of the Grand Fleet, noted that, 'as far as he knew, no air 
policy existed.'7 An absence of effective leadership and direction was the most 
significant factor contributing to the RNAS's lack of clarity and purpose during 
the conflict. The result was a sustained lack of focus and the diversification of 
RNAS activities. Such activities included: a farsighted interest in strategic 
                                            
3
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, p.209. Letter, M. Bonham-
Carter, PM's Private Secretary to M. Hankey, Secretary of CID, 6 Jun 1915. 
4
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, pp.499 – 501. Letter and 
Memorandum from Beatty to Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord, 15 Aug 1917. 
5
 NMM, LP, MS 51/012 – ADL/2/1/5 – 8, Minutes of Air Department Conference, 8 Jan 1914. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, pp.534 – 535. Extracts from 
Minutes of a Conference between Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Grand Fleet, and Rear-
Admiral Lionel Halsey, Third Sea Lord, Aug 1917.  
285 
 
bombing; the highly effective use of aircraft in the anti-submarine role; the 
troublesome task of localised air defence; and the involvement of naval 
aviators in the development and use of armoured cars and tanks. Whilst the 
utilisation of air power in conjunction with the fleet represented a massive 
challenge, the RNAS did not devote enough energy to the task between 1914 
and 1918.8 The RNAS did not possess officers of the reputation and standing 
of Trenchard and Henderson, nor did a close relationship exist between naval 
aviators and their parent service. There was no equivalent of the Trenchard-
Haig relationship, or of the wider cooperation between the BEF and the RFC. 
When faced with the coherent vision of air power, articulated with clarity and 
consistency by Trenchard and Haig, the RNAS was regularly outmanoeuvred 
by their military colleagues, particularly when serious issues arose over the 
development and execution of aerial policy.9 
 
This did not mean that the senior leadership of the Navy was uninterested in 
aviation. On the contrary, in Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, both 
wartime commanders of the Grand Fleet, the Navy possessed two powerful 
supporters of naval aviation. Their interest was driven by genuine concerns 
regarding the control of the air and the superior position of the German Navy 
and its fleet of rigid airships, capable of operating in support of the High Seas 
Fleet. In many respects, means became confused with ends, and the Navy's 
'material ethic' continued to affect the conduct of the RNAS during the First 
World War. Moreover, the failure to produce doctrine in the pre-war period 
continued into the conflict. The RNAS may have been the most progressive 
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innovators in the field of aviation, both technically and conceptually, yet they 
did not 'market' their vision of air power to their service users.  
 
Armoured Adventures: The RNAS and Churchill as First Lord  
 
Marder suggests that Sueter had greatest claim to the title '"Father" of British 
naval aviation.'10 However, without the whole-hearted support of Churchill, 
naval aviation in the UK would not have progressed as rapidly as it did during 
his tenure as First Lord.11 Churchill's involvement in the development of the 
RNAS saw the First Lord in his element, both positively and negatively. Gilbert 
has labelled Churchill an 'aerial overlord,' and, as Grove notes, Churchill had 
a tendency to see the RNAS as his private air force. His decision to 
encourage free-thinking and innovation within the service came at the 
expense of establishing a coherent vision for naval air power.12 Churchill 
understood the need to control the air, but this was affected by his inability to 
manage his adventurous nature, and by his constant desire to tinker and 
innovate.13 
 
Perhaps the most positive characteristics possessed by Churchill throughout 
his time in political office, but particularly during his first spell as First Lord of 
the Admiralty, were his dynamism and ceaseless energy.14 During wartime, 
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governments require from their political elites a drive and determination to 
face the most difficult situations. Moreover, an ability to think creatively, and to 
challenge the established orthodoxies, is useful. In this regard, Churchill was 
a highly valuable member of the British government, as he served in various 
posts during the First World War. However, it was these very traits that were 
Churchill's greatest weaknesses. During his time at the Admiralty, such traits 
manifested themselves in three potentially damaging ways: his fascination 
with small technical details; the value he attached to an aggressive and 
offensive posture; and finally, his desire to embroil himself in naval strategy 
and operations.15 Jellicoe lamented that Churchill had a tendency to force his 
views on the Board of the Admiralty, overriding the genuine wealth of 
experience and expertise possessed by the professional leadership of the 
Royal Navy.16 In a later conflict, Field Marshal Alan Brooke was to note of 
Churchill that his incessant desire to launch offensive action was 'a regular 
disease.'17  
 
Gilbert suggests that Churchill was at his happiest when attempting to assert 
a positive influence over a crisis.18 A darker aspect of Churchill's desire for 
action and influence was in evidence when, in discussion with Asquith's wife, 
he was heard to remark that 
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I would not be out of this glorious delicious war for anything the 
world could give me.19 
 
There are mixed evaluations of Churchill's involvement in Britain's decision to 
declare war on Germany. Charmley argues that Churchill dominated Cabinet 
discussions, actively encouraging his colleagues to go to war, whilst being the 
'only Minister to feel any sense of exultation at the course of events.'20 In 
contrast, D'Este suggests that Churchill wanted to avoid war, but, once a 
declaration was made, an occasion during which Churchill wept, he was 
totally committed to the defeat of Germany.21 As Asquith recorded, 'Churchill 
got on all of his war-paint.'22 In doing so, Churchill struggled to contain his 
enthusiasm for adventure, and this set a dangerous precedent for his 
subordinates. Gilbert highlights one of the most illustrative examples, in which 
Churchill went hunting for spies.23 The message from Churchill's actions, 
particularly during the opening months of the war, were threefold. First, as the 
example of the defence of Antwerp indicates, the front line was the place for 
leaders.24 Second, small matters of detail were vital, and could be prioritised 
over higher level matters. In discussing Churchill's involvement in the 
establishment of the Royal Naval Division, Richmond was to record that 'I 
really believe Churchill is not sane,' as the latter spent an inordinate amount of 
time embroiled in the highly technical administration of this process.25 For 
example, Churchill took time to insist on the importance of a band 
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accompanying the division.26 Finally, Churchill's frequent visits to the front, 
and his privateering attitude, served to legitimise such behaviour in 
subordinates. In October 1914, Churchill sent an astonishing telegram to 
Asquith, noting that he was prepared to resign from the Cabinet so he could 
personally command the defences of Antwerp.27 
 
By examining the Navy's expedition to Ostend at the end of August 1914, the 
weakness of Churchill's management of the RNAS is evident. With 
diversionary and defensive objectives in mind, a force of marines under Brig-
Gen Sir George Aston landed in Ostend during 27 – 28 August 1914.28 
Churchill's hand is strangely absent from Corbett's account of these 
operations, yet, in a telling sentence, Corbett notes that the 'scale of the 
project rapidly developed' as the situation on the ground increased in 
gravity.29 Gilbert asserts that Churchill wanted to 'influence the crisis' at the 
front, and could do so by despatching a naval force to Ostend.30 A less 
generous interpretation would focus on Churchill's desire to embroil the Royal 
Navy in the thick of the action, and to escalate minor operations to include as 
many naval resources as he could spare. Such conclusions did not escape 
Asquith, who showed concern about Churchill's 'little army.'31  
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No.3 Squadron, based at Eastchurch, deployed to the Continent at the end of 
August 1914. Whilst the orders issued to the unit at the beginning of 
September captured the importance of controlling the air against the German 
airship threat, the initial deployment of the squadron was in support of 
Churchill's scheme for combined sea-land-air operations from Ostend. As 
Churchill's orders to Aston stated, the marine force was to be supported by a 
'squadron of aeroplanes' that would conduct 'an aerial reconnaissance of the 
country within 30 miles of Ostend.' Once with the force, the aeroplanes would 
be placed under the direct orders of Aston.32 The squadron was commanded 
by C. R. Samson, then a Commander with the Navy, and, as his memoirs 
record, he was instructed by Sueter to proceed to Ostend on 25 August, with 
the eventual departure of the unit being delayed for two days.33 The most 
important task for the squadron was to provide aerial reconnaissance, 
although it was also vital to secure control of the air. Aston was quick to make 
use of his RNAS contingent, although not necessarily as anticipated. On 29 
August, Aston enquired as to whether Samson could undertake motorcar 
reconnaissance to assist the operations of the marines.34 With no appreciable 
front-line, the situation on the ground was extremely fluid. The integral 
transport that had accompanied Samson's unit to Ostend was the sum total of 
motorised vehicles available to Aston's force.35 Appealing to Samson's 
technically driven naval mind, and his piratical instincts, a machine gun armed 
motorcar (a private vehicle belonging to either Samson or one of his brothers 
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serving with the squadron) was utilised to conduct penetrative reconnaissance 
operations.36  
 
Whilst operations from Ostend came to an abrupt conclusion at the end of 
August, a seed had been sown, and Samson now struggled to control his 
adventurous spirit. His desire to remain at the forefront of the war saw him 
disobey direct orders from the Admiralty to return to the UK. By utilising bad 
weather as an excuse, Samson and his unit remained on the Continent and 
continued their motorised excursions against the advancing German forces.37 
Under instruction from Churchill, Sueter issued orders that legitimised 
Samson's continued presence in France.38 In many respects, by issuing such 
orders, Churchill was demonstrating his adventurous instincts by proxy. As 
Best notes,  
 
Leading the world's biggest and best navy into war might have 
been thought enough to satisfy the most martial ambition, but it 
wasn't enough for Churchill.39 
 
As Grove records, the loss of Antwerp necessitated a geographic 
reorientation of RNAS efforts.40 The operational guidance provided on 1 
September 1914 established Dunkirk as an important centre for the RNAS, 
and it remained so throughout the conflict.41 Located on the far left flank of the 
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Western Front, the air base at Dunkirk, in conjunction with naval aviation units 
based in the south-east of the UK, provided the RNAS with pivotal locations 
from which to launch a coherent strategy for the control of the air. In the first 
instance, this approach was to be directed primarily at countering the threat 
posed by German airships. This was an example of Churchill's 'active' 
approach to the control of the air, derived from the NW's pre-war theorising. 
As Goulter observes, the RNAS, 'thinking outside the box,' attempted to '[find] 
a cure, rather than [treat] the symptoms' of the German air threat.42 In 
contrast, Ferris suggests that such thinking, embracing advanced offensive 
action, was in keeping with an approach to warfare favoured traditionally by 
the RN.43 In the operational guidance of 1 September, it was noted that 
counter offensive operations were designed to ensure the 'immunity of 
Portsmouth, Chatham, and London from dangerous aerial attack.'44 The 
manifestation of such an approach was a series of bold strikes against 
German airship sheds, which resulted in significant success for the RNAS and 
the destruction of several Zeppelins as they sat helplessly in their hangers.45 
The loss of Antwerp did limit the distance at which naval aircraft could strike 
against German airships, although, as H. A. Jones observes, counter 
offensive raiding against Zeppelins alarmed the German Naval Staff 
sufficiently to fear that their force would be squandered before meaningful 
attacks could be launched against Britain.46 In spite of success, the counter 
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offensive did not stop German airships raiding the UK. Importantly, Britain 
lacked aircraft both in number and with sufficient range to pursue a ruthless 
counter-air policy against the sources of German air power. As an Air 
Historical Branch narrative observed,  
 
Such enterprises were too ambitious for the primitive types and 
scanty numbers of naval aircraft available during the early years of 
the war.47 
 
Zeppelins, being designed for long-range tasks, could withdraw to bases 
beyond the operational capacity of British aircraft and prepare safely for 
operations against Britain. As Ferris suggests, the effectiveness of these 
RNAS operations had the negative consequence of exposing eastern and 
northern Britain to strategic raiding.48 Moreover, rather than developing a clear 
and purposeful approach to the application of naval air power, 
 
... Dunkirk became an experimental arena for the naval air service 
and its activities often reflected the most advanced and innovative 
thinking in the Admiralty Air Department.49 
 
This thinking included the continued development of an armoured car 
capability within the RNAS. As the orders of 1 September noted, to be 
included as part of the Dunkirk force were 
 
Sixty special motor-cars ... armed with maxims ... and ... protected 
with armour plating.50  
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As Fletcher observes, this built on the initial efforts of Samson, who made ad-
hoc arrangements to fit armour to his cars, whilst making direct requests to 
the Admiralty for armour, armament, and a detachment of marines.51 Official 
orders from the Admiralty could be interpreted to suggest that RNAS 
armoured cars had a role to play in supporting control of the air operations. By 
deploying modern 'combined-operations' terminology, Grove provides a more 
progressive interpretation of the RNAS's interest in armoured cars.52 D'Este 
supports this contention, noting that, whilst such operations were on an 
insignificant scale, they proved to be the first 'tiny steps' in developing 'three-
dimensional warfare.'53 Nonetheless, the use of such taxonomy does not 
disguise Samson's motivation for developing these vehicles. An examination 
of the operational reports emanating from Samson's units during this period 
demonstrates that armoured car operations were influenced by two factors: a 
fascination with innovation, stemming from the Navy's wider ethic; and a 
desire for adventure.54 As Fletcher notes,  
 
armoured cars made little effective contribution to the outcome of 
the war. It could have been won without them but it would have 
been even more grim and perhaps less inspiring, less adventurous 
[emphasis added].55 
 
Fletcher's point illustrates the essence and development of armoured car 
operations. Possibly more than attempting to improve the reconnaissance 
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capacity of the RNAS, or providing assistance to control of the air operations, 
Samson and his men rather enjoyed hurtling round the French / Belgian 
countryside, dodging the patrols of the enemy and taking pot-shots at like-
minded Germans.56 As Fletcher notes, because of the popularity of such 
operations, most cars went on operations heavily overmanned.57 Samson's 
men could tinker with their cars and fully embrace the material ethic that was 
so dominant in the RN during this period. 
 
Samson was fighting a private war, and this brought out his privateering 
instincts. As Sueter wrote, '[Samson] practically carried out a small war on his 
own.'58 This spirit was captured in his 6 September 1914 letter to the 
'Authorities of the City of Lille,' in which he noted that he had 'this day 
occupied Lille with an armed English and French Force.'59 It is also telling 
that, of the reports submitted to the Admiralty during this period, those 
concerning aerial reconnaissance were invariably shorter in length and more 
perfunctory in tone, whilst those detailing motor car operations were more 
extended and written with a greater sense of excitement.60 It is quite possible 
to imagine Churchill devouring the thrilling prose, wishing he was sat at 
Samson's side as they motored around the French / Belgian countryside. 
 
In many respects, Samson was undertaking the role that Churchill himself so 
desperately craved. As Churchill was to note after resigning as First Lord, 'I 
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find it v[er]y painful to be deprived of direct means of action.'61 His conduct 
during the opening months of the conflict indicates that this sentiment could 
be taken literally. The control of the air was acknowledged as a central task in 
No.3 Squadron operational orders. These embraced legitimate air power 
related roles governing the use of armoured cars, which included the need to 
protect airfields and rescue downed pilots. However, it appears that an 
inordinate amount of effort and resources were being devoted to non-air 
power and non-naval air power tasks. To ensure that the Navy was provided 
with effective aerial support, the senior leadership of the RNAS needed to 
assert a tight grip on the 'centrifugal tendency' of the service.62 However, it 
was from the senior command trio of Churchill, Sueter, and Samson that 
much of this centrifugal force emanated.  
 
Rather than stressing the importance of controlling the air, and devoting time 
and resources to improving the RNAS's capacity in this regard, Sueter, at the 
behest of Churchill, was ordered to begin measures for the creation of a vastly 
expanded armoured car force within the RNAS.63 Sueter's paper of 11 
September 1914 recommended the creation of a force of 50 armoured cars, 
whilst Churchill responded with instructions to double its size.64 At the front, 
Samson busied himself with further innovation. He converted his heavy lorries 
into armoured transports capable of mounting a quick-firing 3-pounder naval 
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gun.65 A shortage of vehicles was no obstacle to Samson, and Fletcher 
alleges that the former stole unattended lorries from BEF units operating in 
the area.66 From reading Sampson's memoirs, it is easy to forget that his 
prime concern was supposed to be the conduct of aerial operations.67 On 26 
September 1914, Aston, not known for discouraging enterprising and 
adventurous subordinates, felt compelled to order Samson, who had been 
conducting combined infantry and armoured car operations with the French, 
to return to Dunkirk, as his  
 
services are urgently needed for organisation of air reconnaissance 
and the conduct of his command which is increasing in strength 
daily.68 
 
In observing these developments, the Daily Mail urged Churchill to avoid the 
'dispersal of his activities in fields which do not concern him.'69 A similar case 
was put forward by the Morning Post, and Churchill was condemned for 
 
using the resources of the Admiralty as if he were personally 
responsible for the naval operations.70 
 
The expansive instincts of the RNAS did not escape the attentions of the 
press. In a private letter to the editor of the Aeroplane, a vehement critic of 
various aspects of British air policy and practice, Samson wrote that  
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I wish you would stop writing all the beastly innuendos you do 
about me ... I do as much flying and have done as much as 
anybody in this war (RFC and RNAS).71 
 
By December 1914, an elaborate infrastructure had been created in the UK. 
This included an armoured car centre and the creation of an armoured 
division within the RNAS. After devoting significant resources to expanding 
the armoured car strength of the RNAS, the appearance of entrenched 
infantry and static warfare 'rendered its employment practically impossible.'72 
This was reflected in the orders issued to Samson's units in November 1914, 
in which the previously central role of the armoured car force was reduced in 
scale.73 Samson persisted in commanding ground patrols, whilst, on 30 
November 1914, he made further requests to the Admiralty for additional 
'touring cars.'74 Even when conditions of static warfare prevented the effective 
use of armoured cars, Samson continued to forward material to the Admiralty 
concerning their construction and the improvements that could be made to the 
type.75 In spite of Samson's enthusiasm for armoured adventures, endorsed 
by Churchill's keen interest, the operational reports of the RNAS during the 
winter of 1914 show an increase in aerial operations at the expense of ground 
work.76 However, rather than gripping the service during this period and 
reemphasising the importance of developing a coherent policy for controlling 
the air, Churchill actually increased the autonomy of the Air Department. The 
Admiralty's weekly order (No.166) of 5 February 1915, which commented on 
the growth and development of the RNAS, stated that  
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the whole of the Naval Air Service ... [shall] ... be placed under the 
orders of the [DAD], who will be solely responsible to the Board of 
the Admiralty for its proper administration.77 
 
As Grove observes, 'Sueter was now effectively monarch of all he surveyed.'78 
Of course, the further Churchill removed the RNAS from the control of 
conservative forces in the Navy, the greater the creative influence he could 
assert on the service. Under the leadership of Churchill and Sueter, the RNAS 
continued to diversify its activities. Rather than cut their losses, Churchill and 
Sueter's interest in the development of armoured vehicles continued 
unabated. The new static conditions at the front prompted Churchill to turn his 
attention toward the utilisation of armoured vehicles to help break the 
deadlock.79 As Harris records,  
 
Though it was really no business of the Admiralty's, Churchill was 
soon asking Sueter to devise means of helping the infantry to cross 
No Man's Land and attack trench systems.80 
 
This was also a contemporary assessment, and Asquith was to note that he 
hoped Churchill would  
 
hand over to the military authorities the little circus which he is still 
running 'on his own' at Dunkirk – Oxfordshire Yeomen, motor-
busses ... armoured cars ... They have really nothing to do with the 
Admiralty which ought to confine its activities to the sea & the air.81 
 
                                            
77
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, pp.193 – 194. Extracts 
from Admiralty Weekly Order No.166 of 5 Feb 1915, 'Naval Air Service-Reorganisation.' 
78
 E. Grove, 'Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?' p.33. 
79
 W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911 – 1914, p.319.  
80
 J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.13; W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911 – 1914, 
p.319. 
81
 M. Brock & E. Brock, eds., H. H. Asquith, p.276.  
300 
 
Sueter's memoirs observe that Churchill viewed the Air Department as a 
creative hub to which he could turn with his latest schemes. Whilst praising 
his drive and inventiveness, Sueter was to note that Churchill's decision to 
utilise the Air Department as his own personal technical staff placed 
significant pressure on the DAD, limiting Sueter's ability to focus on his 
primary concern of air power.82 The nature of this arrangement is perhaps 
best captured in Sueter's recollections of 16 February 1915, in which, some 
two weeks after being given even greater responsibility for the development of 
naval air power, both Sueter and Churchill spent part of the day pushing a 
steam-powered tractor around Horse Guard's Parade.83  
 
As Sueter was to record,  
 
naval airmen were out ... to do their utmost in many new fields, 
spread over wide areas, to help win the war.84  
 
The energy, creativity, and dynamism of the Churchill-Sueter combination is 
unquestionable, yet an already strained Air Department, faced with a 
multiplicity of tasks, including air defence (both localised and forward) and 
operations on the Continent, not to mention operations in support of the fleet, 
had only a finite amount of time and resources. The result was a neglect of 
the genuinely naval functions of the service. The RNAS was unable to control 
the air in any of the operational theatres for which it had responsibility, and it 
could not project a bubble of aerial control over the Grand Fleet. To a greater 
or lesser extent, and with its focus on armoured vehicles, the Air Department 
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even neglected its aerial functions. As Beatty noted, Churchill had a tendency 
of 'putting his fingers into pies which ... [did] ... not concern him.' Such an 
approach was 'bound to lead to disaster.'85 
 
As the situation at the front stabilised, limiting the opportunities for Churchill to 
deploy his innovative and adventurous tendencies, his management of the 
RNAS continued to provide the First Lord with a creative outlet. When the 
opportunity to discuss procurement policy for the service arose in April 1915, 
Churchill seized the opportunity to expand the strategic horizons and 
functions of the RNAS. In a conference of 3 April 1915, Churchill shifted the 
focus of the service to the offensive use of air power, including the 
development of a  
 
heavy bomb-dropping type, capable of carrying upwards of 500lb. 
of explosives for a 150-mile journey there and back ... [with the 
purpose of] ... attacking ... on the largest possible scale of military 
points on enemy territory 86  
 
The strategic goal of such operations was to  
 
harass the enemy and destroy his works as to effect very materially 
his ability to continue the war.87   
 
Churchill wished for bombing of this kind to be prioritised over both 
'reconnaissance and patrolling.' Samson's units at Dunkirk had displayed an 
innate interest in bombing operations, and these missions, which included the 
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raids against German airship sheds and more localised sorties against 
German airfields, embraced an overt function in relation to the control of the 
air.88 Whilst the rhetoric of controlling the air was present in Churchill's 
thinking, it is difficult not to conclude that the First Lord was searching for 
further channels through which to develop the offensive outlook of the Navy. 
 
This desire saw significant resources, including RNAS units, diverted to 
operations in conjunction with the Dardanelles offensive.89 As Jones 
observed, the result was that aerial operations from Dunkirk 'could be little 
more than a demonstration.'90 Air operations at Gallipoli, outside the 
geographical scope of this thesis, are examined in some detail by the official 
history.91 It will suffice to note that very real challenges faced naval aviators in 
this theatre. Nonetheless, the failure of the campaign caused a backlash in 
the direction of Churchill and Fisher (as his First Sea Lord). 92 Not only did the 
failure result in a change of senior leadership at the Admiralty, but, more 
specifically, the RNAS, closely associated with Churchill, was finally without 
its protector, and was thus open to critical scrutiny. 
 
Putting the 'Naval' in RNAS: The Admiralty and Sueter 
 
The diverse range of deployments and activities of the RNAS during this 
period were undertaken against the backdrop of what became the prime 
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function of the service for the opening year of the conflict: air defence. 
Controlling the airspace over Britain was a challenge beyond both the RNAS 
and the RFC at this stage. However, the tendency of the RNAS to diversify its 
activities made it an inviting target for criticism, and, as such, the new First 
Lord, Arthur Balfour, sought to bring the RNAS under closer control. Sueter 
may well have sensed his wings, flippers, tracks, and wheels were about to be 
clipped, and sent a report to Churchill (now Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster) calling for the creation of an independent air service.93 This paper 
found its way to Hankey via the hand of Maurice Bonham-Carter, Private 
Secretary to the Prime Minister. In an unflattering cover letter, which reflected 
Whitehall's impressions of the RNAS, Bonham-Carter was to write that  
 
the naval wing [RNAS] is a failure because it has not been 
designed for naval objects with the result that it has degenerated 
into a crowd of highly skilled but ill-disciplined privateersmen. What 
is wanted is to make the naval wing more 'naval,' not more 
'aerial.'94 
 
In what was a balanced response to Bonham-Carter's letter and Sueter's 
paper, Hankey could not shy away from at least some criticism of the RNAS. 
He noted that  
 
The progress of the Naval Wing on the whole has been less 
definitely naval than that of the Army has been military.95 
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In essence, Hankey's paper reflected on the failure of the concept of a 
national 'corps of aviators,' in whose spirit the combined military-naval RFC 
had been conceived. The division of the Military and Naval Wings was now so 
pronounced that rekindling the concept was no longer an option. Whilst some 
criticism was directed at the RFC during this period, its command and 
leadership team, itself facing difficulties with personality clashes, was a 
picture of efficiency and unity compared to the RNAS. By this stage, the RFC 
was becoming a fully integrated component of the BEF, and its activities, 
particularly in relation to the control of the air, were viewed with increasing 
importance. The generally positive attitude of the BEF to its aerial component 
was only enhanced by the clarity and consistency with which the RFC put 
forth its vision for the application of air power. This set in further relief the 
troubling perceptions and reputation that characterised the performance of the 
RNAS. As First Lord, Balfour saw that it was now crucial to grip the service 
and focus its energies on more legitimate 'naval' activities. For Jellicoe and 
the Grand Fleet, such intentions were welcome. Up to this point, he felt that 
the Grand Fleet had been poorly served by the RNAS. In a letter to Beatty, 
Jellicoe noted that he would press the Admiralty for improved aerial resources 
for the Fleet and the Navy as a whole:  
 
The moment is ripe, because, with the change of First Lords we are 
now going to get the Air Service on a satisfactory footing.96  
 
This reflected the strong criticism that Jellicoe had made of the RNAS in 
March 1915: 
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Picked midshipmen are sent to the RNAS where they are overpaid 
and insufficiently looked after. They spend their time in the Empire 
Theatre, or riding around in Rolls-Royce Motor-cars!97 
 
The process of gripping began on 29 July 1915. Admiralty orders removed 
RNAS air stations from the control of the Air Department, and placed them 
under the command of the senior naval officer in whose area of operational 
responsibility they resided.98 The role of DAD was limited to inspecting these 
stations, and specific instructions were issued to Sueter during July, which 
formalised these changes.99 These instructions were the tip of the iceberg, 
and Sueter was to be the sacrificial lamb for RNAS failures during the opening 
year of the conflict. Admiral Jackson, who had replaced Fisher as First Sea 
Lord, held a meeting on 3 August 1915, which developed into a sustained and 
heated cross-examination of Sueter.100 As a result of this meeting, the RNAS 
was to be commanded by a Flag-ranked officer, who would assume the post 
of the newly created Director of Air Services (DAS).101 The post of DAD was 
abolished, and Sueter was appointed Superintendent of Aircraft Production. In 
softening the blow of this very obvious demotion, Sueter was promoted to 
Commodore First Class. However, it is telling that this was not a substantive 
rank in the Navy, and Sueter was being put firmly in his place.102  
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In making a brief comparison with the RFC, it is instructive to note that, up to 
this point, the RNAS lacked an officer with the equivalent rank and authority of 
Henderson. By this stage, Henderson was a Major-General, and would rise to 
the rank of Lieutenant-General by the conclusion of the war. Samson, who 
served as a Commander with the RNAS (the equivalent to a Major in the 
British Army), retained this rank for much of the conflict. Even Godfrey Paine, 
a more trusted officer, who would rise to the most senior position within the 
RNAS, did not attain flag rank during the course of the war. It is telling that 
RFC personnel seemed to ascend their respective rank structure more swiftly 
than their naval colleagues. Trenchard, for example, was promoted rapidly 
during the war, whilst Sykes also managed to attain the rank of Major-General 
by 1918.103 This hints at the differing attitudes held by the Army and Navy 
toward those manning their aerial components. However, further research is 
required in this field before more steadfast conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Sueter was well aware of the snub, and wrote privately to the editor of the 
Aeroplane. Sueter conceded that the air service had got 'too large for one 
man,' yet he felt he was the subject of rather 'shabby treatment.' Moreover, he 
had not been given the credit he deserved: '[a] fine reward for 6 years (this 
November) pioneer work isn't it?'104 Sueter had undertaken pioneering work, 
and he made a positive contribution to shaping the Navy's understanding of 
the control of the air.105 He was driven by a creative desire to innovate, and 
was a disciple of the Navy's material ethic. He had also been placed in a 
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difficult position by Churchill's management of the Air Department. However, 
he was also motivated by a desire to secure personal reward and acclaim. His 
private papers, held in part at the RAF Museum, Hendon, concern themselves 
primarily with his patents and inventor's claims for the development of a 
torpedo carrying aircraft.106 An example from September 1916 provides some 
clarity in this regard. During this month, Trenchard, in stressing the primacy of 
controlling the air, launched his information offensive, 'selling' his vision of air 
power far and wide. In contrast, Sueter spent time writing a detailed 
memorandum, which established his role in the development of the tank and 
armoured car. This paper was very probably written with one eye on post-war 
settlements, both financial and otherwise.107 In writing of Rear-Admiral 
Charles Vaughan-Lee, the newly appointed DAS, Sueter was to note that he 
was 
 
A very nice fellow but he doesn't know an aeroplane from a 
Radiator. It is an insult to every air man in the Kingdom.108  
 
An insult it may have been, but the decision to appoint a non-airman to the 
post of DAS was an overt attempt to win back the wider trust of the Navy, 
which the triumvirate of Churchill, Sueter, and Samson had undermined. 
Rather than air his grievances in a constructive manner, Sueter wrote an 
(anonymous) article for the Globe, which expounded upon his vision for an 
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independent air service.109 As Roskill observes, such a decision was 'not 
calculated to enhance the Board's confidence in him.'110 In 1917, Sueter was 
posted to the distant Adriatic theatre, before being relieved of his command 
for writing directly to King George V seeking acknowledgment for his role in 
the development of the tank. Sueter may have suggested that the Admiralty 
took the 'little view' when it came to air power, but he could be accused, with 
equal measure, of taking the 'little view' when it came to his desire for 
personal glory.111 His attitude is all the more puzzling given that, as an air 
power innovator, Sueter had much to offer. He clearly understood the 
importance of controlling the air, but, after Churchill's departure, he seemed 
unable to win the support of influential figures in the Navy. This highlights 
marked differences between the senior commanders of the RNAS and RFC. 
Trenchard and Sykes skilfully utilised the press, whilst providing digestible 
and appealing visions of air power to their professional and political seniors. 
Sueter made little or no use of the press, and failed to articulate a coherent 
vision of naval air power to the Board and other senior naval officers. When 
faced with criticism, he sought to emphasise that he had been treated 'very 
badly' by the Admiralty. He also continued to assert his claims for rewards and 
acknowledgement.112  
  
                                            
109
 The Globe, 13 Oct 1915. Copy found in S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the 
Naval Air Service, pp.230 – 233. 
110
 S. W. Roskill, ed., Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, p.230. 
111
 M. F. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs, pp.400 – 401. 
112
 NAL, CGG, File 7. Letter, Sueter to Grey, 9 Dec 1918; M. F. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs, 
p.190. 
309 
 
The Control of the Air and the Grand Fleet during 1915 
 
The Balfour-Jackson Board had much work to do, particularly with providing 
support to the Grand Fleet. Above all, Jellicoe and Beatty were concerned by 
the threat posed to their operations by German airships scouting for the High 
Seas Fleet. In an exchange of letters during the summer of 1915, the issue of 
the control of the air over the fleet provided the focus for discussions. On 19 
June 1915, Beatty was to write to Jellicoe, noting the advantage the High 
Seas Fleet would possess by using its airships for long-range 
reconnaissance.113 In forwarding such concerns to the Admiralty, Jellicoe was 
to spell out his case:  
 
The German airships will be of the greatest possible advantage to 
their fleet as scouts. On the day of the fleet action they will be able 
to give the German Admiral full information as to my dispositions, 
whilst I am entirely ignorant of those of his fleet.114 
 
As Jellicoe noted in a paper of 23 July 1915, German airships provided an 
advantage to the High Seas Fleet in terms of tactical reconnaissance. They 
could assist the gunnery of the German ships, unopposed by the British from 
either sea or air.115 On the day orders were issued that were to result in the 
abolition of the post of DAD, Jellicoe wrote again to the Admiralty stressing 
the gravity of the situation facing the Grand Fleet. In the presence of German 
airships, his fleet would be 'powerless,' and he urged 'Their Lordships' earnest 
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attention' to be given to the matter.116 For Jellicoe, there was no simple 
solution to controlling the air over the fleet. His own experiences utilising 
seaplanes whilst on operations had highlighted significant problems with the 
type.117 Criticism of the Admiralty for failing to develop an effective force of 
rigid airships to counter the German aerial fleet did little to close the gap.118 
As Jellicoe suggested, the long-term solution was to develop the ability to 
launch aircraft from the decks of ships.119 
 
As the Grand Fleet continued to ready itself for 'the day of the fleet action,' 
exercises were conducted to ensure the efficiency of the various squadrons 
and their commanders. In reflecting upon war games held at the beginning of 
August 1915, Beatty continued to worry about the German airship fleet 
placing the British in an inferior position with regard to tactical 
reconnaissance.120 Whilst the results of the war game were of concern to 
Jellicoe, the Admiral appeared in a more pragmatic mood, stressing to Beatty 
the factors that would limit the effectiveness of German airships operating 
over the North Sea.121 As Marder observes, the effectiveness of the airship in 
conjunction with fleet operations was severely overplayed during the conflict. 
However, such perceptions served as a spur to keep the Navy's senior 
operational commanders focused on the control of the air.122  
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The Grand Fleet and Air Power during 1916 
 
The opening of 1916 saw two important developments: first, the appointment 
of Admiral Scheer to command the High Seas Fleet; and second, the creative 
use of naval air power to attempt to draw Scheer into a decisive fleet 
encounter. Operations during the opening half of 1916 indicated the potential 
of utilising aerial resources to force an encounter between the two fleets. They 
also highlighted the very limited capability of the Grand Fleet's aerial support. 
Scheer's appointment saw the more aggressive use of the High Seas Fleet, 
which made a decisive encounter between the two fleets more likely.123 Beatty 
and Jellicoe were still without adequate aerial resources to support the 
operations of their units, which seemed only to increase the importance of 
controlling the air over the fleet.  
 
In writing to Jellicoe regarding combined air and sea operations, Beatty 
concluded that they would not lead to the German fleet being drawn into a 
decisive encounter.124 During such operations in early May 1916, Beatty 
noted that the performance of his seaplanes was, 'as usual[,] ... 
disappointing.'125 The occasion also provided Beatty with an opportunity to 
question the competence of naval aviators. In attempting to alight from heavy 
seas with a significant bomb-load, many of the RNAS seaplanes were 
disabled as their propellers crashed against the waves on take-off. As Beatty 
was to comment, 
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They evidently have not paid attention to trim which is part of a 
Naval Officer's training and thought that what went well in a 
landlocked harbour with smooth water would meet all cases.126 
 
Balfour and Jackson had now been at the Admiralty for nearly twelve months, 
and the senior operational commanders of the Navy still had significant 
reason to feel aggrieved at their lack of aerial support. As Jones comments, 
1916 saw new horizons open for the RNAS, as its commitments in the cause 
of Home Defence and the Dardanelles were reduced in scale.127 In the guise 
of the reconstituted pre-war AC, reformed in early 1916 as the Joint War Air 
Committee (JWAC), an opportunity was presented to establish a more 
coherent vision for the RNAS. This could stress the importance of the control 
of the air, and devote significant resources to assisting the operations of the 
fleet. The proceedings of JWAC, discussed in detail by Cooper, demonstrate 
that, whilst the Balfour-Jackson Board had the RNAS under closer control, 
they had no intention of reining in its centrifugal instincts.128  
 
Vaughan-Lee submitted a paper to JWAC in March 1916, which attempted to 
present a more coherent vision for the RNAS.129 For an individual who was 
appointed for his conservatism and non-technical expertise, a reputation that 
survives in the historiography, his paper did little to curb the progressive 
instincts of his charge.130 Whilst stressing a range of objectives for the 
service, the focus on 'long-range bombing,' articulated by Churchill in April 
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1915, continued to be given prominence.131 Vaughan-Lee's paper was given 
de facto approval by Balfour at the end of March 1916. The First Lord affirmed 
the service's commitment to the pursuit of long-range bombing operations, 
including the development of suitable aircraft and engines.132 The 
development of improved seaplanes and aircraft, as well as the desire to build 
new and improved carriers for use with the Fleet, were also strands of naval 
air policy, but the clear priority was given to developing the offensive capacity 
of the service via long-range bombing. 
 
It is telling that, when the long-awaited day of fleet action arrived, Jellicoe and 
Beatty could muster only two seaplane carriers between them. This was the 
Battle of Jutland, and Campania, which was due to support Jellicoe, did not 
receive orders to sail in time.133 It had been overhauled in November 1915, 
but, so little did Jellicoe think of its abilities, he did not insist on the carrier 
making a late sailing to join the fleet.134 This did not reflect his feelings for the 
value of air power in support of the fleet. More accurately, this decision made 
clear that, even after an overhaul, the stop gap solution provided by 
converting former merchant ships into seaplane carriers was insufficient. 
Moreover, as his experience of the previous year had shown, seaplanes 
operating in the rough waters of the North Sea were of very limited value. 
They possessed limited utility in terms of providing reconnaissance and 
gunnery spotting, and could not drive off German airships or seize control of 
the air over the fleet. The carrier supporting Beatty's force was able to make a 
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successful launch, and a seaplane made a detailed tactical reconnaissance of 
at least part of the German High Seas Fleet.135 As Grove observes, these 
reports were not forwarded to Beatty, reflecting the inexperience of 
cooperation between aerial resources and the fleet.136 
 
The failure to achieve a decisive material victory sent shock waves through 
the Admiralty. In the aftermath of the battle, aerial support was pin-pointed as 
a factor that, for future engagements, could improve the chances of inflicting a 
decisive defeat on the German fleet. Beatty's report recommended  
 
immediate use ... of existing aircraft with the B.C.F. [Battle Cruiser 
Fleet] to practise passing information as to the movements of 
enemy ships for the use of the Control Officer.137 
 
This was an interesting development, and both Beatty and Jellicoe began to 
view controlling the air in a more offensive manner. Prior to Jutland, their 
understanding of the concept had been driven by a desire to negate the 
effects of German air power. In the post-Jutland period, they began to see 
that, by establishing control of the air over the fleet, air power could provide 
direct assistance in defeating enemy forces. This could include both tactical 
reconnaissance and spotting the fall of shot for friendly capital ships. The 
effectiveness of German air power at Jutland was severely limited. Moreover, 
poor signals discipline by German airships actually provided significant 
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intelligence on the movements of the High Seas Fleet.138 However, the press 
highlighted the Grand Fleet's lack of aerial resources as another factor in the 
failure to bring decisive victory to the British. As an article in the Weekly 
Despatch was to comment, '... the Germans can see where we are blind.'139 
Such publicity troubled Jellicoe, and he wrote to both the Admiralty and the 
First Sea Lord in the aftermath of the battle to complain about the press.140  
 
At the beginning of May 1916, Jellicoe had written to the Admiralty noting the 
need for a fast seaplane carrier to operate with the Grand Fleet.141 In many 
respects, this captured his experience of working with Campania, a converted 
seaplane carrier, with which he had little success. In reply, the Admiralty 
noted that to build a special carrier was a question '... of relative urgency.'142 
This was a clear reference to the pressure placed on Britain's ship building 
capacity in the face of the growing potency of the German submarine 
campaign. Not only did this place significant strain on seaborne resources, it 
also continued to exert a drain on the resources of the RNAS itself.143 Given 
the perceived failure at Jutland, it is interesting to note that the Admiralty were 
willing to contemplate converting the nearly completed large light cruiser, 
Furious, into a carrier to support Jellicoe.144 Whilst still short of decisive action 
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by the Board, it is clear that controlling the air over the fleet was being 
considered in a more urgent manner.  
 
The Admiralty and Air Policy Bodies 
 
In the wider sphere of air policy, the Admiralty's involvement in JWAC had 
been disastrous. As Cooper records, JWAC failed because, ultimately, it 
lacked executive power to settle grievances between the RFC and RNAS.145 
Able to speak directly on behalf of the Army Council, Henderson's contribution 
to JWAC made the Admiralty's attitude to the Committee appear hap-hazard 
and disinterested. Vaughan-Lee and the Third Sea Lord, Rear Admiral 
Charles Tudor, did not possess authority to speak for the Board of the 
Admiralty. As Lord Curzon was to note, by not appointing members that could 
speak for the Board, the Admiralty made it so the Committee 'was sterilised 
from the start.'146 In many respects, the uncooperative attitude of the 
Admiralty toward JWAC reflected that the RNAS had nothing to gain, as the 
RFC, fighting a brutal attritional struggle at the front, sought to claim greater 
resources to ease its insatiable appetite for aircraft and aero-engines.147 This, 
again, reflected the RFC's progressive attitude to the use of information.  
 
Trenchard 'sold' his vision of air power to influential political figures, including 
Lords Derby and Curzon. In contrast, Balfour and the command of the RNAS 
failed to provide effective cooperation with the Committee. Cooper notes that 
the dispute between the RFC and RNAS centred on two issues: the allocation 
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of high-powered aero-engines; and the responsibility for conducting long-
range bombing operations.148 The nature of this quarrel is outside the scope 
of the thesis, other than to emphasise that, as the senior operational 
commanders of the Grand Fleet were pressing desperately for additional 
resources, assimilating the lessons of Jutland to give further emphasis to 
controlling the air, Balfour and the leadership of the RNAS prioritised 
arrangements to begin a bombing campaign against Germany.149 The focus 
of naval aviators on the strategic uses of air power, present in pre-war 
debates, continued during the war, and came at the expense of providing 
tactical support to the fleet. This was particularly pronounced in terms of 
controlling the air, and the Navy's most important units, its capital ships, 
lacked adequate aerial support until the close of the conflict. 
 
Already strained relations with the War Office were aggravated further when 
the RNAS began to make arrangements with the French to establish a 
bombing wing in France.150 As Vaughan-Lee noted, such operations had 
several objectives, including helping RFC operations at the front by forcing 
Germany to devote resources to defensive duties.151 To develop a more 
offensive and strategic posture, the Admiralty seemed willing to put forth any 
justification, including rhetoric that focused on controlling the air. With 
pressure on the RFC reaching new heights as the Somme campaign opened, 
the RNAS bombing force expanded only slowly, as resources were diverted to 
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assist the RFC.152 Relations between the services reached an all-time low as 
Derby's Air Committee collapsed, to be replaced by a new Air Board under 
Lord Curzon. This culminated, toward the end of year, in a feisty exchange, as 
Haig questioned the Admiralty's decision to base its bombers hundreds of 
miles from the French coast without consulting the War Office or the BEF.153 
After devoting so much time and energy to massing resources and developing 
equipment, it was with little fight that RNAS bombing units were transferred to 
the Army in March 1917.154 In many respects, this mirrored the development 
of RNAS armoured cars. Much effort was put into the expansion and 
development of the armoured car capability of the RNAS, yet, after 
negotiations during August 1915, the force was given to the BEF.155 In both 
instances, it is not obvious whether the British Army was interested in either 
pursuit. Whilst the accumulation of additional resources was welcome, both 
affairs seem to provide opportunities for the Army to quash naval 
encroachment into 'military' areas. 
 
Curzon, whose experience with JWAC made him aware of the intransigent 
attitude of the Admiralty, restated his belief that the Admiralty needed to 
appoint a member to the proceedings of the equivalent standing and power of 
Henderson.156 Curzon's pressure on the Admiralty to create a Fifth Sea Lord, 
who would be able to speak with the authority of the Board on air policy and 
air power matters, was discussed by Jellicoe and Balfour in the aftermath of 
                                            
152
 AIR 41/39 – Bombing Offensive Vol I, pp.7 – 8; G. K. Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights, 
passim. 
153
 ADM 1/8449/39A – Letter, Haig to WO, 1 Nov 1916. Forwarded to Admiralty, 10 Nov 1916. 
For the Admiralty response see letter of 13 Nov 1916. 
154
 G. K. Williams, Biplanes and Bombsights, p.6. 
155
 D. Fletcher, War Cars, pp.29 – 31. 
156
 AIR 1/2311/ 221/18 – First Report of the Curzon Air Board, 23 Oct 1916. 
319 
 
Jutland.157 This exchange of letters saw Balfour set out his progress over the 
last year, whilst Jellicoe was quick to defend criticism which suggested that  
 
aircraft were considered by most sailors as little more than 
ingenious toys of no great naval value.158 
 
Both men agreed that an independent air service was not the solution to the 
Navy's needs. Whilst commenting favourably on the creation of a Fifth Sea 
Lord, there was further agreement that it would be difficult to find a suitable 
candidate.159 Grove argues that Curzon was '"got at" unofficially by Sueter 
and other unhappy airmen.'160 For Curzon, the Admiralty's attitude to the 
RNAS was  
 
deficient both in understanding and imagination ... The Air Service 
is, in its eyes, or was until recently, the last and the least efficient of 
the Service of the Navy.161 
 
Above all, it was a convoluted command and administrative structure that 
prevented the RNAS from attaining a higher degree of efficiency and 
providing effective support to the wider Navy.162 As Sueter was to write, '[y]ou 
have no idea what it is like to work under about 40 bosses.'163 As a result of 
these deficiencies, Curzon cited the Battle of Jutland to demonstrate that, due 
to  
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a lack of policy ... in the twentieth month of the war during which 
the Board of the Admiralty had had before them in the Zeppelins of 
the enemy the most striking evidence of the value of aircraft for 
reconnaissance, the British Fleet sent up a single seaplane.164 
 
In effect, senior political figures in Britain were beseeching the Admiralty to 
take the issue of controlling the air more seriously. However, it is telling that, 
in the face of such criticism, Vaughan-Lee, appointed to assert a cautious and 
navalising influence over the RNAS, continued to press for the diversification 
of its activities. Long-range bombing, as advocated by the 'imaginative' 
Churchill, was pushed with equal vigour by the 'conservative' non-airman, 
Vaughan-Lee. When under the control of visionaries such as Sueter, the 
RNAS had failed to provide adequate support to the Grand Fleet, particularly 
in terms of controlling the air against German airships. Such a policy 
continued under the Balfour-Jackson regime. As was the case in the pre-war 
era, the RNAS failed to successfully articulate air power roles to internal and 
external audiences, and, when it did so, in the case of JWAC and the Curzon 
Board, the convoluted administrative structure of the Admiralty seemed to 
demonstrate an intransigent or disinterested attitude toward its own aerial 
arm.  
 
In the post-war battle of memoirs, Sueter continued to strike a blow for the 
RNAS, suggesting that anti-air-minded officers had stifled the development of 
the RNAS.165 Such accusations were enough to persuade Marder of the 
merits of Sueter's case, yet, during 1916, as Trenchard 'marketed' his vision 
for air power with clarity, consistency, and energy, naval airmen failed to do 
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the same.166 At the forefront of this vision was the importance of controlling 
the air. There was no naval equivalent to Trenchard's 'Future Policy in the Air,' 
or to his papers to senior BEF commanders explaining the functions and 
purpose of the RFC.167 The RFC amended its Training Manual, whilst 
providing regular updates in the form of tactical manuals or memos detailing 
Trenchard's vision for the RFC. The RFC also possessed a progressive 
attitude to information and doctrine, and this was reflected in the wide support 
it received amongst the senior command of the BEF. It was more than 
capable of warding off challenges at the political level, and Trenchard's vision 
shaped military air policy until the conclusion of the conflict. Even the 
Admiralty could not resist direct calls for support, and units of the RNAS were 
placed at the disposal of the RFC during the difficult winter of 1916 / 1917. 
These instructions, issued by the Air Board, demonstrate the effectiveness of 
Trenchard's information offensive, and the RNAS's failings in that regard.168 
 
For example, RNAS publications continued to focus on inherently technical 
matters. In July 1916, the Handbook of Aircraft Armament was published. 
Written under the auspices of Vaughan-Lee and the Air Department, the 
manual offered some thoughts on RNAS policy, yet these were articulated via 
the lens of technical innovation and the use of weapons.169 This may have 
appealed to the naval mind, but it did not assuage the fears of those who felt 
the RNAS lacked a coherent policy. Of the little policy contained in the 
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manual, it is telling that the control of the air featured as the most important 
task of the RNAS. This reflected its experience in defending British airspace, 
as well as capturing the thoughts of senior commanders such as Jellicoe and 
Beatty in relation to controlling the air over the fleet.170 
 
Progress and Frustration: Naval Air Power in 1917 
 
Late 1916 saw the fall of the Asquith government and its replacement with 
Lloyd George's coalition. The Admiralty did not escape change, and Jellicoe 
took up the post as First Sea Lord. He was replaced as C-in-C of the Grand 
Fleet by the dynamic Beatty. Both had first-hand experience of fleet-versus-
fleet combat, and both felt that a lack of aerial resources had, at least in part, 
cheated them out of a decisive victory. As a result of Curzon's report, the 
Admiralty was compelled to create the position of Fifth Sea Lord.171 Grove 
hints that Sueter was angling for the post, but it was Godfrey Paine, former 
Commandant of the CFS, who was appointed in early 1917.172 By providing a 
voice on the Board with sole responsibility for air power, coupled with the 
voices of Jellicoe and Beatty, the RNAS now possessed a clearer command 
structure, and powerful backers that were finally in a position to take firm hold 
of naval air policy and to provide the fleet with effective aerial support.173 
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As Jellicoe entered the Admiralty, the resources available to the Grand Fleet 
had grown little since Jutland. As was revealed during a conference in mid-
October 1916, it was still only the carriers Campania and Engadine that were 
available for operations with the fleet.174 Beatty had been in post for little over 
a month when he wrote to the Admiralty in early January 1917, referencing 
the above.175 Since October 1916, an additional carrier, Manxman, was in 
service, but it had 'proved totally unfit for service with the Battle-Cruiser 
Fleet.'176 Beatty pressed the Admiralty again, and his letter of 21 January 
1917 enquired as to the development of RNAS policy.177 Beatty contrasted 
the threat facing his fleet from German air power, a threat highlighted in 
earnest since the summer of 1915, with the 'insufficient' provision of aerial 
resources for the Grand Fleet.178 He continued by criticising the priorities of 
the air service, as 'only a small portion of the R.N.A.S. ... [was] ... employed 
upon naval air service.'179 Beatty took another opportunity to criticise the 
personnel of the RNAS, noting that, in future, their training should be 
 
exclusively naval, and the officers should have a common training 
with other naval officers until the necessary standard of naval 
education is reached.180  
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Beatty's criticism reflected his feelings that the RNAS was considered 
something of an anomaly, operating outside of the Navy proper.181 It was not 
an integrated part of the Royal Navy, and, until such a time as the officers of 
the RNAS considered themselves to be naval officers first and foremost, the 
provision of aerial support to the Grand Fleet would suffer. This provides a 
clear contrast with the position of the RFC and BEF. The former may have 
operated in a new and strange medium, and some aspects of its craft may 
have puzzled the BEF, yet those on the ground knew two facts: the RFC 
played an integral role in land operations; and its pilots would risk all to assist 
their comrades on the ground. The RFC sold its vision of air power to the 
BEF, whilst the RNAS did not achieve the same feat with the Navy. Beatty 
continued by urging the Board that  
 
Every effort should be made ... to develop the use of naval aircraft 
for fleet purposes in every respect possible.182 
 
Roskill, in detailing the Admiralty's reply, noted that it 'must have brought 
somewhat cold comfort to the C-in-C [Beatty],' as the Board highlighted its 
large-scale commitment to strategic bombing.183 It may have been the 
Admiralty's delayed response to Beatty's letter of 21 January that prompted 
the latter to commission his own investigations into the aerial policy of the 
Grand Fleet. On 26 January, Beatty established the Grand Fleet Committee of 
Air Requirements, chaired by Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas.184 This 
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body reported on 5 February 1917, and Beatty forwarded the paper to the 
Admiralty two days later. The report stressed that heavier-than-air-craft were 
required to operate with the fleet, and, as the Committee recorded, it was 
'essential that the Grand Fleet should be in a position to attack Zeppelins.'185 
Controlling the air over the fleet was vital, for it robbed the Germans of any 
advantage to be gained via tactical reconnaissance or gunnery spotting from 
the air. With the German aerial threat eliminated, the RNAS could provide 
tactical reconnaissance and assist with gunnery without fear of opposition. 
The suggestion to convert Furious into a carrier was again stated, and, after 
expressing unease at the potential loss of a fighting ship, Beatty concluded 
that the rapid provision of adequate aerial resources outweighed such 
concerns.186 Importantly, this report accepted the limited abilities of 
seaplanes, and made the suggestion of utilising modern fighting aircraft, 
which could be launched from the decks of carriers.187  
 
The decision to modify Furious was taken in March 1917, and shows 
something of the impact of Jellicoe and Beatty.188 As Jones notes, Paine also 
played his part, and was quick to grasp the importance of providing the fleet 
with sufficient numbers of carriers.189 The air power concerns of the fleet were 
finally being given serious consideration, and the Admiralty was now willing to 
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sacrifice a modern fighting ship to provide the fleet with adequate support. 
The result, a hybrid large light cruiser / aircraft carrier, was not wholly 
satisfactory, but it improved the provision of aerial support available to the 
fleet.190  
 
As Jones records, an additional recommendation of the Evan-Thomas 
Committee was the provision of aircraft in light cruisers, if a viable method 
could be found of launching the aircraft.191 Experiments in 1915 had been 
undertaken, but it was not until 1917 that successful trials were conducted 
from the light cruiser Yarmouth.192 A platform was fitted between the conning 
tower and forecastle turret, which provided a short deck to launch an aircraft. 
The first successful flight was made by a Sopwith Pup in June 1917, with the 
destruction of a Zeppelin achieved in August 1917.193 Whilst a pronounced 
success, the experimental Yarmouth was just such, and Beatty continued to 
press the Admiralty for the allocation of greater resources and a firmer 
commitment with regard to the development of an aerial policy for the 
RNAS.194 In producing notes on his visit to the Grand Fleet, Rear-Admiral 
Halsey, then Third Sea Lord, recorded that Beatty was 'very disturbed on the 
subject of the lack of efficient and fast seaplane carriers.'195 
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The subject was discussed again in August, and Beatty pressed Halsey for 
the formulation of a clear carrier policy, the absence of which left the Grand 
Fleet lacking in aerial support.196 Light cruisers were to be modified to the 
Yarmouth model, which would serve to assist in securing control of the air in 
advance of the fleet.197 In a letter to the Admiralty of 20 August 1917, Beatty 
was to stress that a clear air policy was 'vital ... to our air supremacy at sea 
during the year 1918.'198 In responding with formal naval air policy guidelines, 
Jellicoe and the Admiralty highlighted three roles for air power in conjunction 
with the fleet: the use of torpedo aircraft in an offensive role against enemy 
shipping; reconnaissance, including the observation of gunnery; and finally, to 
facilitate these activities, the use of fighting aircraft to secure control of the air 
over the fleet.199 To discuss the above, a conference was held on board 
Beatty's flagship, the Queen Elizabeth.200 With Jellicoe in attendance, and 
reflecting the experience of both Admirals, the decision was taken to favour 
the use of aircraft on carriers rather than seaplanes. Such thinking also 
captured the successful operational trials with the Yarmouth and its turret 
launching platform.201 It is telling that, when finally presenting Beatty with a 
more tangible aviation policy, the Board was careful to insert caveats, noting 
the difference between laying down policy and carrying it out.202  
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As Beatty attempted to drive naval aviation policy forwards, the wider sphere 
of British air policy was affected by the production of the Smuts reports. The 
Admiralty's reaction to the proposed creation of an independent air service is 
well documented in Roskill.203 As Grove suggests, the Board's opposition to 
an Air Ministry was 'half-hearted at best.'204 Beatty's reaction to the First 
Lord's cautionary introduction to Smuts was instructive, and Beatty again 
seized the opportunity to note the lack of clarity regarding the functions of the 
RNAS.205 As Beatty wrote, 
 
No military operation is complete without the co-operation of 
aircraft. No naval operation should be complete without the co-
operation of aircraft ... [emphasis in original]206 
 
After digesting the Smuts report, Beatty forwarded his reply to the First Lord. 
As Roskill suggests, the Board may have been surprised to discover that 
Beatty approved the conclusions of Smuts.207 In doing so, Beatty again 
stressed the lack of a coherent air policy for the Navy, and contrasted the 
development of military aviation with the  
 
little progress [that] has been made in air work with the Fleet since 
the beginning of the war.208 
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Attempts to persuade Beatty of the Admiralty's case met with little success, 
and he rebuffed a staff paper forwarded to him in mid-August.209 Beatty's 
position was simple, and reflected his dealings with the RNAS since his time 
with the BCF. For Beatty, the RNAS was not a service that emphasised its 
naval duties. It suffered for its lack of policy, and the result was a 
diversification of activity, with only 'a very small proportion of the R.N.A.S.' 
working with the fleet.210 Wise's analysis of the RNAS during 1916 supports 
this claim, and a significant number of RNAS personnel were occupied with 
long-range bombing and home defence duties.211 In other words, Beatty felt 
the matter of naval aviation policy was too important to be trusted to the 
RNAS or the Admiralty.212 Slow progress, and a somewhat evasive attitude 
toward his correspondence, pushed Beatty to side with Smuts and other air 
power reformers such as Henderson. 
 
For the Admiralty, the notion of an independent air service threatened the 
control it was able to exercise over its air power assets. Its great fear, very 
probably inspired by its dealings with centralised air policy bodies, was that air 
power resources would be prioritised to support the BEF.213 For the Navy, 
Beatty's decision was delivered at the most inopportune moment. As Jones 
records, the efforts and pressure applied by Beatty during the summer of 
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1917 were starting to deliver positive results for the fleet.214 Although not as 
far-reaching as Beatty desired, an Admiralty policy statement of September 
1917 placed significant emphasis on controlling the air over the fleet. It noted 
that purpose built carriers would take time to come into service, so short-term 
arrangements would be made to fit flying-off decks on as many cruisers and 
light cruisers as possible.215  
 
That the Admiralty was taking matters seriously is captured in their proposals 
to convert the sister ships of Furious, the large light cruisers Courageous and 
Glorious, into carriers. In addition, Furious was to have further work carried 
out that would result in the extension of her flight deck at the expense of her 
remaining 18-inch gun.216 Whilst such measures were limited, and did not 
seriously impair the capacity of the Grand Fleet, these were the first gentle 
hints that the future capability of a navy may depend more on its capacity to 
launch aircraft than on the number of large calibre guns it could bring to bear. 
Beatty continued to press for greater resources, which were to include fighting 
aircraft, reconnaissance planes, and, as particularly desired by the Admiral, a 
force of torpedo bombers.217 As both Grove and Jones record, by early 1918, 
the Grand Fleet, due largely to the efforts of Beatty, was in a much improved 
position. Most importantly, it was able to project a bubble of aerial control over 
its ships whilst on operations.218 It was at such a moment, when the control of 
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the air over the fleet was being treated as a prime concern, that further 
change and disruption occurred at the Admiralty, driven by the creation of the 
Air Ministry. 
 
Conclusion: Naval Air Power in 1918 – Promise and Regrets 
 
The close of 1917 saw Jellicoe dismissed from his post as First Sea Lord.219 A 
general reading of the second volume of Jellicoe's papers gives the 
impression of a man under significant pressure. By late 1917, Geddes was 
alleging that a certain lack of energy was to be found in the First Sea Lord.220 
However, Beatty's drive for a more efficient aerial service had now gathered 
significant momentum. The RN-RNAS command structure was brought in line 
with the BEF-RFC. A proposal by Beatty to appoint an 'Admiral of the Air' was 
approved by the Board in January 1918.221 The Navy's prized Grand Fleet 
Battle Orders, by this stage known as Grand Fleet Battle Instructions, were 
also updated in January 1918 to include a fully integrated section on the use 
of aircraft.222 March 1918 saw the Naval Staff create a specialised Air Division 
that drew upon the wealth of experience possessed by RNAS and Air 
Department personnel.223 'By the end of the war,' as Grove records, 'the 
Grand Fleet was awash with aircraft.'224 These aircraft were found not only in 
specialised carriers, but on every type of ship. All battle cruisers were 
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equipped with aircraft, as were fifteen battleships and 22 light cruisers. These 
included the latest generation of fighting aircraft, and, as Jones notes, the 
navalised Sopwith Camel, launched from the turret platforms of a range of RN 
ships, could best most aircraft utilised by the Germans, and was a grave 
threat to German airships.225  
 
There were more aircraft with the Grand Fleet in 1918 than there 
were with the Home Fleet at the outbreak of the Second World 
War.226  
 
In fact, criticism of the RNAS for not providing the Grand Fleet with effective 
support until 1918 must be tempered by noting that, in line with Till's analysis, 
the development of shipborne aviation was a significant technological 
challenge.227 For example, aircraft had to be fitted with folding wings (for 
stowage on ships), which degraded their performance.228 Such challenges, 
coupled with a naturally diffuse set of operational requirements, made the 
conduct of core naval air operations extremely difficult.229 Moreover, on some 
levels, their colleagues in the RFC had a more straightforward task, given that 
they did not have to operate over water, and that their operational objectives 
and tasks were more limited and extremely clear. However, what the RNAS 
required was a greater degree of centralised policy and doctrine to help 
ensure that the service's great abilities – conceptualising air power roles and 
developing advanced aeronautical technologies – were used to provide a 
genuinely useful service to the RN and Britain's wider war effort. As 
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Abbetiello's study indicates, the RNAS's role in defeating the U-boat threat, a 
campaign directed with great care and attention, demonstrates that air power 
could be used effectively in a specialised naval context.230 Conversely, the 
example of the RNAS's role in the development and use of armoured cars 
demonstrates the logical extreme of an unchecked and unguided fascination 
with technology. Gordon's study of naval command indicates the negative 
implications of stifling initiative, which, amongst other things, resulted in 
missed opportunities at the Battle of Jutland.231 However, whilst the Grand 
Fleet needed less of the 'book,' the Naval Air Service required a great deal 
more. Had a clear vision for the application of naval air power existed, it would 
have provided naval aviators with a focal point (or focal points) toward which 
to direct their conceptual and technological efforts. 
 
Beatty's incessant drive for improved aviation resources, a process started 
under the tenure of Jellicoe, saw the concept of the control of the air given 
primacy by the end of the conflict. Such progress was tempered by the 
knowledge that the Admiralty no longer retained control of its air power 
assets. Beatty, who had shown support for an independent Air Ministry, came 
to regret the ease with which the Navy lost its indigenous aerial resources. 
Assuming the post of First Sea Lord during the early post-war period, a time 
of stringent economies, Beatty found his service embroiled in a bitter struggle 
with the RAF to regain control of naval air assets.232 Naval aviation continued 
to assume even greater importance during the interwar years, and both Beatty 
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and Jellicoe had been correct to emphasise the importance of controlling the 
air over the fleet. As noted, using air power in a naval context presented many 
obstacles; obstacles that the creative and innovative abilities of the RNAS 
were ideally suited to overcome. However, by choosing to pursue an 
unnecessarily diverse range of activities, the RNAS earned a poor reputation 
with the wider Navy, captured in the Admiralty's post-war assessments.233 
Churchill, Sueter, and Sampson, and their command of the RNAS during 
1914 – 1915, played a significant part in this process. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has sought to explore the conceptual origins of the control of the 
air in Britain, setting this examination in the context of the creation of a 
national 'corps of aviators' and the use of air power during the First World 
War. Some historians assert that ideas relating to the control of the air 
developed only during the course of the 1914 – 1918 conflict, yet the evidence 
seems to suggest that, in keeping with, and possibly going beyond, Buckley’s 
contention, those concerned with the development of air power theory and 
doctrine in the pre-war period understood, in more than 'vague' terms, that 
there would be a need to control airspace.1 In moving into the First World 
War, it is difficult to disagree with the conclusions of Morrow, who argues that 
the '[c]ontrol of the airspace over the battlefield became essential to victory in 
World War I.'2 As McFarland and Newton suggest, an important aspect of air 
power doctrine that emerged from the First World War was the need to fight 
for the control of the air.3 This was reflected in the composition of air forces at 
the conclusion of the conflict. For example, by August 1918, the RAF devoted 
some 55 percent of its strength to aircraft that could fight for the control of the 
air.4  
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In the case of military aviation, the unique operating characteristics of aircraft 
drew initial theorising in the direction of reconnaissance. However, this was 
accompanied by an innate understanding of the need to control the air in 
order to facilitate friendly aerial reconnaissance, and to prevent the 
reconnaissance activities of enemy air services. As Sir John French's 
thoughts on the subject suggest, this may have stemmed from an 
understanding of air power shaped via the prism of cavalry operations or via 
the reconnaissance / intelligence expertise of early air power specialists such 
as David Henderson.5  
 
The links between pre-1911 theorising on the control of the air and the 
creation of the RFC offers evidence of a robust cause and effect chain, in 
which the work of J. E. Capper and other military aviators – Brooke-Popham 
and Burke, to name but two more – was translated almost verbatim into early 
air power policy. Having their fingers on the pulse of contemporary thought 
relating to the control of the air, Henderson and Sykes played an important 
role in this process. In the case of Sykes, his Staff College experience saw 
him become fluent in the language of the British Army and inculcated in the 
dominant paradigm of the organisation: the importance of offensive action to 
seize moral superiority. Moreover, Sykes was taught that the route to decisive 
victory lay in the defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the field; an approach 
that could be attributed to a subjective interpretation of the theories of 
Mahanian and Clausewitz. As such, when he came to craft air power doctrine 
between 1912 and 1914, it embraced these core ideals, and the control of the 
                                            
5
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337 
 
air would be established via an aggressive and offensive approach designed 
to achieve moral superiority. Importantly, such doctrine utilised a taxonomy 
and philosophy that was reassuringly familiar to the British Army; a result, at 
least partially, of the high concentration of Staff College graduates that were 
to be found in the senior command team of the RFC. In many respects, the 
focus on the moral battlefield, as highlighted by Travers, tends to obscure the 
genuinely progressive fashion in which both the British Army and its aerial 
component conceptualised their understanding of warfare.6 In line with the 
wider doctrinal culture of the British Army, and the precedent set by FSR, the 
RFC was able to articulate a concept for the control of the air that was clear 
and concise, but open to evolution. At its core, the RFC's vision for the control 
of the air remained remarkably consistent throughout the First World War, but, 
as with the wider BEF, served as a basis upon which to build tactical and 
operational practices.  
 
Of course, by embracing the organisational culture in which they found 
themselves, and by crafting doctrine in line with such factors, military aviators 
did much to win sponsorship from senior figures within the British Army. Of 
these figures, both French and Haig played a pivotal role. To take but one 
example, Sir John French emerges from this study with his reputation 
enhanced. He was a noted supporter and sponsor of military aviation in the 
pre-war period, and he made effective use of his air power resources during 
his time as Commander of the BEF. He took a keen interest in the activities of 
the RFC, and established an excellent relationship between GHQ and the 
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Corps. Moreover, he laid the groundwork for the rapid and large-scale 
expansion of the RFC; a decision influenced by the need to control the air 
over the battlefield. At the lower level, it was the energy and drive of Sykes 
that created the stable base – including the doctrinal foundations – upon 
which future commanders of the RFC could build. In this regard, Haig and 
Trenchard owe a significant debt to their predecessors in the BEF and RFC.  
 
Trenchard was not an original air power theorist, and, whilst a hugely 
significant figure in the RFC, he built upon pre-war air power doctrine that had 
been crafted by Sykes in the first instance. However, much like Haig, 
Trenchard possessed the strength of character and conviction to see his 
command through a conflict unprecedented in scale and complexity. This 
included his forceful and consistent articulation of a specific concept for the 
control of the air. Trenchard was particularly successful at working the 
'interfaces' that existed between the RFC and the other organisations with 
which it came into contact, and, as a result, he, with the support of Haig, 
retained close control of the policies and practices of the RFC. Again, the 
nature of this approach to command, seemingly inflexible and dogmatic, 
conceals some of the more positive aspects of Trenchard's command. For 
example, he possessed a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the 
nature of coalition warfare, which allowed him to establish a close relationship 
with his French allies. This relationship demonstrates a rare example of the 
process of intellectual 'binding.'7 
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In terms of the development of military air power, 1916 continues to be 
highlighted as the turning point, particularly in terms of the control of the air, 
as fighting aircraft became available in significant numbers for the first time; a 
conclusion supported by this thesis. However, this thesis also demonstrates 
that 1915 was a highly significant year for the development of ideas relating to 
the control of the air. Not only did this include the RFC’s first efforts to codify 
their early experiences of the conflict, building on the foundations of the pre-
war doctrine and serving as a basis for the first amendments to the Training 
Manual, it also included the issuing of orders for offensive patrols; the first 
operational orders in which the RFC were instructed to fight for control of the 
air. Moreover, 1915 saw the rise of effective fighting aircraft, in the guise of 
the Fokker Monoplane, and it was also the year in which Trenchard began to 
assert a tangible influence over the direction of the RFC: first, in terms of his 
operations in conjunction with the Neuve Chapelle offensive; and second, 
when taking command of the RFC in France. In serving to reinforce the 
importance of the coalition context, 1915 also saw the first meetings between 
Trenchard and du Peuty, in which the collective Anglo-French air power 
experience to that point was distilled. This did not see the development of a 
new air power doctrine, but served to confirm the theories and ideas that were 
framed in the pre-war era and captured in the first edition of the Training 
Manual. The importance of 1915 was recognised by 'Billy' Mitchell, who wrote 
in 1921 that, 
 
during the year 1915 pursuit aviation, or that which goes out and 
fights the enemy aviation for control of the air, was established 
definitely as a special branch of Aviation. From that time on, 
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primary consideration was given to the fighting of airplane against 
airplane as a principle as a prelude to any other air work.8 
 
In a more general sense, these conclusions seem to resonate with the work of 
Krause, who, in a recent study of the Second Battle of Artois, emphasises the 
importance of 1915 in terms of the development of doctrine in the French 
Army.9 Thus, it is hoped that the historiographical 'black hole' that is 1915 will 
continue to receive scholarly attention.10 
 
If a single word sums up the First World War, it is attrition. The fluid and semi-
fluid campaigns, which served as book-ends to the conflict, were vital. Yet, in 
many respects, it was during the grinding middle years of 1916 – 1917 that 
the outcome of the conflict was shaped. Given the sheer scale of the First 
World War, which saw the accumulation of significant air power assets on 
both sides, the control of the air was never established in a decisive fashion. 
The air could never be controlled in the same fashion as the ground, 
demonstrating the impermanence of air power. The vast and intricate system 
of trenches that characterised the Western Front had no equal in the air. To 
control the air during the First World War required unceasing effort. Control 
had to be re-established daily, and the process was intrinsically attritional in 
nature. As Hallion notes with reference to air superiority, 'like democracy itself, 
[it] must be constantly secured and renewed.'11 This is supported by 
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McFarland and Newton, who, with reference to the Second World War, note 
the attritional qualities of establishing control of the air.12 
 
The nature of the RFC's rhetoric, forceful and indefatigable, suggests a static 
quality to the manner in which military aviators approached the concept of the 
control of the air. This has done much to shape subsequent analysis of the 
RFC's concept of the control of the air in a negative fashion. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, a clear focus on the offensive provided the RFC with drive and 
momentum, crucial factors in attaining control of the air, particularly when 
undertaking air power operations of the unprecedented scale and complexity 
as those experienced on the Western Front. Moreover, operational and 
tactical nuances were a feature, and, by the conclusion of the conflict, the 
RFC embraced a multifaceted, multilayered approach to securing the control 
of the air that recognised the impermanence of air power and the importance 
of concentration. The RFC's conceptualisation of the control of the air, 
influenced by the organisational ideals stressed by the BEF, and conducted at 
a tempo that was in keeping with the wider policy of the British Army, resulted 
in the defeat of the German Air Service and assisted directly in the defeat of 
the Germany Army in the field. However, this is not to suggest that criticism of 
the RFC is unfounded. Even the overwhelmingly positive official histories are 
compelled to note that, at times, the RFC's approach to the control of the air 
was 'not always sufficiently characterized by an alert imagination,' reflecting 
the 'routine' nature of offensive patrols.13 However, the RFC was an integral 
aspect of the BEF, and, in keeping with the increasingly nuanced 
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historiographical treatment of the British Army during this period, its reputation 
as a blunt instrument deserves revision. 
 
The naval conception of the control of the air reflected a sense of strategic 
vulnerability that served to focus attention on the need to protect the Navy’s 
capital ships and onshore facilities against air attack. The challenges facing 
naval aviators, in terms of the conceptualisation of air power roles, were 
pronounced. These challenges were two-fold: first, the technological and 
operational factors that made operating air power at and over the sea 
extremely difficult; and second, the varied operational roles of the Navy and 
the accompanying demand placed upon naval aviators to support such 
operations.14 In many respects, these challenges explain, at least to an 
extent, one of the themes highlighted during the course of this thesis: that 
naval aviators had an experimental focus, whilst naval air policy was shaped 
by a certain 'lack of definition.'15 Moreover, they go some way to explaining 
the disconnect between pre-war theorising and the policy that came to shape 
the creation of the RFC. 
 
However, the wider organisational context in which naval aviators came to 
think about the control of the air also had a significant effect on the 
development of naval air power. Unlike military aviators, whose 
conceptualisation of the control of the air was affected by the Army's wider 
focus on moral superiority, naval aviators possessed an inherently technical 
understanding of warfare, affected by the 'material ethic' that was prevalent in 
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the Navy of the Fisher Era.16 This ethic, driven home by the technical 
education provided to the recruits of the service, resulted in a Naval Air 
Service that emphasised the material and technical aspects of its profession. 
Given that air power was still in its earliest developmental stage, a focus on 
experimentation was, in many respects, appropriate, as the application of air 
power in a naval context was severely limited by technological considerations. 
Only by developing its technological capabilities could the Naval Air Service 
hope to provide genuine support to the RN. However, in order to persuade the 
wider Navy of the value of aviation, naval aviators, like their colleagues in the 
military, needed to undertake a proactive campaign to earn such support. As 
part of this process, it was vital that doctrinal material was created that, at the 
very least, demonstrated to the wider RN that the RNAS was thinking carefully 
about the application of air power – particularly the control of the air, so as to 
assuage the feelings of vulnerability present in the Navy – and that it was 
attempting to integrate aviation into the wider organisational and operational 
context of the RN. Of course, in criticising the RNAS for not producing 
doctrine, it must be noted that, in keeping with Gordon's analysis of naval 
doctrine during this period, which highlights the focus on experience rather 
than theory, RN personnel lacked experience of producing doctrine in the vein 
of FSR.17 Moreover, the complex operational roles and technological 
challenges facing naval aviators, coupled with a lack of experience, meant 
that attempting to codify ideas relating to the development of naval air power 
was extremely difficult.  
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Nonetheless, without the guidance provided by FSR-like doctrine, naval 
aviators were free to pursue the dominant material ethic to its logical 
extremes. The result was the development of some of the most advanced 
aviation technology and techniques seen during the course of the First World 
War, laying the foundations for the deployment of strategic air power during 
the Second World War.18 Moreover, when directed with sufficient care and 
attention, naval air power made a significant contribution to the outcome of 
the conflict, particularly in its role in the defeat of the German submarine 
campaign.19 However, this does not disguise the fact that, throughout the 
course of the war, naval aviators were viewed as something of an anomaly in 
the RN, and senior operational commanders, particularly Jellicoe and Beatty, 
spent the majority of the conflict harassing the Admiralty, stressing their 
displeasure with the RNAS, particularly in relation to the control of the air. As 
Till records, attempts to navalise the RNAS were done in such a manner as to 
alienate naval aviators and reinforce the poor relations that existed between 
the RN and its aerial component.20 The development of naval air power 
doctrine, however simple, could have helped smooth the process of 
integrating aviation into a naval context. The importance of military aviation 
doctrine was not in its detail, but came via its deployment of language that 
helped the Army understand the functions, limitations, and potential of air 
power. As such, the RFC's doctrinal model was worthy of emulation by their 
naval colleagues. Sueter's argument, that senior figures within the Navy did 
not understand the abilities of air power, a further attempt to condemn the 
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Admiralty, serves to highlight the very obvious doctrinal gap present in the 
RNAS.21 
 
Of course, the RNAS's fascination with technology was aggravated by 
Churchill's role. Sponsorship of air power within the Navy owed much to 
Churchill during his tenure as First Lord. He supported the creation of a 
national 'corps of aviators,' and proved to be a powerful overlord for the 
Admiralty's Air Department. However, Churchill's drive for action, and his 
enthusiasm for diversification and distraction, seemed to synthesise with the 
wider organisational ethos of the Navy. As such, the RNAS was a natural 
outlet for Churchill, and, supported by Sueter, the First Lord directed his 
passion for air power in a manner that spread discord and disharmony. For 
example, an interest in strategic bombing, praised in the literature, served to 
siphon air power resources away from more conventional naval air power 
tasks.22 The roles of Churchill, Sueter, and the Air Department in the 
development of armoured forces within the RNAS further illustrate this 
phenomenon. Again, whilst the use of air power to support the operations of 
the Grand Fleet was a significant challenge, operationally and technologically, 
the efforts and resources directed toward the development of armoured cars 
or the development of a strategic bombing force could have been channelled 
more productively. As Grove notes, one result of the troubled relations 
between the RN and RNAS was that naval opposition to the creation of an 
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independent air service was half-hearted; leaving the Admiralty to spend the 
post-war years fighting to regain control of any meaningful air power assets.23 
 
Military aviators may have needed to be less dogmatic in their approach to the 
conceptualisation of the control of the air, but, in many respects, their naval 
colleagues possibly needed to be a little less expansive. It is interesting to 
reflect upon the notion that, had the original concept for a combined Army-
Navy RFC been successful, it would have presented Britain with the 
opportunity to develop air power by fusing together the strengths of Britain's 
two defence departments: the Navy's understanding of technology and 
sophisticated operational techniques; and the Army's ability to craft flexible 
and persuasive doctrine. However, in reality, the control of the air was 
conceptualised within the differing organisational contexts of the British Army 
and Royal Navy. The differences that existed between the services, and the 
manner in which they pursued their understanding of the control of the air, do 
not detract from the importance that was attached to controlling airspace 
during the First World War. The importance of the control of the air has left a 
lasting legacy, and, as Hallion concludes, such considerations remain 'the 
most enduring requirement of air power forces [emphasis in original].24 
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